Also known as:speculations · speculative · speculator · speculators
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A conjectural prediction or assumption that lacks reasonable certainty or factual grounding. Courts and statutes bar recovery or adjudication when a claim rests on such uncertainty because it prevents reliable application of legal standards.
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Common Examples
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Uncertain Regulation Enforcement
Serena Soto challenges a new zoning rule that might restrict her planned development. The agency has issued no enforcement guidance and has never applied the rule to similar projects. The court dismisses the suit because any future harm remains uncertain and the government has not shown it will apply the rule as asserted.
Bar Admission Residency Rule
Steven Silva, an out-of-state lawyer, seeks admission in State A. The state board denies his application on the ground that nonresidents might fail to keep current on local rules. The court holds the denial invalid because the assumption about out-of-state conduct is conjectural and supplies no substantial justification under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Samuel Soto and his partner seek to marry but fear possible future state interference with their marriage. They sue to enjoin hypothetical enforcement actions that have not occurred. The court finds the claimed injury too conjectural to create an actual controversy.
Obergefell v. Hodges576 U.S. 644 (2015)
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes.
The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee.
Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
Samantha Stone offers an expert who attributes birth defects to a drug based on untested theories. The court excludes the testimony because it rests on unsupported conjecture rather than scientific methods and therefore cannot assist the trier of fact.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982.
Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects.
The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries.
Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
Sophia Singh and her husband allege injury from possible future contraceptive failure and resulting pregnancy. They seek declaratory relief against the statute. The court holds the asserted harm too conjectural to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement.
Roe v. Wade410 U.S. 113 (1973)
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code.
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions.
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
Summit Bank alleges that competitors engaged in parallel pricing that could reflect an agreement. The complaint offers no facts showing actual collusion beyond ordinary market behavior. The court dismisses the claim because the alleged conspiracy is conceivable but rests on conjecture rather than plausible facts.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities.
William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc.
The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories.
This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
When does a claim fail for resting on speculation in ripeness analysis?
A claim fails when enforcement of the challenged regulation remains uncertain and the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the government is likely to apply the rule in the asserted harmful manner. Courts refuse to adjudicate where any retroactive enforcement is only a conjectural possibility.
Why are speculative assumptions insufficient to justify bar admission residency requirements?
Speculative assumptions about out-of-state lawyers failing to keep abreast of local rules or perform pro bono work cannot supply the substantial justification needed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Such conjectural concerns do not permit exclusion of nonresidents from the common calling of law practice.
How does the certainty requirement affect recovery of lost profits in contract damages?
A party cannot recover damages for loss beyond the amount that evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty. Lost profits from a new or highly fluctuating business are often too conjectural to meet this standard unless supported by expert testimony or comparable data.
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
…future possibility of contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, and possible future unpreparedness for parenthood is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129. (c) The physician-appellant Hallford, who is under two pending prosecutions for violating the Texas abortion laws, has standing to…