Also known as: vague · vaguer · vaguest · void for vagueness · vagueness doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A constitutional doctrine that invalidates a statute when the forbidden conduct is defined so unclearly that a reasonable person must guess at its meaning. The doctrine protects due process by requiring fair notice of prohibited acts and by preventing arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
A procedural rule permitting a party to obtain clarification of a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that a response cannot reasonably be prepared.
A constitutional doctrine that invalidates a statute when the forbidden conduct is defined so unclearly that a reasonable person must guess at its meaning. The doctrine protects due process by requiring fair notice of prohibited acts and by preventing arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
Valerie Voss, a criminal defense attorney, told reporters that her client would present 'general evidence of police misconduct.' A disciplinary rule barred statements creating a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the trial yet permitted 'general nature of the defense' comments without clear boundaries. The vagueness of the safe harbor left Voss uncertain whether her statement was safe, prompting a successful void-for-vagueness challenge.
A procedural rule permitting a party to obtain clarification of a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that a response cannot reasonably be prepared.
Vincente Vukovic sued Vega Motors alleging defective parts but described the defects only as 'improper manufacturing practices.' Vega Motors could not determine which components or time periods were at issue. It moved under Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement before answering. The court ordered clarification and struck the complaint when none was supplied within fourteen days.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Veronica Villanueva, a physician, faced prosecution under a statute criminalizing all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life. The law supplied no guidance on viability or maternal health factors. Villanueva challenged the statute on vagueness grounds, arguing that physicians could not reasonably determine when conduct crossed into criminal territory.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseViolet Vang owned waterfront property condemned by the city for an economic development plan. The statute authorized takings that served 'public purposes' without defining the term. Vang argued the phrase was unconstitutionally vague because owners could not predict which projects would qualify or how courts would measure public benefit.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseVictoria Vernon sought to introduce a witness's out-of-court statement under a state rule allowing 'reliable' statements. The rule supplied no criteria for reliability. The defense objected that the standard was void for vagueness because it failed to give fair notice of when confrontation rights could be bypassed.
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment. Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night. Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege. The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseValentina Vasquez, a public figure, sued a publisher for a defamatory article. The governing standard required proof of 'actual malice' defined only as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. Vasquez argued the formulation was unconstitutionally vague because reporters could not ascertain in advance what level of investigation would avoid liability.
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record. Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research. Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
View case5 common questions
Vagueness focuses on unclear drafting that leaves people guessing about prohibited conduct. Overbreadth focuses on a statute that reaches too much protected speech even if its terms are clear. A single law can suffer from both defects.
The challenger must demonstrate that the statute fails to provide fair notice of what is forbidden or creates a substantial risk of arbitrary enforcement. Courts examine the text, any narrowing constructions, and the statute's application to the challenger's conduct.
Yes. If a state court authoritatively narrows the statute to eliminate vagueness before federal review, the federal court will assess the narrowed version. Without such a construction, the statute remains vulnerable.
No. Rule 12(e) provides a procedural remedy when a pleading is too vague for a party to prepare a response. It does not invalidate statutes. It merely requires clarification of the complaint or answer.
Vagueness is especially dangerous when a statute regulates speech because uncertain terms chill protected expression and invite selective enforcement against disfavored viewpoints. Courts therefore apply heightened scrutiny to speech-related vagueness claims.
…conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch , 402 U.S., at 67-72. To summarize and to repeat: 1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a…