spending power

The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System. In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees. Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA. On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.

The University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia, maintains a Student Activities Fund financed by a mandatory $14 per semester fee assessed to each full-time student. The fund supports extracurricular student activities related to the University's educational purpose through payments to third-party contractors for approved groups that qualify as Contracted Independent Organizations. To obtain CIO status, a student group must be composed primarily of University students, file its constitution, pledge nondiscrimination, and agree to a disclaimer stating that it is independent of the University. CIO publications are eligible for printing-cost reimbursement if their content is related to the University's educational purpose, but the Guidelines expressly exclude funding for any activity that primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. In 1990, University of Virginia undergraduates formed Wide Awake Productions as a CIO and began publishing Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The first issue contained articles on racism, crisis pregnancy, prayer, C. S. Lewis, and reviews of religious music, each marked by a cross; subsequent issues addressed homosexuality, missionary work, eating disorders, and Christian theology, with advertisements from churches and Christian bookstores. In 1991, Wide Awake Productions requested $5,862 from the Student Activities Fund to cover printing costs for one issue. The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the request on the ground that the publication constituted a religious activity under the Guidelines. Wide Awake Productions appealed the denial through the Student Council and the Student Activities Committee, which upheld the decision. The group and three of its student editors and members then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the refusal to pay printing costs violated their rights under the First Amendment Speech, Press, and Free Exercise Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for the University. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Low-level radioactive waste is generated by many sources and must be isolated from humans for long periods. Historically the Nation relied on a small number of disposal sites. Concern about declining disposal capacity prompted Congress initially to adopt the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. That statute declared a federal policy that each State is responsible for providing for disposal of waste generated within its borders. It authorized States to enter into regional compacts. That Act contained no penalties for nonparticipation. By 1985, with few operational sites and a looming crisis, Congress enacted the 1985 Amendments. The amendments were based largely on proposals of the National Governors' Association. They embodied a compromise among sited and unsited States. The 1985 Act directs each State to be responsible for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the State. It authorizes States to enter into interstate compacts. For an additional seven years the three existing disposal sites were required to make capacity available for waste from any source. Sited States were permitted to exact graduated surcharges on out-of-region waste. After the transition period approved compacts could exclude out-of-region waste. The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with its requirements. The monetary incentives authorize sited States to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste. They require the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion of the surcharge into an escrow account. They permit distribution of that fund to States that achieve the statutory milestones. The access incentives authorize sited States and regional compacts to increase and ultimately deny access to their sites to waste from States that do not meet federal deadlines. The take title provision requires a State that fails to provide for disposal by January 1, 1996. Upon request of the generator or owner of waste, the State must take title to and possession of the waste and be liable for damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to take possession. The petitioners, New York and two of its counties, sought a declaratory judgment that the three incentives are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.