substantially limits

The New York City Transit Authority operates the subway system and certain bus routes in New York City. It employs about 47,000 persons, many of whom hold safety-sensitive positions such as subway motormen, conductors, bus operators, crane operators, and high-voltage equipment handlers. In 1971 the Authority adopted a rule forbidding the employment of persons who use narcotics. Methadone, a synthetic narcotic, is covered by this rule. Rule 11(b) forbids employees from using or possessing narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs of the amphetamine group, or barbiturate derivatives except with written permission of the medical director. Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of Rule 11(b). No written permission has ever been given by TA’s medical director for the employment of a person using methadone. Methadone maintenance programs in New York City treat approximately 40,000 persons, of whom about 26,000 participate in five major public or semipublic programs and 14,000 participate in roughly 25 private programs. State regulations require that patients appear at clinics at least three times per week for observed ingestion of methadone, counseling, and testing for illicit drug or alcohol use, with the frequency of visits decreasing only after satisfactory progress over multiple months. The District Court found that the strong majority of patients who remain in such programs for at least one year abstain from illicit drugs. Yet 20 to 30 percent of those with more than twelve months' tenure continue to experience drug or alcohol problems. Four named plaintiffs—Beazer, Reyes, Frasier, and Diaz—filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who had been or would be denied employment by the Authority because of participation in a methadone maintenance program. Two plaintiffs had been discharged while receiving methadone and two had been rejected for employment while participating in or shortly after completing such programs. The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs introduced evidence concerning the success rates of methadone programs, the employability of participants, and the fact that between 62 and 65 percent of methadone-maintained persons in New York City are black or Hispanic. After a lengthy trial, the District Court held that the Authority's blanket exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied to persons who had participated in methadone maintenance for at least one year and had been free from illicit drug use for at least one year. The court later issued a supplemental opinion finding a Title VII violation based on two statistics and awarded attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the constitutional holding and the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 without reaching the statutory claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, noting both the lower courts' departure from the usual sequence of addressing statutory claims before constitutional claims and concern that the merits had been decided erroneously. After certiorari was granted, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to address discrimination against handicapped individuals, a category that arguably includes certain former drug abusers and current methadone users.

In August 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The suit challenged the Alabama Department of Public Safety's longstanding practice of excluding blacks from employment as state troopers. The United States joined as a party plaintiff. Phillip Paradise, Jr., intervened on behalf of a class of black plaintiffs. After a hearing the District Court found that in the thirty-seven-year history of the patrol there had never been a black trooper. The court also found that the Department had engaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring both as to troopers and supporting personnel. The court issued an order requiring the Department to hire one black trooper for each white trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately 25 percent of the state trooper force. The order also enjoined any employment practices with the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the hiring order in 1974. In 1975 the District Court found that the defendants had artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the number of new troopers hired to frustrate or delay full relief. The court also found that the high attrition rate among blacks resulted from selection of other than the best qualified blacks, social and official discrimination at the academy, preferential treatment of whites in training and testing, and harsher discipline of blacks. The court reaffirmed the 1972 order and enjoined further attempts to delay or frustrate compliance. In September 1977 the plaintiffs returned to the District Court seeking supplemental relief on promotion practices. Following discovery the parties entered a partial consent decree approved in February 1979. Under the decree the Department agreed to develop within one year a promotion procedure for corporal that would have little or no adverse impact on blacks and conform to the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. Similar procedures were required for sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major. After the Department failed to meet the deadline the parties executed a second consent decree approved in August 1981. That decree required administration of a proposed procedure whose results would be reviewed under the four-fifths rule. No promotions could occur until the parties agreed or the court ruled on a method with little or no adverse impact. In 1983 the Department administered a corporal promotion test to 262 applicants of whom 60 were black. Only five blacks ranked in the top half. The highest black candidate was number 80. The United States objected to rank-ordered use of the list. After nine months with no promotions the plaintiffs moved to enforce the consent decrees and requested one-for-one promotions until a valid procedure was implemented. The District Court found the procedure had an adverse impact. The court ordered the Department to submit a plan to promote at least fifteen persons without adverse racial impact. When the Department proposed promoting four blacks and eleven whites the court on December 15, 1983, ordered that at least 50 percent of promotions to corporal be awarded to qualified black candidates. Similar contingent requirements applied for upper ranks until acceptable procedures were in place. The Department promoted eight blacks and eight whites to corporal in February 1984. It later submitted procedures for corporal and sergeant that the court approved, suspending the quota for those ranks. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's order in 1985. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.

Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role. Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels. Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.