Also known as: uniform laws · uniform act · uniform acts · model law · model act · uniform code
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A model statute drafted for adoption by state legislatures in identical form to promote consistency in state law across jurisdictions.
Ulf Ulfsson operates a failing business across three states and files for bankruptcy. Congress has exercised its authority to enact a single set of rules governing debtor-creditor relations nationwide. The court applies those rules to determine the treatment of Ulf's assets and discharge his debts without variation by state.
Uri Underwood owns a small bakery in a state that has enacted a uniform religious freedom statute. Local officials deny a permit citing a neutral zoning rule. The court measures the denial against the uniform act's strict scrutiny standard and orders the permit issued.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseUriah Urban's tribe seeks to enforce a gaming compact against State officials. The state legislature had adopted the uniform provisions governing such compacts. The court upholds the tribe's claim by applying the uniform language that binds both sovereigns.
In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes. Class III gaming includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries. Such gaming is lawful only when conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State. The Act imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of such a compact. It authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty. The Seminole Tribe of Florida requested that the State of Florida enter into negotiations for a compact governing class III gaming on the Tribe's lands. When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe filed suit in September 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the State and its Governor, Lawton Chiles. The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. It alleged that respondents had refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation contained in § 2710(d)(3). The State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against the State and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did not permit a suit against the Governor to enforce the statutory duty. The Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and whether the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits against a State's Governor for such relief.
View caseUriel Urban runs for Congress after voters in his state adopted a uniform term-limits measure. State election officials disqualify him under the new rule. The court invalidates the disqualification because the uniform state measure conflicts with federal constitutional qualifications.
In November 1992 the voters of Arkansas approved Amendment 73 to their state constitution. The amendment's preamble declared that long-term incumbency had reduced voter participation and made elections less competitive and less representative. Section 3 barred any person elected to three or more terms in the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas from appearing on the ballot for that office. It imposed a parallel bar on any person elected to two or more terms in the United States Senate from Arkansas. The amendment was self-executing and applied to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself and similarly situated Arkansas citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters, together with the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County seeking a declaratory judgment that section 3 was unconstitutional and void. The complaint named then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas as defendants. The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment, including petitioner U. S. Term Limits, Inc., also intervened. On cross-motions for summary judgment the Circuit Court held that section 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution. In a 5-to-2 decision the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that holding. The State and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for argument.
View caseUsman Uddin and his wife enter a gestational surrogacy arrangement under a uniform parentage act adopted by their state. After birth the surrogate asserts parental rights. The court applies the uniform act's intent-of-parties test and declares the intended parents the legal parents.
In 1984 Crispina Calvert underwent a hysterectomy that left her ovaries capable of producing eggs. She and her husband Mark desired a child genetically related to both of them. In 1989 Anna Johnson, a licensed vocational nurse who had previously given birth to a daughter, learned of Crispina's situation from a coworker and offered to serve as a surrogate. On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a written contract providing that an embryo created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg would be implanted in Anna, who would carry the child to term and relinquish all parental rights to the Calverts upon birth. In exchange the Calverts agreed to pay Anna $10,000 in installments, with the final payment due six weeks after birth, and to purchase a $200,000 life insurance policy on Anna's life. The zygote was implanted on January 19, 1990, and an ultrasound confirmed Anna's pregnancy less than a month later. During the pregnancy relations between the parties deteriorated. Anna felt the Calverts were not providing sufficient attention or obtaining the required insurance policy in a timely manner. In July 1990 Anna demanded the balance of the payments or she would refuse to relinquish the child. The following month the Calverts filed suit in superior court seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn child. Anna filed her own action to be declared the mother, the cases were consolidated, and the parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child. The child was born on September 19, 1990. Blood samples taken from Anna and the child excluded Anna as the genetic mother. The parties stipulated that Mark and Crispina were the genetic parents. After a trial in October 1990 the superior court ruled that the Calverts were the child's genetic, biological, and natural parents, that Anna had no parental rights, that the surrogacy contract was enforceable, and that Anna was not entitled to visitation. Anna appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of California granted review.
View caseUrban Utley sues a debtor in bankruptcy court over a state-law contract claim. The debtor moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court applies the uniform jurisdictional boundaries set by Congress and dismisses the claim as outside the bankruptcy court's authority.
In 1978 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act after nearly ten years of study. The statute established a United States bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to the district court. It granted those courts jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11. Bankruptcy judges appointed under the Act served fourteen-year terms. They were subject to removal by the judicial council of the circuit for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability. They received salaries subject to congressional adjustment. In January 1980 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for reorganization under the Act in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota. In March 1980 Northern filed a separate suit in the same court against Marathon Pipe Line Co. seeking damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty as well as for misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power on bankruptcy judges who lacked life tenure and salary protection. The United States intervened to defend the statute. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal the District Court reversed and dismissed the suit. Northern and the United States filed notices of appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA uniform law is drafted so that every adopting state enacts the identical text. This produces consistent rules on the same subject across state lines and reduces conflicts when parties or property cross borders.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepares the model statutes. Commissioners from each state review and approve the final text before it is offered to legislatures for adoption.
States are free to modify or reject any uniform act. Many do enact the text without change to preserve the goal of uniformity, but variations are common and can undermine the intended consistency.
A uniform law is state legislation that happens to be identical across jurisdictions. A federal statute is enacted by Congress and applies nationwide under federal authority. Uniform laws operate only within each adopting state's borders.
…Identical provisions appear in the Evidence Ordinance of Ceylon, enacted in 1895. Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without first being warned of his right not to make a statement and that any statement he makes may be used against…