Also known as: strict scrutiny · strict scrutiny review · compelling interest test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review that requires the government to demonstrate that a challenged law is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest.
Skylar Sullivan, a practitioner of Santeria, faces prosecution under a city ordinance that bans a specific animal slaughter method used only in her faith's rituals. The ordinance was enacted after public outcry targeted the religious practice. Because the law is not neutral or generally applicable, the court applies the strict scrutiny test and invalidates the ordinance when the city cannot prove it is necessary to any compelling interest.
Seth Shapiro, a nonminority contractor, challenges a city program that reserves a percentage of public contracts exclusively for minority-owned firms. The program rests only on general assertions of past societal discrimination without evidence of specific local discrimination in the construction industry. The court applies the strict scrutiny test and strikes down the set-aside because the city lacks a strong basis in evidence of identified past discrimination.
Scott Summers operates a religious foster agency that declines to certify same-sex couples on faith-based grounds. A city policy bars agencies from rejecting same-sex applicants yet permits case-by-case exemptions for secular reasons. The court applies the strict scrutiny test because the policy is not generally applicable and invalidates enforcement against the agency when the city cannot satisfy the test.
Sebastian Santos seeks to register a trademark containing a term the Patent Office deems disparaging. The statute bars registration of marks that express disfavored viewpoints. The court applies the strict scrutiny test because the bar is a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech and invalidates the denial when the government cannot show the restriction is necessary to a compelling interest.
Sydney Santos and her spouse seek a prescription for contraception at a state university health center that limits services to married students. The restriction directly burdens the fundamental right to make intimate marital decisions. The court applies the strict scrutiny test and invalidates the limitation when the state cannot demonstrate that the marital-status rule is necessary to a compelling interest.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseStephen Shaw, a developer, challenges a village zoning denial that blocks construction of integrated housing. Evidence shows the decision was motivated in part by racial considerations rather than neutral land-use factors. The court applies the strict scrutiny test because the classification rests on race and invalidates the denial when the village cannot prove the action is necessary to a compelling interest.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseA law triggers the strict scrutiny test when it employs a suspect classification such as race or burdens a fundamental right. The government then bears the burden of proving the classification is necessary to a compelling interest and narrowly tailored. General assertions of societal discrimination do not suffice.
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The law must be neutral and generally applicable. If it permits individualized exemptions or targets religious conduct, strict scrutiny applies. The government must then show the law is necessary to a compelling interest and narrowly tailored.
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Yes. Content-based or viewpoint-based restrictions on protected speech are subject to strict scrutiny. The government must prove the restriction is necessary to a compelling interest and narrowly tailored. Otherwise the restriction is invalid.
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…law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin , 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its…