Also known as: king can do no wrong · rex non potest peccare · sovereign immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principle of sovereign immunity providing that the government cannot be sued for damages without its consent. The maxim embodies the structural rule that private parties may not hale a sovereign into court for retrospective monetary relief absent waiver or valid abrogation.
A group of probation officers employed by the State of Maine filed suit in state court alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and seeking back wages. Maine had not consented to the action. The court dismissed the claims because the state retained sovereign immunity from private damages suits on federal claims in its own courts.
SilverStack, a Nevada corporation, sued the Revenue Department of State X in Nevada state court for damages arising from allegedly improper tax assessments. State X had not consented to suit in Nevada. The court dismissed the action because one state may not entertain private damages claims against another state without consent.
Lena, a citizen of Franklin, sued the State of Franklin's Technology Agency in federal court for unpaid licensing fees under a contract. Franklin had not consented to the federal suit. The court dismissed the case because the Eleventh Amendment bars private damages actions by a state's own citizens against the state absent consent or abrogation.
Meridian Health sued the Redland Insurance Commission in federal court under a commerce-power statute that purported to authorize damages against state insurance authorities. Redland had not consented. The court dismissed the suit because Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity through Article I legislation.
A former White House aide sued the President for damages arising from an alleged retaliatory discharge. The President moved to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds. The court granted the motion because the office of the President enjoys immunity from damages suits for official acts.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
View casePaula Jones sued President Clinton for damages based on pre-presidency conduct. Clinton sought to defer the suit until after his term. The court denied the request for deferral because the immunity of the President does not extend to suits based on unofficial acts.
In May 1994 Paula Corbin Jones, a California resident who had worked at the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against William Jefferson Clinton, then President of the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer. The complaint alleged that on May 8, 1991, while Clinton was Governor of Arkansas and attending an official conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Ferguson persuaded Jones to leave the registration desk and visit Clinton in a business suite where he made unwanted sexual advances that she rejected. Jones further alleged that after she refused the advances her superiors at the Commission treated her in a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties in retaliation. After Clinton became President, Ferguson made defamatory statements to a reporter implying she had accepted the advances, while Clinton's authorized spokespersons publicly branded her a liar by denying the incident. The four-count complaint asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 plus state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, seeking $75,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Jurisdiction was predicated on federal-question and diversity grounds. With the exception of the defamation count, the alleged misconduct occurred before Clinton took office and was unrelated to any official presidential duties. Clinton promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. He requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immunity issue was resolved. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation until he is no longer President. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, allowed discovery to proceed, but stayed the trial until the end of the presidency. Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity grounds but reversed the stay of trial, holding that the District Court had abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The maxim supports sovereign immunity that bars most private damages suits against states in federal court absent consent or valid abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officers may proceed under Ex parte Young.
No. Article I powers such as the commerce power do not authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court. Valid abrogation requires reliance on the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yes. The constitutional structure preserves each state's sovereign immunity from private damages actions in the courts of other states absent consent.
The maxim historically supported absolute immunity for the President for official acts, though suits based on unofficial conduct may proceed during the term of office.
…§2000bb–1(b). The Act’s authorization of claims for money damages against the States is an attempt to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity. The question is whether Congress has the power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do so. Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends only to “enforc[ing]” the…