A uniform statute supplying jurisdictional standards for adoption proceedings that states adopt to address the gap created by the UCCJEA's exclusion of adoption. Most states require the petitioner to reside in the county where the adoption petition is filed.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Work Ties Versus Personal Residence
Umar Usmani directs operations at a nonprofit headquartered in County C but maintains his only home in County D fifty miles away. He files an adoption petition in County C court citing his daily professional presence. The court dismisses the petition because the statute demands residency in the filing county and Umar's personal domicile remains in County D.
Unwed Father's Consent Rights
Uliana Ustinova seeks to adopt her child with the consent of the child's mother. The biological father, Ugo Ucelli, has maintained regular contact and paid support. The court denies the adoption petition because the father's established relationship gives him a protected interest that cannot be bypassed without due process.
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed began living together in New York City in September 1968. They continued until the end of 1973. During this time they held themselves out as husband and wife even though Caban remained married to another woman until 1974. Mohammed gave birth to two children during this period: David Andrew Caban on July 16, 1969, and Denise Caban on March 12, 1971. Caban was named as the father on both birth certificates. The couple jointly supported the children while living together as a family.
In December 1973, Mohammed left Caban with the children and began residing with Kazin Mohammed, whom she married on January 30, 1974. For the following nine months, the children visited their maternal grandmother weekly, allowing Caban to see them regularly. In September 1974, the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico and took the children with her at the Mohammeds' request. Caban maintained contact through his parents in Puerto Rico. In November 1975, he traveled there to retrieve the children, returning with them to New York.
Upon learning of the children's location, Maria Mohammed attempted to recover them with police assistance. The Mohammeds then initiated custody proceedings in New York Family Court. That court awarded temporary custody to the Mohammeds and granted visiting rights to Caban and his new wife, Nina. In January 1976, the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the children under section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law. The Cabans responded with a cross-petition for adoption in March 1976.
A hearing occurred before a Law Assistant to the Surrogate in Kings County, where both parties presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses. The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' adoption petition. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision, relying on the Court of Appeals' ruling in In re Malpica-Orsini. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, leading to review by the United States Supreme Court.
Why do states rely on the UAA for adoption jurisdiction?
The UCCJEA excludes adoption proceedings, leaving a jurisdictional gap. Most states fill that gap by adopting either the UCCJEA amendments or the UAA's jurisdictional provisions, which require the petitioner to be a resident of the filing county.
Supporting sources
How does the UAA limit revocation of consent?
The UAA permits a parent to revoke consent within eight days of the child's birth absent fraud or duress. Consent given before a judge is immediately effective, and many states invalidate pre-birth consent to promote finality.
Does employment in a county satisfy the UAA residency requirement?
No. Courts interpreting the residency rule focus on the petitioner's actual domicile, not mere workplace presence. A petitioner whose sole personal residence lies in another county fails the statutory test even when professional activities occur in the filing county.
Supporting sources
441 U.S. 380 (1979)
…is acting as the guardian of the child, e. g. , In re Erhardt , 27 App. Div. 2d 836, 277 N. Y. S. 2d 734 (1967). Moreover, the Uniform Adoption Act, after which the New York statute appears to be patterned, has a similar section that its drafters intended to benefit "a father having custody of his illegitimate minor child." Uniform…