Also known as: sons-in-law · son in law · sons in law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
The husband of one's daughter.
A person related only by marriage to the child of a designated individual. When a donor describes beneficiaries as the children of a designated person, the primary meaning of the class gift excludes such persons unless the instrument or circumstances indicate a contrary intent.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
The husband of one's daughter.
During the capital sentencing of a defendant who murdered an elderly couple, the prosecution offered a victim impact statement. The statement included statements from the victims' son-in-law describing the emotional effect on the family. The trial court admitted the evidence over objection. The jury considered the son-in-law's account when imposing sentence.
A person related only by marriage to the child of a designated individual. When a donor describes beneficiaries as the children of a designated person, the primary meaning of the class gift excludes such persons unless the instrument or circumstances indicate a contrary intent.
Samantha Stone executed a will leaving resort partnership interests to her children. Her daughter Elena lived with Devon, who staffed the front desk and hosted guests. Samantha repeatedly called Devon her son-in-law in company materials. After Samantha died before any marriage, the personal representative denied Devon a share. The court construed the class to include Devon because the will language and surrounding circumstances showed intent to treat him as within the described group.
In June 1987 Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted by a Tennessee jury on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. The victims were twenty-eight-year-old Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter Lacie, and her three-year-old son Nicholas, who survived multiple stab wounds. The three lived in an apartment in Millington, Tennessee, across the hall from Payne’s girlfriend Bobbie Thomas. On Saturday June 27 1987 Payne entered the Christophers’ apartment after visiting Thomas’s apartment several times, became violent when Charisse resisted his advances, and inflicted forty-two stab wounds on Charisse, multiple stab wounds on Lacie, and repeated stab wounds plus a slashed throat on Nicholas. Police arrived to find blood covering the walls and floor, Charisse and Lacie dead on the kitchen floor, and Nicholas still breathing. Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic of the home of a former girlfriend. It was later determined that the blood stains matched the victims' blood types. A search of his pockets revealed a packet containing cocaine residue, a hypodermic syringe wrapper, and a cap from a hypodermic syringe. His overnight bag, containing a bloody white shirt, was found in a nearby dumpster. At trial Payne testified that another man had committed the crimes and that he had only tried to help the victims, but the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. During the sentencing phase the State called Charisse’s mother Mary Zvolanek, who testified that Nicholas cried for his mother and sister, asked whether she missed Lacie, and did not understand why they did not come home. A probation officer’s victim impact statement describing the family’s devastation and Nicholas’s nightmares was also introduced. In closing argument the prosecutor emphasized that Nicholas had witnessed the murders, would grow up knowing what happened, and would want to know what justice had been done, while also noting that Lacie would never attend a high school prom and that Charisse would never again sing a lullaby to her son. Payne presented four mitigation witnesses: his parents, who stated he had no prior criminal record and no history of alcohol or drug abuse; Bobbie Thomas, who described him as caring and good with her children; and a clinical psychologist, who testified that Payne was mentally handicapped, polite, and neither psychotic nor schizophrenic. The jury sentenced Payne to death on each murder count and to thirty years in prison for the assault. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider its prior holdings concerning the admission of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings.
View caseThe Lubells purchased a painting and contacted the artist and his son-in-law to verify its history before buying. Years later the museum claimed the work had been stolen. The son-in-law's statements formed part of the record on whether laches barred the museum's claim.
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation operates the Guggenheim Museum in New York City. In 1937 Solomon R. Guggenheim donated to the museum a Chagall gouache known alternately as Menageries or Le Marchand de Bestiaux, painted in 1912. The museum tracked the painting on accession cards that recorded loans to other institutions, its return after a 1961-1962 loan, its presence in the museum on April 2, 1965, and an undated later notation that the painting could not be located. The museum first realized the gouache was missing sometime in the late 1960s and confirmed the fact during a complete inventory conducted from 1969 to 1970. It did not notify the New York City Police, the FBI, Interpol, other museums, galleries, or artistic organizations of the theft. In 1974 the museum's Board of Trustees voted to deaccession the gouache and remove it from the museum's records. In May 1967 Rachel Lubell and her husband purchased the gouache from the Robert Elkon Gallery for $17,000. The invoice and receipt listed the prior owner as a named individual who later proved to be the museum mailroom employee suspected of the theft. The Lubells displayed the painting in their home for more than twenty years and exhibited it at the Elkon Gallery in 1967 and again in 1981. In 1985 a private art dealer brought a transparency of the painting to Sotheby's for an auction estimate. A person at Sotheby's who had previously worked at the Guggenheim recognized the gouache and notified the museum, which traced the painting to Mrs. Lubell. On January 9, 1986 the museum's director wrote demanding return of the gouache. Mrs. Lubell refused, and the museum commenced this action for recovery of the painting or $200,000 on September 28, 1987. In her answer Mrs. Lubell raised affirmative defenses including the statute of limitations. The trial court granted her cross motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified by dismissing the statute of limitations defense and denying the cross motion for summary judgment, then granted leave and certified the question whether its order was properly made.
View caseIn a prosecution under the National Firearms Act, witnesses described how the defendant and his son-in-law jointly possessed a weapon. The government introduced the relationship to show the defendant exercised dominion over the firearm. The court considered the son-in-law's testimony when evaluating the possession element.
