special need

On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, New Jersey, discovered two girls, including fourteen-year-old freshman T. L. O., smoking in a school lavatory in violation of school rules. The teacher escorted the girls to the principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. When questioned, T. L. O. denied smoking in the lavatory. Choplick then took T. L. O. into his private office and demanded to inspect her purse. Upon opening the purse, Choplick found a pack of cigarettes and a package of cigarette rolling papers. Suspecting drug involvement, he conducted a thorough search of the purse, uncovering a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of one-dollar bills, an index card listing students who owed T. L. O. money, and two letters implicating her in marijuana dealing. Choplick turned this evidence over to the police, and T. L. O. was charged with delinquency based on possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. T. L. O. moved to suppress the evidence from her purse, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion but remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the search unreasonable and ordering suppression of the evidence. The State of New Jersey petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted. The Court initially focused on the exclusionary rule but later ordered reargument on the Fourth Amendment standard applicable to school searches.

The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.

The petitioner, Michael M., was seventeen and one-half years old when, on June 3, 1978, he and two friends approached Sharon, a sixteen-and-one-half-year-old female, and her sister at a bus stop. Petitioner and Sharon had been drinking. They moved away from the others and began to kiss. After petitioner struck Sharon in the face for rebuffing his initial advances, she submitted to sexual intercourse with him. In July 1978, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Sonoma County. The complaint alleged that petitioner had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under the age of eighteen in violation of section 261.5 of the California Penal Code. Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on the ground that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court denied the motion, and petitioner was convicted after a jury trial. The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's request for relief.

In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City. Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket. The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases. Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time. Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies. Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address. The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York. At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags. Place refused consent to a search of his luggage. The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them. The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag. Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside. Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.