Also known as: substantial hardships
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A severe economic or personal burden that would result from enforcing a term or rule.
Simone Sanders signed a premarital agreement waiving spousal support, believing she could always earn a modest income. Years later she developed a disabling autoimmune disease that left her unable to work while her spouse's business income surged. In the divorce proceeding the court refuses to enforce the waiver because applying it now would leave Simone without any means of support.
Samuel Soto's spouse executed a mortgage on community property under an old statute that gave husbands sole control. A later court decision invalidating the statute on equal-protection grounds would upset countless existing mortgages if applied retroactively. The court limits the ruling to prospective effect only, citing the substantial hardship that full retroactivity would impose on property rights throughout the state.
In 1974, Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband Harold Feenstra charging him with molesting their minor daughter. While incarcerated on that charge, Harold retained attorney Karl Kirchberg to represent him and signed a $3,000 promissory note for legal services. To secure the note, Harold executed a mortgage on the couple's jointly owned home without informing his wife or obtaining her consent, relying on former Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code. After Joan dropped the charge, Harold obtained a legal separation and moved out of state. Joan first learned of the mortgage in 1976 when Kirchberg threatened foreclosure unless she paid the outstanding amount on the note. Upon her refusal to pay, Kirchberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the home. Kirchberg filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act for nondisclosures regarding the mortgage. In her answer, Joan asserted counterclaims including one challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme allowing her husband to execute the mortgage unilaterally. The State of Louisiana and its Governor were joined as third-party defendants on the constitutional counterclaim. The District Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional counterclaim. While Joan's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was pending, the Louisiana Legislature revised its community property laws to grant spouses equal control over the disposition of such property, with the changes effective January 1, 1980. The Court of Appeals held that Article 2404 violated the Equal Protection Clause but limited its decision to prospective application. Only Kirchberg appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseSierra Santos, a female civil-service applicant, challenges a state statute that awards absolute hiring preference to veterans, nearly all of whom are male. She argues the preference imposes substantial hardship on women seeking public employment. The court evaluates whether the preference can survive equal-protection scrutiny given the breadth of the burden it places on a historically disadvantaged class.
Helen B. Feeney, a Massachusetts resident, entered the workforce in 1948 and held a variety of jobs in the private sector for the next fourteen years. She first entered the state civil service system in 1963 after competing successfully for a Senior Clerk Stenographer position in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. She worked there for four years and was promoted in 1967 to Federal Funds and Personnel Coordinator in the same agency. The agency and her job were eliminated in 1975. During her twelve years of public employment, Feeney took and passed multiple open competitive civil service examinations. She received the second-highest score on a 1971 examination for a position with the Board of Dental Examiners and the third-highest score on a 1973 test for an Administrative Assistant position with a mental health center. Despite these strong performances, the veterans' preference placed her behind multiple male veterans on the eligible lists, some with lower scores, and she was never certified for appointment. The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 23, applies to all positions in the state's classified civil service, which constitute approximately 60 percent of the public jobs in the state. It requires that disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans who achieve passing scores be ranked above all other candidates on eligible lists. The preference originated in 1884 as a tie-breaking measure for Civil War veterans and blossomed into an absolute preference in 1895 when the state exempted veterans from all merit selection requirements. In 1919 the formula was modified to provide a priority in eligibility rather than an absolute preference in hiring, and it has since been extended to cover veterans of later wars. At the time this litigation began, over 98 percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male. During the decade between 1963 and 1973, 47,005 new permanent appointments were made in the classified official service. Of the women appointed, 1.8 percent were veterans, while 54 percent of the men had veteran status. Feeney sued the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the absolute preference unconstitutionally denied women equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court ruled in her favor in 1976. After this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, the District Court reaffirmed its conclusion in 1978, and the Attorney General appealed directly to this Court.
View caseA court may refuse enforcement when a material, unforeseen change after signing leaves one spouse unable to meet basic needs. Severe illness that destroys earning capacity, combined with an unexpected windfall to the other spouse, satisfies the standard. The inquiry focuses on the agreement taken as a whole and is decided as a matter of law.
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No. The exception balances the client's need for the particular lawyer against the cost and timing of replacement and the potential harm to the opposing party. Courts weigh these factors rather than requiring a showing that substitute counsel is impossible to obtain.
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When compliance would force a party to incur irreversible costs or risk forfeiture of property, the hardship element of ripeness is satisfied. Courts permit review before actual enforcement if the burden of waiting is concrete and nonrecoverable.
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