Also known as: specific and articulable facts · articulable facts · reasonable suspicion facts
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Concrete observations and circumstances that together supply an objective basis for an officer to form reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or danger to safety. The facts must be particularized to the person or place at issue rather than general or speculative. They permit limited intrusions such as an investigative stop or protective sweep when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.
Officers arrested Stella Shapiro inside her apartment for assault. As they led her out, they heard movement in a back bedroom and saw a shadow cross the hallway. They conducted a quick sweep of that room and found an armed associate hiding behind the door. The sweep was upheld because the officers' observations supplied specific articulable facts indicating another person who posed a danger.
Officer Lopez saw Sydney Santos standing in a known drug area after dark. Santos repeatedly glanced over his shoulder, adjusted a bulge at his waist, and approached passing cars for brief exchanges. Lopez stopped and frisked Santos. The stop was valid because the officer's direct observations of Santos's conduct supplied specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion of drug activity and possible armament.
Agents watched Scott Summers arrive on a short flight carrying only a small bag. Summers appeared nervous, avoided eye contact with officers, and repeatedly checked the same bag. Agents detained the bag briefly for a dog sniff. The detention rested on specific articulable facts that the bag likely contained contraband.
Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City. Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket. The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases. Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time. Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies. Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address. The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York. At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags. Place refused consent to a search of his luggage. The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them. The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag. Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside. Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
View caseAn officer stopped Simone Sanders on a public sidewalk after she refused to identify herself during a lawful investigation of recent burglaries. Sanders had been seen near the crime scene at odd hours and matched a description. The stop was permissible because the officer possessed specific articulable facts tying Sanders to the ongoing inquiry.
The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop. The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had any identification on him, which the officer understood as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The man refused the officer's requests for identification eleven times. He began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse, the officer placed him under arrest. The man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.280. Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court convicted Hiibel and fined him $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed the conviction. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction in a divided opinion. Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was denied without opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA trooper stopped Steven Silva for a traffic violation late at night. Silva appeared agitated and kept reaching toward the passenger seat where a jacket lay. The trooper conducted a limited search of the passenger compartment. The search was justified by specific articulable facts indicating a weapon might be accessible.
In a rural area of Michigan one evening shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the vehicle was left open. Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another repeated request, Long, who Howell thought appeared to be under the influence of something, turned from the officers and began walking toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which revealed no weapons. Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action was to search for other weapons. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana. The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in this case. The marihuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court below to be the fruit of the illegal search of the interior, and was also suppressed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the authority of a police officer to protect himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle.
View caseOfficers took Sylvia Santos to the station for questioning after observing her near a robbery scene with blood on her sleeve and inconsistent statements. They lacked probable cause for arrest. The prolonged detention was unlawful because the officers had only specific articulable facts supporting a brief Terry stop, not the higher showing needed for custodial seizure.
On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a pizza parlor in Rochester, New York, was killed during an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, Detective Anthony Fantigrossi learned of a possible lead implicating petitioner Irving Dunaway in the crime from an informant. Fantigrossi questioned a jail inmate but obtained no information sufficient to secure a warrant for Dunaway's arrest. Nevertheless, on the morning of August 11, 1971, three detectives located Dunaway at a neighbor's house and took him into custody. Although not told he was under arrest, Dunaway would have been physically restrained if he had attempted to leave. He was driven to police headquarters in a police car and placed in an interrogation room. After receiving Miranda warnings, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the crime. He was then formally arrested and charged with murder and attempted robbery. Dunaway's motion to suppress the statements and sketches was denied at trial, and he was convicted by a jury. Following initial affirmances and a remand from the Supreme Court in light of Brown v. Illinois, the County Court found the detention illegal and granted the suppression motion, but the Appellate Division reversed that determination. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway's application for leave to appeal.
View caseSpecific articulable facts are concrete observations that, taken together under the totality of the circumstances, give an officer an objective basis to suspect criminal activity or danger. A hunch lacks any particularized facts and rests only on intuition or speculation.
Supporting sources
Yes. Conduct that is individually consistent with lawful activity can still support reasonable suspicion when the combination of facts, viewed through an officer's training and experience, points to possible criminality.
Supporting sources
When officers possess a reasonable belief, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that an area beyond the arrestee's immediate control harbors a person posing danger, they may conduct a limited sweep of spaces where a person could hide.
Supporting sources
No. Reliable information from a known eyewitness or informant can supply the required facts, provided the information is sufficiently particularized and credible under the totality of the circumstances.
Supporting sources