A formal adverb referring back to a thing or place previously mentioned in the discourse. It functions as a concise substitute for repeating the antecedent noun or phrase in legal drafting and opinions.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Trespassing Children on Artificial Condition
Travis Tate owns a vacant lot with an unfenced excavation. Local children frequently play near the site. When a child is injured by the condition, liability attaches because the possessor knew children were likely to trespass thereon.
Intended Beneficiary Judgment Satisfaction
Tiffany Torres is the intended beneficiary of a promise by TechVista Solutions to pay her consulting fees owed by Trailblazer Airlines. After receiving partial payment from the promisee, any judgment thereon reduces the promisor's remaining duty by the same amount.
Tabitha Taylor was removed from her leased storefront by the landlord. She later returns and places one foot inside the premises. That single step does not regain possession thereof under the governing statute.
Activity Creating Risk Outside Land
Timothy Tang operates heavy machinery on his industrial parcel. Vibrations from the activity damage a neighboring building. The possessor faces liability for harm caused by the activity carried on by him thereon.
Reliance on Public Statements
Tara Tran sells shares after reading Basic Inc.'s press releases. She later sues alleging the statements were misleading and that she relied thereon in making the sale.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson485 U.S. [224], at 238 1988
Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966 Combustion Engineering expressed interest in acquiring Basic but was deterred by antitrust concerns. In 1976 regulatory action removed the antitrust barrier and Combustion's strategic plan listed an objective to acquire Basic for thirty million dollars.
Beginning in September 1976 Combustion representatives met and spoke by telephone with Basic officers and directors about a possible merger. During 1977 and 1978 Basic issued three public statements denying that merger negotiations were under way. On December 18 1978 Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and announced it had been approached by another company concerning a merger.
The next day Basic's board endorsed Combustion's offer of forty-six dollars per share. On December 20 1978 Basic publicly announced approval of Combustion's tender offer for all outstanding shares. Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's October 21 1977 public statement and before the December 1978 trading suspension.
Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors alleging that the three statements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by misleading the market and causing sales at artificially depressed prices. The District Court certified the class under a presumption of reliance but granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that any misstatements were immaterial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Tracy Torres publishes criticism of a public official. The writing addresses the right of free examination of public measures and free communication among the people thereon.
New York Times v. Sullivan376 U.S. 254 (1964)
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others.
Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.
The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files.
Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
Does 'thereon' change the substantive meaning of a legal rule when substituted for the antecedent noun?
No. The adverb serves only as a drafting shortcut that refers back to the previously identified thing or place without altering the rule's elements or scope.
In third-party beneficiary cases, what does satisfaction of a judgment thereon accomplish?
Satisfaction of a judgment against either the promisee or the promisor discharges the corresponding duty of the other party to the same extent, subject to subrogation rights.
How does 'thereon' function in the Model Penal Code provision on regaining possession of land?
It identifies the specific land from which the person was dispossessed, clarifying that merely setting foot on the same parcel does not restore possession.
Why do courts and restatements repeatedly employ 'thereon' in property and tort rules?
The term provides concise, precise reference to the antecedent land or condition, reducing repetition while preserving exact doctrinal scope in formal legal texts.
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
…it is levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right." 4 Elliot's Debates, supra, pp. 553-554. Madison prepared the Report in support of the protest. His…