Also known as: throws out · threw out · thrown out · throwing out · dismiss · reject
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A judicial action by which a court terminates a pending claim or lawsuit without reaching the merits.
Tyler Taylor filed a state-law contract claim in federal district court against Titan Industries without alleging diversity or a federal question. The court examined the pleadings and determined it had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. It therefore threw out the entire action under the governing rule.
Tonya Takahashi sued Torchlight Media for defamation but offered only bare assertions that the statements were false and damaging. The court disregarded the conclusory statements and found the remaining facts insufficient to make the claim plausible. It threw out the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Tanya Tang was named trustee in a revocable trust but took no steps to accept the role after learning of the designation. More than a reasonable time passed without any indication of acceptance. She was deemed to have rejected the trusteeship, preventing any later attempt to exercise trustee powers.
Trevor Tate moved to dismiss an indictment after discovering one grand juror lacked legal qualification. The record showed that at least twelve qualified jurors had concurred in the indictment. The court denied the motion because the statutory safeguard prevented dismissal on that ground.
Tobias Thomas, as trustee, received an offer to add real property to an existing trust. After reviewing the terms, he decided the addition would create unacceptable administrative burdens. He rejected the addition under his statutory powers and the court upheld that decision.
Topaz Mining challenged a municipal zoning ordinance that restricted its planned industrial use of land. The court applied the established standard for reviewing land-use regulations and found the ordinance constitutional. It threw out the complaint and upheld the zoning restriction.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseA court must throw out the action at any time it determines subject-matter jurisdiction is absent. The obligation applies even after the parties have litigated other issues or proceeded to trial.
No. The court must disregard conclusory allegations and assess whether the remaining well-pleaded facts plausibly support relief. Mere possibility of liability is insufficient to survive the motion.
The designated trustee is deemed to have rejected the trusteeship if acceptance does not occur within a reasonable time after learning of the designation. Rejection prevents the person from later exercising trustee powers.
No. The court may not dismiss the indictment on that ground if the record shows at least twelve qualified jurors concurred. The motion is also subject to timing and procedural limits under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e).
…proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention. C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue of the Does' standing in their case has little significance. The claims…