tenant’s right to possession

Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.

Raymond Johnson and plaintiff Hazel Tenhet owned a parcel of property as joint tenants. The deed was executed by Jettie N. Johnson to them as joint tenants. The property consisted of a dwelling house and lot. Its value did not exceed three thousand five hundred dollars at the time of Johnson's death in 1971. Assertedly without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, Johnson leased the property to defendant Boswell. The lease was for a period of ten years at a rental of one hundred fifty dollars per year. It included a provision granting the lessee an option to purchase. Johnson died some three months after execution of the lease. Plaintiff sought to establish her sole right to possession of the property as the surviving joint tenant. After an unsuccessful demand upon defendant to vacate the premises, plaintiff brought this action to have the lease declared invalid. The third amended complaint contained five causes of action. The trial court granted a motion to strike the fourth and fifth causes of action. It sustained demurrers to the second and third causes without leave to amend. But the court made no express ruling on the first cause of action seeking declaratory relief and damages. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of California.

In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation. The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item. After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent. On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately. On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge district court was convened. It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding. The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date. A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.