Also known as:special need · special education · disability accommodations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in trusts law
An equitable device that permits a court to modify trust terms and create a supplemental trust for a disabled beneficiary. The modification preserves eligibility for public benefits while fulfilling the settlor's intent when unanticipated circumstances arise.
2
in criminal procedure
Sense 1
1
in trusts law
An equitable device that permits a court to modify trust terms and create a supplemental trust for a disabled beneficiary. The modification preserves eligibility for public benefits while fulfilling the settlor's intent when unanticipated circumstances arise.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
Examples
Sense 2
2
in criminal procedure
Governmental interests beyond the normal need for law enforcement that render the warrant and probable-cause requirements impracticable. Such interests justify suspicionless searches when the program serves a special need closely tied to public safety or institutional administration.
Governmental interests beyond the normal need for law enforcement that render the warrant and probable-cause requirements impracticable. Such interests justify suspicionless searches when the program serves a special need closely tied to public safety or institutional administration.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
1
Trust Modification for Disabled Beneficiary
Sylvia Santos created a trust leaving an outright remainder to her grandson Solomon Silver, who later suffered a severe disability. Because unanticipated medical costs would exhaust the assets and disqualify him from public benefits, the court authorized conversion of the remainder into a special needs trust. The modification preserved the corpus for Solomon while advancing Sylvia's original purpose of providing for his welfare.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When may a court modify a trust to create a special needs trust?
A court may authorize the conversion when circumstances not anticipated by the settlor would otherwise defeat the trust's purpose. The modification must further the settlor's intent by preserving assets for the disabled beneficiary while maintaining eligibility for public benefits.
Supporting sources
5
Religious School District Challenge
A village created a separate public school district to serve children with disabilities whose religious practices precluded attendance at nearby secular schools. Parents challenged the arrangement as an establishment of religion. The court examined whether the district's formation served a special need of delivering education to those children without advancing religion.
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet512 U.S. 687 (1994)
The village of Kiryas Joel in Orange County, New York, is a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism. In 1977, the Satmars incorporated the village within the town of Monroe after negotiating boundaries that included only the 320 acres they owned and inhabited. The village has a population of about 8,500 today, and its residents interpret the Torah strictly, segregate the sexes outside the home, speak Yiddish primarily, and educate their children in private religious schools, with boys attending the United Talmudic Academy and girls attending Bais Rochel.
These private schools do not offer special education services to handicapped children, who are entitled to such services under state and federal law. Starting in 1984, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District provided these services at an annex to Bais Rochel, but ended the arrangement in 1985 following the Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball. Handicapped children from Kiryas Joel were then sent to public schools outside the village, leading most parents to withdraw them due to the children's panic, fear, and trauma from the cultural differences, with some seeking administrative review.
By 1989, only one child from Kiryas Joel attended Monroe-Woodbury's public schools. In response, the New York Legislature passed Chapter 748 of the 1989 New York Laws, which constituted the village of Kiryas Joel as a separate school district with all the powers of a union free school district. The new district currently operates only a special education program for handicapped children, serving just over 40 full-time students, while other village children remain in parochial schools.
Several months before the new district began operations, the New York State School Boards Association and respondents Grumet and Hawk brought an action challenging Chapter 748 under the National and State Constitutions. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs on summary judgment, finding the statute unconstitutional under the Lemon test. A divided Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal Establishment Clause question while reserving the state constitutional issue. The Supreme Court stayed the mandate and granted certiorari.
A public high school denied a student Bible club the same access to facilities granted other student groups. Club members argued the denial violated equal-access rules. The court assessed whether the school's policy reflected a special need to avoid religious endorsement or merely treated all groups equally.
Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens496 U.S. 226, 249-253 (1990)
Westside High School is a public secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska, that enrolls about 1,450 students in grades 10 through 12 and is part of the Westside Community Schools district. Under school board policy, students may join on a voluntary basis any of approximately 30 recognized student clubs and groups that meet after school hours on school premises. Students wishing to form a club must obtain permission from the principal and submit a statement of the club's purpose and objectives, and each club must have a faculty sponsor.
In January 1985, respondent Bridget Mergens met with Principal Dr. Findley and requested permission to form a Christian club at the school. The proposed club would have the same privileges and meet on the same terms as other student groups, except that it would not have a faculty sponsor. The club's purposes included providing a forum for students to discuss and share their beliefs in God, study the Bible, live in accordance with their religious beliefs, and pray together, with membership open to all students regardless of religious affiliation.
Findley denied the request, as did Associate Superintendent Tangdell and Superintendent Hanson. The school officials explained that school policy required all student clubs to have a faculty sponsor and that a religious club would violate the Establishment Clause. In March 1985, Mergens appealed the denial to the board of education, which voted to uphold the denial.
