Also known as:supplemental jurisdictions · 28 USC 1367 · pendent jurisdiction · ancillary jurisdiction
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine granting federal district courts authority to hear additional claims that lack an independent basis for original jurisdiction when those claims form part of the same constitutional case or controversy as a claim already within the court's original jurisdiction. The additional claims must share a common nucleus of operative fact with the anchor claim so that a plaintiff would ordinarily expect to try them together in one proceeding. Exercise of the authority remains discretionary and subject to statutory limitations in diversity cases.
See Our Sources· 10 primary sources
Cases
Statutes
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Joined Plaintiffs Below Amount Threshold
Sabrina Shah, a citizen of State A, sued Skyline Construction in federal court on a diversity claim seeking $120,000 for breach of a construction contract. Stephen Shaw, also a citizen of State A, joined as a co-plaintiff asserting a related breach claim arising from the same project but seeking only $35,000. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Shaw's claim because Shah's claim satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement and both claims arose from the identical construction dispute.
State Claims Added to Federal Question Suit
Sofia Stern filed a federal copyright infringement action against Sterling Manufacturing alleging unauthorized use of her software code. She also asserted state-law claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract arising from the identical episode of code copying and distribution. The district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because they shared the same operative facts as the federal copyright claim.
Pendent State Tort Claims With Federal Claim
Scott Summers sued Sapphire Technologies in federal court under a federal anti-discrimination statute for workplace harassment. He added state-law claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same pattern of supervisor misconduct. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because they derived from the common nucleus of operative fact presented by the federal claim.
Plaintiff Claim Against Impleaded Party Barred
Solomon Silver, a citizen of State A, sued Starlight Media, a citizen of State B, in diversity for $90,000. Starlight impleaded Steven Silva, also a citizen of State B, on a contribution claim. Silver then asserted a direct state-law claim against Silva for the same underlying events. The court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over Silver's claim against Silva because exercising it would violate the complete-diversity requirement of section 1332.
Admiralty Claim With Related State Claim
Sabrina Shah, owner of a vessel, sued a terminal operator in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction for cargo damage occurring during unloading. She added a state-law negligence claim against the same defendant arising from the identical unloading operation. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim because it formed part of the same case or controversy as the admiralty claim.
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.358 U.S. 354, 382-383, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959)
In October 1953 Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a crew member of the S.S. Guadalupe, a vessel of Spanish registry owned by the Spanish corporation Compania Trasatlantica.
Romero continued to serve on the Guadalupe after the initial voyage, so that under Spanish law the original contract of hire remained in force. The ship sailed from Bilbao, touched other Spanish ports, proceeded to New York and Hoboken, made a brief trip to Vera Cruz and Havana, and returned to Hoboken.
On May 12, 1954, while the vessel lay in Hoboken, Romero was struck by a cable on deck and seriously injured. Romero filed suit on the law side of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against four corporate defendants.
He asserted Jones Act and general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort against Compania Trasatlantica and its New York husbanding agent Garcia & Diaz, Inc. He asserted maritime-tort claims against stevedore International Terminal Operating Co. and carpenter Quin Lumber Co., both of which were performing work aboard the Guadalupe under oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz. Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
After a pre-trial hearing the district court dismissed the entire complaint. It held that the Jones Act supplied no right of action against the foreign shipowner, that § 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over general maritime claims, that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and that complete diversity was lacking under Strawbridge v. Curtiss. The court also declined to exercise discretionary admiralty jurisdiction after examining Spanish law, which provided Romero a lifetime pension of 35 to 55 percent of his wages plus maintenance and cure enforceable through the Spanish consul. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1331 and the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen to the facts presented.
Bankruptcy Core Proceeding With State Claim
Stephen Shaw, a bankruptcy debtor, brought a core proceeding in federal bankruptcy court against a creditor for turnover of property. He added a related state-law contract claim against the same creditor arising from the identical pre-petition transaction. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim because it shared the common nucleus of operative fact with the core bankruptcy proceeding.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982)
In 1978 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act after nearly ten years of study. The statute established a United States bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to the district court. It granted those courts jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
Bankruptcy judges appointed under the Act served fourteen-year terms. They were subject to removal by the judicial council of the circuit for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability. They received salaries subject to congressional adjustment.
In January 1980 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for reorganization under the Act in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota. In March 1980 Northern filed a separate suit in the same court against Marathon Pipe Line Co. seeking damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty as well as for misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power on bankruptcy judges who lacked life tenure and salary protection. The United States intervened to defend the statute. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal the District Court reversed and dismissed the suit. Northern and the United States filed notices of appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a federal court have power to hear a state-law claim that lacks an independent jurisdictional basis?
A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when the claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim that supplies original jurisdiction, so that the plaintiff would ordinarily expect to try both claims in one proceeding.
Does supplemental jurisdiction allow a second plaintiff in a diversity case to join when that plaintiff's claim falls below the amount-in-controversy threshold?
Yes, provided at least one plaintiff's claim satisfies the amount requirement and complete diversity exists, section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over the additional plaintiff's related claim that shares a common nucleus of operative fact.
What statutory restriction limits supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-only cases?
Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24, or by persons proposed for joinder or intervention as plaintiffs, when exercising jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the requirements of section 1332.
May a court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even when the constitutional test is satisfied?
Yes, under section 1367(c) a court may decline when the state claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, substantially predominates over the anchor claim, or when the anchor claim has been dismissed, among other grounds.
jurisdiction
of three-judge courts to hear statutory claims
pendent
…
jurisdiction
. We should assume,…
, and as shall be prescribed by rules or orders of the courts of bankruptcy of their respective districts, except as herein otherwise provided." The bankruptcy judge possessed "complete…
under the Jones Act. Of course the considerations which call for the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction
of a state claim related to a pending federal cause of action within the appropriate scope of the doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler , 289 U. S. 238, are not the same when, as here, what is…
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