source of income

George Eldridge was first awarded Social Security disability benefits in June 1968. In March 1972 he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. He completed and returned the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying recent medical sources. The state agency obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After reviewing those reports and other information in his file, the agency sent Eldridge a letter stating that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination and advised Eldridge that he could request time to submit additional information. Eldridge responded in writing, disputing one characterization of his medical condition and asserting that the agency already possessed sufficient evidence of his disability. The state agency then made a final determination that Eldridge had ceased to be disabled in May 1972; the Social Security Administration accepted that determination. In July 1972 Eldridge received written notice that his benefits would terminate after that month and that he could seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months. Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's termination procedures and sought an injunction barring termination of benefits until a pretermination evidentiary hearing was provided, together with immediate reinstatement of benefits. The District Court held that the existing procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ordered the Secretary to provide Eldridge a pretermination hearing, and directed reinstatement of benefits pending that hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.

Bela Lugosi and Universal Pictures Company, Inc. concluded an agreement in September 1930 for the production of the film Dracula in which Lugosi contracted to and did play the title role. Paragraph 4 of the agreement granted Universal the right to photograph and exploit in connection with the photoplay any and all of the artist's acts, poses, plays and appearances and the right to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness in connection with the advertising and exploitation of the photoplay. Lugosi died in 1956. Commencing in 1960 Universal entered into many licensing agreements which authorized licensees to use the Count Dracula character in connection with the sale of commercial merchandising products such as plastic model kits, masks, posters, candy dispensers, T-shirts, and beverage stirring rods. The licensing agreements specifically authorized the use of Lugosi's likeness from his portrayal of Count Dracula in Dracula and Dracula's Daughter. On February 3, 1966, Lugosi's widow Hope Linninger Lugosi and surviving son Bela George Lugosi filed a complaint against Universal alleging that they were the heirs of Bela Lugosi and that Universal had appropriated property which they had inherited from Lugosi and which was not embraced in paragraph 4 of the 1930 agreement. The complaint sought damages, an accounting of profits, and an injunction against further licensing without their consent. The trial court found that the essence of the thing licensed by Universal was the uniquely individual likeness and appearance of Bela Lugosi in the role of Count Dracula. It concluded that Lugosi had a protectable property right in his facial characteristics and individual manner of likeness and appearance as Count Dracula that descended to his heirs under his will. The court awarded plaintiffs $53,023.23 in damages for licensing agreements executed after February 3, 1964, and issued a permanent injunction against further unauthorized licensing of Lugosi's likeness as Count Dracula on commercial products. Universal appealed. The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing, conducted an independent study of the issues, and adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, as its own after appropriate deletions and additions.

In 1948 the Puerto Rico Legislature enacted the Games of Chance Act authorizing roulette, dice, card games, bingo, and slot machines in licensed gambling rooms while directing that no gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer its facilities to the public of Puerto Rico. The Act's Statement of Motives explained that its purpose was to contribute to tourism development by authorizing games customary in major tourist centers. It also aimed to open an additional source of income for the Treasurer, with strict government surveillance to protect tourists. Regulations issued in 1957 and amended in 1971 by the Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, which assumed regulatory authority in 1970, prohibited concessionaires from advertising gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico while authorizing advertising outside Puerto Rico subject to prior editing and approval. In 1975 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, a Texas partnership operating as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, obtained a franchise to operate a gambling casino. In 1978 the Tourism Company twice fined Posadas for violating the advertising restrictions; Posadas protested in letters, and in February 1979 the Tourism Company issued a memorandum interpreting the ban to include the word casino on matchbooks, lighters, envelopes, napkins, brochures, menus, and numerous other items accessible to the public in Puerto Rico. The Tourism Company assessed additional fines and ordered Posadas to pay a total of $1,500 by March 18, 1979, or face nonrenewal of its franchise; Posadas paid under protest. In July 1981 Posadas was fined another $500 for further violations and again paid under protest to avoid nonrenewal. In February 1982 Posadas filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, against the Tourism Company seeking a declaration that the Act and regulations violated its commercial speech rights under the First Amendment as well as equal protection and due process guarantees, both facially and as applied. After trial the Superior Court found the Tourism Company's past applications capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable, issued narrowing constructions limiting the ban to advertising contracted for consideration to attract residents to bet, and allowed advertising in magazines for distribution primarily to tourists, in the New York Times, on cable television from outside Puerto Rico, and hotel trade names that do not use the word casino alone even if incidentally reaching residents. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed Posadas's appeal on the ground that it did not present a substantial constitutional question. Posadas appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The record shows that Posadas raised its federal constitutional claims in a February 24, 1982 letter to the Tourism Company, in its complaint, and in its bill of appeal to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's dismissal constituted a decision on the merits in favor of validity under Puerto Rico law.

In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.