Respondents, through their parents as next friends, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the denial violated the Equal Access Act. The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court entered judgment for petitioners, holding that the Act did not apply because Westside did not maintain a limited open forum as all existing student clubs were curriculum-related.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the District Court erred in concluding that all existing student clubs at Westside were curriculum-related and that many clubs, including the chess club, were noncurriculum-related. The Court of Appeals concluded that Westside maintained a limited open forum under the Act and that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
State Disability Employment Suit
A state employee with a disability sued under the ADA after being denied accommodation. The state asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court considered whether Congress had identified a special need for national legislation addressing patterns of unconstitutional state discrimination against disabled workers.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role.
Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
After-School Religious Program
A school district barred a religious club from meeting in classrooms after hours while permitting secular clubs. Club leaders claimed viewpoint discrimination. The court evaluated whether the exclusion served a special need to maintain separation of church and state or instead infringed equal access.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School533 U.S. 98 (2001)
In 1992, the Milford Central School District enacted a community use policy based on New York Education Law section 414. The policy authorized after-school use of its facilities for instruction in any branch of education, learning, or the arts. It also permitted social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainment events pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided such uses were nonexclusive and open to the general public. The policy expressly prohibited use for religious purposes.
Stephen and Darleen Fournier, district residents and sponsors of the Good News Club, submitted a request in September 1996 to hold the Club's weekly after-school meetings in the school cafeteria. The Good News Club is a private Christian organization for children ages six to twelve sponsored by the Child Evangelism Fellowship. The proposed meetings included taking attendance with Bible verse recitation for treats, singing songs, playing games involving Bible verses, relating a Bible story and explaining its application to the children's lives, closing with prayer, and distributing treats and verses for memorization.
Milford's interim superintendent denied the request in October 1996 after reviewing materials describing the activities. He concluded that they constituted the equivalent of religious instruction and worship rather than a discussion of secular subjects from a religious perspective. In March 1997 the Good News Club, along with the Fourniers and their daughter Andrea, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The suit alleged that the denial violated the Club's free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in April 1997 that allowed the Club to hold meetings in a high school resource room and middle school special education room from April 1997 until June 1998. In August 1998 the district court vacated the preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment to Milford, finding the Club's subject matter decidedly religious in nature. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in 2000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2000.
Athlete Drug Testing Program
A school district required student athletes to submit to random drug tests without individualized suspicion. A student challenged the policy as an unreasonable search. The court upheld the program because the district's interest in deterring drug use among athletes presented a special need beyond ordinary law enforcement.
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton515 U.S. 646 (1995)
Vernonia School District 47J operates one high school and three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon.
In the mid-to-late 1980s, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use among students. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's. A Vernonia high school football coach had observed suspicious steroid use by his athletes. The District's wrestling coach had witnessed students sharing steroids and had discovered steroids in a school locker. The District had a drug testing policy for student athletes since before 1989, but it had not been enforced for lack of funding.
In the fall of 1989, the District received funds for a drug testing program and approved a Student Athlete Drug Policy. The Policy authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in the District's athletic programs. The Policy applied to all students participating in interscholastic athletics. It required students and their parents to sign a consent form agreeing to drug testing as a condition of participation. Athletes were tested at the beginning of the season and then randomly throughout the season.
The testing procedure required students to provide a urine sample in a bathroom stall with an adult monitor of the same sex standing outside the stall. The monitor listened for normal sounds of urination. The samples were sent to a laboratory for analysis. A positive test result led to a meeting with the student and his or her parents. The student was given the option of participating in a drug assistance program or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the season and the next season.
In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, who was then a seventh grader, signed up to play football at the District's middle school. He was denied participation because he and his parents refused to sign the consent form for drug testing. They then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court dismissed the suit on the merits. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What governmental interests qualify as special needs under the Fourth Amendment?
Interests such as ensuring public safety on railroads, maintaining discipline in schools, and regulating closely supervised industries qualify when they extend beyond routine law enforcement. The program must be divorced from the general interest in crime control and must limit officer discretion.
Does a special needs justification permit drug testing of pregnant women?
No. When the primary purpose of the testing is to gather evidence for law enforcement or to coerce treatment, the special needs exception does not apply and ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements govern.
Supporting sources
May police set up checkpoints whose main purpose is drug interdiction?
No. Roadblocks must serve special needs related to roadway safety or border control. A primary purpose of detecting ordinary criminal wrongdoing requires individualized suspicion.
Supporting sources
Can a state require drug tests of political candidates under a special needs theory?
No. Symbolic or generalized interests are insufficient. The government must demonstrate a concrete special need tied to the position that outweighs the privacy intrusion.
Supporting sources
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
…(G). In addition, despite the Court of Appeals' suggestion to the contrary, see 2 F. 3d 1342, 1365 (CA5 1993), there is no special need here for a clear indication of Congress' rationale. The statute does not interfere with the exercise of state or local authority. Cf., e. g. , Dellmuth v. Muth , 491 U. S. 223, 227-228…