A defendant or litigant appearing without the assistance of an attorney in a legal proceeding.
See Our Sources
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Offense-Specific Questioning
Ulysses Usher faces charges for one theft but sits in a cell awaiting trial. An undercover officer questions him about an unrelated arson without any lawyer present. The statements are admissible because the right to counsel does not extend to the uncharged offense.
Withdrawal Refused in Divorce
Una Ueda hires counsel for her divorce but later cannot pay. The lawyer seeks to withdraw, leaving her without representation in ongoing hearings. The court denies withdrawal because the client would suffer material prejudice from proceeding uncounseled.
Uri Underwood gives an uncounseled statement leading police to a body. At trial the prosecution shows the body would have been found anyway through proper channels. The evidence is admitted despite the lack of counsel during the initial disclosure.
Nix v. Williams (Williams II)467 U.S. 431 (1984)
On December 24, 1968, ten-year-old Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had accompanied her parents to watch an athletic contest.
Williams was seen leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. A fourteen-year-old boy who helped open his car door reported seeing two skinny white legs inside it.
Williams' car was found the next day 160 miles east in Davenport, Iowa. Items of the child's clothing along with an army blanket were recovered at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell between Des Moines and Davenport.
A warrant issued for Williams' arrest. On December 26 the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation organized a search with two hundred volunteers divided into teams that began twenty-one miles east of Grinnell and moved westward through Poweshiek County into Jasper County. Searchers checked all roads, ditches, culverts, abandoned farm buildings, and other places where a small child's body could be hidden. The search area was marked off in grids on highway maps.
Williams surrendered to police in Davenport and was arraigned. After his attorneys arranged for no questioning during transport, two Des Moines detectives took him into custody for the return drive.
During the trip Detective Leaming spoke to Williams about predicted snow and the parents' right to a Christian burial. Williams then directed the officers to the child's shoes, the blanket, and ultimately the body itself.
The body lay next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road in Polk County. It was roughly two and one-half miles from where one search team had stopped when the search was suspended at 3 p.m.
Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. At his first trial the evidence of the body was admitted over objection. He was convicted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Brewer v. Williams on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
At the second trial in 1977 the prosecution introduced evidence of the condition of the body, articles and photographs of clothing, and autopsy results without offering Williams' statements or showing that he had directed police to the body. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have been discovered within a short time in essentially the same condition by the continuing search. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.
On federal habeas corpus the District Court denied relief after an independent review. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ulrike Ulrich stands in a post-indictment lineup without counsel present. A witness identifies her as the robber. The identification is suppressed because the uncounseled confrontation occurred at a critical stage after formal charging.
United States v. Wade388 U.S. 218 (1967)
On September 21, 1964, a federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed when a man wearing a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a pistol at the female cashier and the vice president, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank's money before driving away with an accomplice waiting in a stolen car outside.
On March 23, 1965, an indictment was returned charging respondent Billy Joe Wade with conspiring to rob the bank and with the robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, 1965, and counsel was appointed to represent him on April 26, 1965. Fifteen days later, on May 11, 1965, an FBI agent arranged a lineup at the local county courthouse without notifying Wade's counsel; Wade stood with five or six other prisoners, each wearing strips of tape on his face, and each was directed to say words such as "put the money in the bag."
Both bank employees identified Wade at the lineup. At Wade's subsequent trial in federal district court, the two employees identified him in the courtroom on direct examination; on cross-examination they testified about their prior lineup identifications, and an FBI agent who observed the lineup also testified. Wade's counsel moved to strike the courtroom identifications on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds, but the motion was denied and Wade was convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the lineup violated Wade's Sixth Amendment rights, and ordered a new trial at which the in-court identification evidence would be excluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ulysses Usher is arrested and questioned in custody without receiving warnings or counsel. He makes incriminating statements. The statements are excluded because the uncounseled interrogation violated constitutional protections against compelled self-incrimination.
Miranda v. Arizona384 U.S. 436 (1966)
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape.
On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery.
On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours.
On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
Unity Underhill faces termination of welfare benefits at an administrative hearing without counsel. She cannot effectively challenge the agency's evidence. The proceeding violates due process because the uncounseled recipient lacks a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Goldberg v. Kelly397 U.S. 254 (1970)
Residents of New York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the state and city officials who administered those programs.
At the time the suits were filed, New York had no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. The suits prompted the State Commissioner of Social Services to amend the Department of Social Services regulations.
The amendment required local officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's aid to follow either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26. The City of New York elected to follow subdivision (b). It promulgated Procedure No. 68-18.
Under that procedure a caseworker who doubts a recipient's continued eligibility first discusses the doubts with the recipient. The caseworker then recommends termination to a unit supervisor. If the supervisor concurs, the recipient receives a letter stating the reasons for the proposed termination and notifying the recipient that within seven days he may request review by a higher official and may submit a written statement.
The reviewing official decides whether to discontinue aid. Aid stops immediately upon affirmation, and the recipient is notified in writing of the reasons. The city's procedure contains no provision for the recipient's personal appearance before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.
The letter sent to the recipient states that he may request a post-termination fair hearing before an independent state hearing officer. At the hearing the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a record made. If the recipient prevails, all funds erroneously withheld are paid. A recipient whose aid is not restored after the fair hearing may obtain judicial review under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. The court rejected the argument that the combination of the post-termination fair hearing and the informal pre-termination review was constitutionally adequate. Only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
When does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach for an uncounseled defendant?
The right attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings such as indictment or arraignment. Once attached it is offense specific and does not bar questioning about unrelated uncharged crimes.
Supporting sources
May a lawyer withdraw from representing an indigent uncounseled client in ongoing litigation?
Withdrawal is not permitted when it would materially prejudice the client by leaving her without representation in a complex proceeding. The duty of continued representation persists absent good cause and court permission.
Supporting sources
Does an uncounseled post-indictment lineup require suppression of the resulting identification?
Yes. A post-indictment corporeal identification is a critical stage at which counsel's presence is required. The absence of counsel renders the identification inadmissible.
Supporting sources
without counsel
present, absent a waiver of the right to
counsel
, and as the Court all but admonishes the lawyer to advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up to a judicial judgment that…