spouse’s consent

In 1972, New York Education Law section 6811(8) prohibited the sale or distribution of any contraceptive to a minor under sixteen. It limited distribution to persons sixteen and older to licensed pharmacists. It also banned the advertisement or display of contraceptives. Population Planning Associates, Inc., a North Carolina corporation engaged in mail-order sales of nonprescription contraceptives, regularly advertised its products in New York periodicals. It filled orders from New York residents without age restrictions. On December 1, 1971, New York officials notified PPA that one of its advertisements violated the statute and requested future compliance. A February 23, 1973 letter threatened referral to the Attorney General for legal action if PPA failed to comply with the provisions prohibiting sales to minors and sales by nonpharmacists. On September 4, 1974, state inspectors served PPA with a report recording its advertising of male contraceptives and advising it to cease sales in violation of state law. PPA, along with Population Services International, Reverend James B. Hagen, three physicians, and an adult New York resident, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. A three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New York declared § 6811 (8) unconstitutional in its entirety under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution insofar as it applies to nonprescription contraceptives, and enjoined its enforcement as so applied. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute. Appellants included New York Governor Hugh Carey and other state officials responsible for enforcing the Education Law. After proceedings, a three-judge district court in 1975 declared section 6811(8) unconstitutional in its entirety under the First and Fourteenth Amendments insofar as it applied to nonprescription contraceptives and enjoined its enforcement. The district court opinion is reported at 398 F. Supp. 321 (1975). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1976.

In 1975, the Connecticut Welfare Department regulation restricted Medicaid payments for first trimester abortions to those certified as medically necessary by the attending physician, a term that included psychiatric necessity, and required prior authorization from the Department of Social Services along with a written request from the patient or, for a minor, a parent or guardian. Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services of Connecticut, enforced the limitation through this system of certificates and approvals. Appellees Poe, a sixteen-year-old high school junior who had obtained an abortion for which the hospital later sought reimbursement of $244, and Roe, an unwed mother of three unable to obtain the required certificate, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of themselves and a certified class of indigent women unable to secure Medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation. The complaint challenged the regulation as inconsistent with Title XIX of the Social Security Act and as violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees. The district court initially held that Title XIX required state funding of nontherapeutic abortions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed that statutory ruling, holding that the Act permitted but did not require such funding, and remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues. On remand a three-judge district court was convened; it invalidated the regulation and enjoined enforcement of the medical necessity certificate requirement as well as the related prior written request and authorization procedures. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the constitutional validity of the Connecticut regulation.

In 1974, Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband Harold Feenstra charging him with molesting their minor daughter. While incarcerated on that charge, Harold retained attorney Karl Kirchberg to represent him and signed a $3,000 promissory note for legal services. To secure the note, Harold executed a mortgage on the couple's jointly owned home without informing his wife or obtaining her consent, relying on former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code. After Joan dropped the charge, Harold obtained a legal separation and moved out of state. Joan first learned of the mortgage in 1976 when Kirchberg threatened foreclosure unless she paid the outstanding amount on the note. Upon her refusal to pay, Kirchberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the home. Kirchberg filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act for nondisclosures regarding the mortgage. In her answer, Joan asserted counterclaims including one challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme allowing her husband to execute the mortgage unilaterally. The State of Louisiana and its Governor were joined as third-party defendants on the constitutional counterclaim. The District Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional counterclaim. While Joan's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was pending, the Louisiana Legislature revised its community property laws to grant spouses equal control over the disposition of such property, with the changes effective January 1, 1980. The Court of Appeals held that Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause but limited its decision to prospective application. Only Kirchberg appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

Isaac Boggs began working for South Central Bell in 1949 and remained employed until his retirement in 1985. He was married to Dorothy Boggs from 1949 until her death in 1979, and the couple had three sons. After Dorothy died, Isaac married Sandra Boggs in 1980, and they remained married until Isaac's death in 1989. Upon retirement, Isaac received a lump-sum distribution of $151,628.94 from the Bell System Savings Plan, which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account worth $180,778.05 at his death. He also received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership Plan and a monthly annuity of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retirement Program. Dorothy's will bequeathed one-third of her estate to Isaac outright along with a lifetime usufruct in the remaining two-thirds, with naked ownership passing to the sons. A 1980 Louisiana judgment of possession ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest in Isaac's Savings Plan account valued at $21,194.29. After Isaac's death, Sandra began receiving a survivor annuity and other benefits. The sons filed suit in Louisiana state court claiming a portion of the retirement benefits under Dorothy's will and Louisiana community property law. Sandra then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting that ERISA preempts the sons' claims. The District Court granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.