Also known as: vitia clerici · clerical error · clerical mistake
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence in writing or copying a judgment, order, or record, rather than from judicial reasoning or determination. Courts may correct such an error at any time on motion or sua sponte, subject to limits once an appeal is docketed.
After a bench trial, the court announced a five million dollar award to Violet Vang against Vanguard Bank. The clerk entered judgment for fifty million dollars due to a misplaced decimal. Vang moves under Rule 60(a) to correct the amount while an appeal is pending.
Detective Lopez submitted an affidavit correctly describing ByteBox but the judge signed a form listing TrendWear's address. Lopez notified the judge, who confirmed the mismatch was a clerical error and authorized the search of ByteBox. Officers executed the warrant at the intended location.
In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed ATF Special Agent Jeff Groh that on multiple visits to the ranch of Joseph Ramirez and his family in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana, the visitor had observed a large stock of weaponry including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher. Groh prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch for any automatic firearms or parts, destructive devices including grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and receipts pertaining to their purchase or manufacture. He supported the application with a detailed affidavit setting forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the premises. Groh also completed a warrant form that, in the portion calling for a description of the person or property to be seized, contained a description of the respondents' two-story blue house rather than the stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate the application by reference. The magistrate judge signed the warrant form after reviewing the documents, and the affidavit was placed under seal. The day after the magistrate issued the warrant, Groh led a team of federal agents and local sheriff's deputies in executing the search on the Ramirez ranch while Joseph Ramirez was absent but his wife and children were present. The officers uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Groh gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant but not the sealed application. The following day he faxed respondents' attorney a copy of the page of the application listing the items to be seized. Respondents Joseph Ramirez and his family brought this action against Groh and the other officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to all defendants and claims except the Fourth Amendment claim against Groh, on which it reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity questions.
View caseA Dixon County clerk cleared Luis Ortiz's warrant but neglected to update the shared database. Deputies relied on the outdated entry, arrested Ortiz, and searched his bunkhouse. The isolated database error had no pattern of recurrence.
In 2012 Austin Lynn Miller was convicted of one count of possession of a methamphetamine precursor and one count of maintaining a vehicle or dwelling for sale or delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 16 to 20 months and placed him on 36 months of supervised probation. Effective 1 January 2012 the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.52A, which required retailers to submit purchaser information for pseudoephedrine products to the National Precursor Log Exchange system before completing any sale and to generate stop-sale alerts when quantity limits would be exceeded. Effective 1 December 2013 the legislature added subsection (c) to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d1)(1), making it unlawful for any person previously convicted of possession or manufacture of methamphetamine to possess a pseudoephedrine product and classifying any violation as a Class H felony. On 7 January 2014 Miller purchased one 3.6-gram box of allergy and congestion relief medicine containing pseudoephedrine from the Boone Walmart. The transaction was recorded in the NPLEx system and no stop-sale alert was issued. Detective John Hollar of the Watauga County Sheriff's Office reviewed the weekend NPLEx logs, identified Miller's purchase, visited the store, and obtained a receipt bearing Miller's electronic signature even though the surveillance video system had not functioned. On 23 January 2014 Hollar obtained an arrest warrant that he served on Miller at his probation officer's office the following day. On 4 August 2014 Miller was indicted under the new subsection. On 4 February 2015 he filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The case was tried at the 2 February 2015 criminal session of Watauga County Superior Court before Judge Eric C. Morgan. After a pretrial hearing at which the State compared the statute to the felony-firearm possession law, the trial court denied the motion. The State presented testimony from Detective Hollar and the Walmart pharmacy manager. The court denied Miller's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court imposed a suspended sentence of 6 to 17 months together with 24 months of supervised probation. Miller indicated at sentencing that he wished to appeal but did not give oral notice after entry of judgment or file written notice within fourteen days as required by N.C. R. App. P. 4(a). On 5 June 2015 Miller filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. The State filed a response acknowledging the court's discretion to grant the petition. By order entered 24 June 2015 the petition was referred to the panel, which allowed it and addressed the merits of the appeal.
View caseA juror disclosed racial bias during deliberations but the court reporter transcribed the statement with an omitted phrase. The defense later sought to impeach the verdict using the corrected note. The transcription error was purely clerical.
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
View caseIndiana's voter identification statute required the name on the ID to match the registration record exactly. A county clerk entered a minor spelling variation when processing Vivian Vaughn's registration. Election officials treated the discrepancy as a clerical error and allowed the ballot.
In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, referred to as the Voter ID Law or SEA 483. The statute requires citizens voting in person at primary and general elections to present a government-issued photo identification card. It does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail. There is an exception for persons living and voting in a state-licensed facility such as a nursing home. Voters who lack compliant photo identification may cast a provisional ballot. The ballot will be counted only if they execute an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within ten days following the election. A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days following the election. The state offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their residence and identity. Promptly after the enactment of SEA 483 in 2005, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the state officials responsible for its enforcement. A second suit seeking the same relief was brought on behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing groups of elderly, disabled, poor, and minority voters. The cases were consolidated, and the State of Indiana intervened to defend the validity of the statute. After discovery, District Judge Barker prepared a comprehensive 70-page opinion explaining her decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. She found that petitioners had not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result of SEA 483 or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements. She rejected as utterly incredible and unreliable an expert's report that up to 989,000 registered voters in Indiana did not possess either a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification. She estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver's license or identification card. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Four judges voted to grant a petition for rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA court may correct a clerical mistake or oversight in a judgment or record at any time on motion or sua sponte. Once an appeal is docketed, leave from the appellate court is required. The correction restores the record to reflect the court's actual intention without altering substantive rulings.
No. Officers may reasonably rely in good faith on a warrant containing a judge's clerical error when the affidavit correctly identifies the target and officers search only the intended premises. Suppression is not required because the error is judicial rather than police misconduct.
An isolated clerical error by court staff that leaves an invalid warrant in a database does not trigger suppression when officers act in objective good faith. Courts weigh the minimal deterrent value against the social cost of excluding reliable evidence.
Yes. When a judge orally corrects a room number or similar detail on a preprinted form before execution, officers who rely on the affidavit and the correction act reasonably. The good faith exception applies because the defect is clerical and promptly addressed by the issuing judge.
…proposed rule. The substance of the Rule has not changed since 1975, except for a 2006 modification permitting evidence of a clerical mistake on the verdict form. See 574 U. S., at . The current version of Rule 606(b) states as follows: “(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a…