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith. In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications. From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants. A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation. The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
View caseA French judgment creditor sought enforcement of a decree against a New York resident. The debtor's son-in-law had participated in the underlying French proceedings. The court examined whether the son-in-law's involvement satisfied due process requirements for recognition of the foreign judgment.
In 1873 and 1874, Henry Hilton and William Libbey, citizens of New York doing business as Hilton & Libbey, shipped large quantities of merchandise from New York to John F. Guyot and his partners, citizens of France doing business as Charles Graux & Co. in Paris. The agreement provided that the defendants would sell the goods on commission in France, collect the proceeds, and remit them to the plaintiffs. Disputes arose over the quality and quantity of the goods shipped and over the accounts between the parties. The plaintiffs demanded an accounting and payment of the balance allegedly due. On April 5, 1883, the plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the defendants for $197,300 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York following a jury trial. The defendants appeared by attorneys and raised defenses including breach of contract by the plaintiffs. The New York judgment was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. A writ of error from the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On December 18, 1883, the plaintiffs commenced the present action at law in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York to recover the amount of the New York judgment plus interest. They alleged that the judgment remained in full force and unpaid. The defendants were residents and citizens of France, and had a place of business in the city of Paris. The plaintiffs were residents and citizens of the State of New York, and had a place of business in the city of New York. They answered by denying the allegations. They asserted that the New York court lacked jurisdiction over them or the subject matter. They further asserted that the proceedings did not conform to French law or natural justice, that the judgment was procured by fraud and false swearing, that French courts would not enforce similar United States judgments, and that the amount exceeded what was justly due. The defendants also interposed a counterclaim for $100,000 in damages arising from the plaintiffs' alleged breach of the 1873-1874 shipping contract by delivering inferior goods in insufficient quantities. The plaintiffs replied that the matters in the counterclaim had already been adjudicated in the New York action. The circuit court tried the case before a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of the New York judgment together with interest. The defendants' motion for a new trial was denied. The defendants then sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.
View caseA corporate insider disclosed material information to his son-in-law, who then traded on the basis of that information. The SEC brought an enforcement action alleging the son-in-law was a tippee. The court analyzed whether the son-in-law knew or should have known the information was disclosed in breach of duty.
Robert Chestman, a stockbroker, first met Keith Loeb in 1982 when Loeb sought to consolidate his and his wife Susan's holdings in Waldbaum, Inc., a publicly traded supermarket chain. During their initial meeting, Loeb told Chestman that his wife was a granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum, a member of the board of directors of Waldbaum and the wife of its founder. Julia Waldbaum also was the mother of Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum. Over the next four years, Chestman executed several transactions involving Waldbaum stock for Keith Loeb, and Loeb sent Chestman a copy of his wife's birth certificate indicating that his wife's mother was Shirley Waldbaum Witkin. On November 21, 1986, Ira Waldbaum agreed to sell Waldbaum to the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company at $50 per share for a controlling block. Two days later, Ira told three of his children, his sister Shirley Witkin, and his nephew Robert Karin about the pending sale, admonishing them to keep the news confidential and offering to tender their shares along with his to simplify the process. Despite the caution, Shirley told her daughter Susan Loeb on November 24 that Ira was selling the company, warning her not to tell anyone except her husband Keith because disclosure could ruin the sale. The next day, Susan told Keith about the pending tender offer and cautioned him similarly. On November 26, Keith telephoned Chestman at 8:59 a.m., leaving a message to call ASAP, and later between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m. told him he had some definite, accurate information that Waldbaum was about to be sold at a substantially higher price. Chestman responded that he could not advise Loeb what to do in a situation like this. Later that morning, Chestman purchased 3,000 shares for his own account at $24.65 per share and between 11:31 a.m. and 12:35 p.m. purchased an additional 8,000 shares for his clients' discretionary accounts, including 1,000 shares for the Loeb account. After another call, Chestman indicated Waldbaum was a buy, and Loeb ordered 1,000 shares. The tender offer was publicly announced after the market closed, and the stock rose to $49 the next business day. In December 1986 and April 1987, after learning of investigations, Loeb contacted Chestman, who claimed the purchases were based on research. Loeb agreed to cooperate with the government, disgorging profits and paying a fine. A grand jury indicted Chestman on July 20, 1988, on thirty-one counts. The district court denied Chestman's motion to dismiss the indictment. After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts. A panel of the Second Circuit reversed the convictions, but the court granted rehearing en banc on the Rule 14e-3(a), Rule 10b-5, and mail fraud convictions.
View case3 common questions
No. The primary meaning of a class gift to the children of a designated person excludes sons-in-law and other persons related only by affinity unless the instrument or circumstances show a contrary intent.
Language in the instrument that expressly includes sons-in-law who perform a described role, combined with repeated references by the donor treating the individual as a son-in-law, can demonstrate the required contrary intent.
No. Continued legal marriage plus post-separation conduct by the testator requesting and publicly praising the son-in-law's business participation can establish intent to include him despite the separation.
…son Raymond and their daughter-in-law Kathryn by refusing to cook for or even attend their wedding. They then rebuffed their son-in-law Freeman Burkholder’s request for help refinancing jointly owned property in 2010, even though they knew Freeman might lose his home if they refused. When Barbara Miller’s daughters-in-law…