Also known as: strict in theory but fatal in fact · strict in theory and fatal in fact · strict scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A characterization of the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review. Under that standard a law or classification is upheld only when it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The phrase acknowledges that the standard is rigorous yet does not invariably invalidate the challenged action.
Santiago Sanchez and fellow practitioners of Santeria seek to perform animal sacrifices central to their faith. The city enacts an ordinance that prohibits only the precise method they use while allowing other animal killings. The court applies strict scrutiny and finds the ordinance fails because it is not necessary to any compelling interest.
Sterling Manufacturing, owned by a minority contractor, bids on a city project that reserves a percentage of contracts for minority firms. The city offers only general assertions of past societal discrimination rather than evidence of specific local discrimination. The court applies strict scrutiny and invalidates the program for lack of narrow tailoring.
Sabrina Shah runs a religious foster agency that declines to certify same-sex couples on faith-based grounds. The city allows case-by-case exemptions for secular reasons but refuses one here. The court applies strict scrutiny because the policy is not generally applicable and finds the city cannot satisfy the standard.
Sebastian Santos applies to register a trademark containing a term some view as derogatory. The Patent Office rejects the application under a statutory bar on disparaging marks. The court applies strict scrutiny to the viewpoint-based restriction and holds the bar unconstitutional.
Samantha Stone and her husband seek contraceptives from a licensed physician. State law criminalizes their use and distribution even within marriage. The court applies strict scrutiny to the burden on the fundamental right of marital privacy and invalidates the statute.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseStonehaven Properties proposes a multifamily development in a predominantly white suburb. Village officials deny the permit after hearing community opposition tied to racial demographics. The court examines whether discriminatory purpose exists and applies strict scrutiny to any racial classification that emerges.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseNo. The phrase describes the demanding nature of strict scrutiny while recognizing that the standard permits some classifications or regulations to survive when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. The Court has explicitly stated that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact.
Strict scrutiny applies when a law is not neutral or generally applicable because it targets religious conduct or permits individualized exemptions that allow officials to favor secular interests. Once triggered the government must prove the law is necessary to a compelling interest.
The program must rest on a strong basis in evidence of specific past discrimination in the relevant industry and jurisdiction. General assertions of societal discrimination are insufficient and the remedy must be narrowly tailored to the identified discrimination.
Such restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny because trademarks are private speech. A statutory bar that denies registration based on disapproval of the speaker's viewpoint fails the standard and is unconstitutional.
…law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin , 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its…