temporary order

The parties Amy Mullins Roberts and Warren Keith Roberts were married in May 1993. They had one child together, Warren K. Roberts, who was born on May 20, 1996. Another child, Mya Brooks, was born during the marriage on September 24, 2006, and paternity was established with Daryl Brooks as the father. On August 15, 2003, Amy filed a complaint for divorce in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations. Pursuant to temporary orders, Amy was named residential parent and legal custodian. Keith was granted standard visitation and ordered to pay $388.90 per month in child support, which was a downward deviation based on his obligation to pay $258.33 per month for the son's school tuition. The parties agreed to a shared parenting plan with Amy named the residential parent for school placement purposes. On November 19 and 20, 2007, a trial was held regarding child support, spousal support, and property division. On December 11, 2007, the trial court issued its judgment. Keith appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, asserting three assignments of error. Keith exercised parenting time with the son approximately 40 percent of the time under an alternating schedule. The schedule provided parenting time from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. one week, and from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. until Friday at 6:00 p.m. the next week. The parties were not following the agreed schedule, with the child spending weekdays with Amy and weekends and holidays with Keith. In addition to the guideline child support, the trial court ordered Keith to pay $150 per month in child support arrearages, $250 per month for non-taxable property settlement, $250 per month to equalize the property division, $1 per month for spousal support, and $5,000 in attorney fees. Amy testified that Keith had intentionally dragged out the case for four years by failing to follow discovery orders and never responded to her requests for documents. Attorney Jeff Fish testified that Amy was forced to file a subpoena to obtain retirement documents and tax returns and that Keith never submitted updated discovery after 2004. Amy presented a document at the hearing listing household goods and furnishings and how they were divided, believing the values to be equal. Keith testified that the total value of items he received was $5,000 and the value of items Amy received was $15,000, but neither party provided present values for the items. The trial court found that neither party presented credible testimony as to the value of the used household goods and furnishings.

The Santa Fe Independent School District is a political subdivision of the State of Texas responsible for the education of more than 4,000 students. It includes Santa Fe High School along with two primary schools, an intermediate school, and the junior high school. Prior to 1995, the student who occupied the school's elective office of student council chaplain delivered a prayer over the public address system before each varsity football game for the entire season. In April 1995, respondents, two sets of current or former students and their respective mothers from one Mormon family and one Catholic family, commenced this action alleging that the District had engaged in several proselytizing practices, such as allowing students to deliver overtly Christian prayers over the public address system at home football games. They moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent violations at the imminent graduation exercises. The District Court permitted respondents to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment. While these proceedings were pending in the District Court, the District adopted a series of policies over several months dealing with prayer at school functions. On May 10, 1995, the District Court entered an interim order providing that non-denominational prayer consisting of an invocation and/or benediction could be presented by a senior student or students selected by members of the graduating class, with the text of the prayer determined by the students without scrutiny or preapproval by school officials. In response to the District Court order, the District enacted a policy in May for graduation ceremonies that authorized two student elections. In July, the District enacted another policy eliminating the nonsectarian requirement but providing that the May policy would become effective if enjoined. The parties stipulated that after the May policy was adopted the senior class voted by secret ballot to include prayer at graduation and elected two seniors to deliver the invocation and benediction. The August policy for football games, titled Prayer at Football Games, was similar and authorized two student elections to determine whether invocations should be delivered and to select the spokesperson. On August 31, 1995, the high school students voted to allow a student to say a prayer at varsity football games and a week later selected a student to deliver the prayer. The final October policy is essentially the same as the August policy though it omits the word prayer from its title and refers to messages and statements as well as invocations. It permits students to deliver a brief invocation and/or message during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition, with the student volunteer selected by classmates deciding the content consistent with the policy goals, and includes a fallback provision that automatically adds a nonsectarian and nonproselytizing limitation if the preferred policy is enjoined. The District Court entered an order precluding enforcement of the first open-ended policy. It held that delivering a prayer over the school's public address system prior to each football game coerces student participation in religious events. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the alternative policy could be extended to football games. The Supreme Court granted the District's petition for certiorari, limited to the question whether the petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self-preservation" as defined under state law. On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and 18 individuals, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot. The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would repeal the amendments. Petitioners requested attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA. They argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the catalyst theory. This theory posits that a plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

On September 26, 1970, petitioners L. N. McDonald and Raymond L. Laird, both white, and Charles Jackson, a black employee of Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., were jointly and severally charged with misappropriating sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze from a shipment the company was carrying for a customer. Six days later Santa Fe fired McDonald and Laird while retaining Jackson. A grievance was promptly filed with International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 988 under the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the company, but the grievance proceedings secured no relief. In April 1971 McDonald and Laird filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that Santa Fe had discriminated against them on the basis of race in their discharge and that Local 988 had discriminated against McDonald on the basis of race by failing to represent his interests properly in the grievance proceedings. The EEOC notified them in July 1971 of their right to initiate a civil action in district court within thirty days. McDonald and Laird then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas joining claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. In June 1974 the District Court issued a final modified opinion and order dismissing the claims under both Title VII and § 1981. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal per curiam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.