Also known as: strict in theory, fatal in fact · strict scrutiny · fatal in fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A description of the strict scrutiny standard of review that demands a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring. In practice the standard permits some race-conscious measures when supported by a strong evidentiary basis of specific past discrimination.
The City of Hialeah enacts an ordinance that prohibits only the Santeria method of animal sacrifice while allowing other forms of animal killing. Animal-rights groups sue, claiming the ordinance targets religious practice. A court applies strict scrutiny because the law is not neutral or generally applicable. The ordinance fails because the city cannot show it is necessary to achieve a compelling interest in public health.
The City of Richmond adopts a plan requiring prime contractors to subcontract thirty percent of city construction work to minority-owned businesses. Non-minority contractors challenge the plan. A court subjects the racial classification to strict scrutiny and requires a strong evidentiary basis of identified past discrimination in the local construction industry. The plan is invalidated because general societal discrimination is insufficient to justify the set-aside.
A city policy bars foster agencies from rejecting same-sex couples but permits officials to grant individualized exemptions for other reasons. A religious agency refuses to certify same-sex couples and sues. The court finds the policy is not generally applicable because of the exemption mechanism and therefore applies strict scrutiny. The policy fails because the city cannot demonstrate narrow tailoring to a compelling interest.
A federal statute prohibits registration of trademarks that may disparage persons or institutions. A band seeks to register a mark that some find offensive and sues when registration is denied. The court treats the bar as a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech and applies strict scrutiny. The statute is struck down because the government may not suppress speech based on disapproval of the speaker's viewpoint.
A village denies a rezoning request for low-income housing after hearing comments reflecting racial animus from some residents. The developer sues, alleging the denial was motivated by race. The court examines circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose under the Arlington Heights factors and applies strict scrutiny once purpose is established. The denial is invalidated because the village cannot show the action was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseA state statute criminalizes the use of contraceptives by married couples and authorizes police to search marital bedrooms for evidence. A married couple and their physician challenge the law. The court recognizes a fundamental right to marital privacy and applies strict scrutiny to the prohibition. The statute is invalidated because the state cannot demonstrate that the ban is necessary to serve a compelling interest.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseThe phrase describes the demanding theoretical standard of strict scrutiny while recognizing that some race-conscious programs survive when supported by particularized evidence of past discrimination and narrow tailoring. The casebook places the discussion in the affirmative action and public contracting section.
No. Although the standard is strict in theory, programs that rest on a strong evidentiary record of identified past discrimination and are narrowly tailored can survive. The phrase captures this practical outcome in affirmative action litigation.
The government must produce a strong basis in evidence of specific past discrimination in the relevant industry or jurisdiction. General societal discrimination is insufficient to justify a set-aside or preference.
A law or policy that permits officials to grant individualized exemptions is not generally applicable. The existence of such discretion triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
…law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin , 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its…