Also known as:takings clause · takings clause's · eminent domain clause · just compensation clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The constitutional commands, found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that the government provide just compensation when it takes private property for public use. Physical appropriations of real or personal property and certain regulatory restrictions that eliminate all economically viable use trigger the requirement.
See Our Sources· 7 primary sources
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Union Organizers Access Farm
Theodore Tucker owns an almond orchard. State regulators grant a union recurring twice-weekly entry to the property to meet with workers. Tucker sues, claiming the mandated access appropriates his right to exclude without compensation. The court holds the recurring physical invasion constitutes a per se taking requiring payment.
Raisin Set-Aside Program
Tanner Thompson grows raisins. Federal rules require him to deliver a portion of each harvest to a government reserve, leaving him only a contingent interest in later sales proceeds. Thompson challenges the mandate as an uncompensated appropriation of personal property. The court concludes the physical transfer of title effects a per se taking.
Beachfront Building Ban
Tristan Thompson buys two coastal lots intending to build homes. A new state statute bars all permanent habitable structures on the parcels, rendering them valueless for their intended use. Thompson sues for compensation. The court finds the total deprivation of economic use amounts to a categorical taking.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation.
Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures.
Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
Tamara Tan owns a waterfront home in a blighted area. The city condemns the parcel as part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan transferring the land to private developers for new offices and retail. Tan claims the transfer to another private party is not a public use. The court upholds the taking because the plan serves a legitimate public purpose of economic revitalization.
Kelo, et al. v. City of New London545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005)
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization.
In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain.
Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000.
In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties.
Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
Rent Control Challenge
Thaddeus Tran owns an apartment building subject to a city rent-control ordinance that sharply limits returns. He argues the regulation effects a taking by denying him a fair rate of return. The court applies a multi-factor test focusing on economic impact, investment expectations, and the character of the action rather than treating the measure as a per se taking.
Lingle, et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)
In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers.
Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership.
Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.
Temporary Development Moratorium
Tara Tran owns lakefront lots. A regional planning agency imposes a multi-year moratorium on all development while it studies environmental protections. Tran claims the delay constitutes a taking of all economically viable use during the period. The court holds that temporary restrictions are analyzed under a multi-factor balancing test rather than a categorical rule.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency535 U.S. 302
In the early 1980s, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin. The first, Ordinance 81-5, took effect on August 24, 1981, and lasted until August 26, 1983. The second, Resolution 83-21, ran from August 27, 1983, to April 25, 1984. Together these measures prohibited virtually all development on sensitive lands for a total of 32 months while TRPA developed a comprehensive land-use plan.
Lake Tahoe's exceptional water clarity had begun to deteriorate due to increased land development starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Runoff from impervious surfaces on steeper slopes and stream environment zones carried nutrients that promoted algae growth. In response, California and Nevada, along with the federal government, amended the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1980 to require TRPA to establish environmental threshold carrying capacities and adopt a regional plan.
The 1980 Compact amendment directed TRPA to adopt thresholds within 18 months and a plan within a year thereafter. It also included a finding that temporary halts on development were necessary to preserve the region's capacity for future development consistent with the ultimate plan. TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5 in June 1981 after concluding it could not meet the original deadlines, and later adopted Resolution 83-21 when no plan was in place by August 1983.
Petitioners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council representing about 2,000 owners and a class of approximately 400 individual owners of vacant lots purchased before 1980 primarily for building single-family homes, filed parallel actions in federal courts in Nevada and California shortly after the 1984 plan was adopted. The suits were consolidated in the District of Nevada. The District Court found that the moratoria constituted categorical takings under Lucas because they temporarily deprived owners of all economically viable use. The Ninth Circuit reversed that determination.
The Ninth Circuit held that the temporary nature of the regulations meant no categorical taking had occurred and that Penn Central analysis applied, though petitioners had not challenged the District Court's Penn Central findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the moratoria effected per se takings.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does the Takings Clause protect personal property as well as real property?
Yes. The Clause applies to both. Government appropriation of personal property, such as a required set-aside of crops or goods, triggers the compensation requirement even when the owner retains only a contingent interest in the taken items.
Supporting sources
When does a regulation granting third-party access to private property become a per se physical taking?
A regulation that grants recurring physical access to private property appropriates the owner's right to exclude and constitutes a per se taking. Intermittent but regular invasions, such as scheduled union visits, require just compensation regardless of their temporary character.
Supporting sources
What standard determines whether a permit condition demanding land dedication effects a taking?
The condition must satisfy both an essential nexus to a legitimate governmental interest and rough proportionality to the projected impact of the proposed development. Failure to meet either test renders the exaction an uncompensated taking.
Supporting sources
Does a regulation that eliminates all economically viable use of land always require compensation?
Yes, when the regulation denies the owner all economically beneficial use of the parcel. Such a total deprivation is treated as a categorical taking unless background principles of state law already barred the intended use.
Supporting sources
How does the public-use requirement limit eminent-domain actions?
The requirement is satisfied when the taking is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose, including economic development plans that transfer property to private parties. Courts defer to the government's reasonable belief that the project will produce public benefits.
Supporting sources
claim "simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply…
, is therefore an express limit on the government's power of
eminent
domain
. The most natural reading of the
Clause
is that it allows the government to take property only if the government…
of the Fifth Amendment. The essence of the argument against the law was, while taking property for ridding an area of slums was permissible, taking it “merely to develop a better balanced,…
Constitutional LawThe nature of judicial review · JurisdictionUBEFoundational