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The State B court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Frank if his conduct satisfies the effects test applicable to intentional torts. Under this test, personal jurisdiction is proper when a defendant commits an intentional tort that is expressly aimed at the forum state and causes harm that the defendant knows will be suffered in that state, even where the defendant's physical contacts with the forum are minimal. Arguments for Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Frank: The facts presented demonstrate that Frank's conduct satisfies the requirements of the effects test. Frank published a column that directly accused the governor of State B of accepting bribes from contractors involved in a State B infrastructure project. This accusation is not a general statement about national politics but instead focuses specifically on events and an official located exclusively within State B. By centering the defamation on a State B project and a State B public figure, Frank directed his intentional tort at the forum in a manner that satisfies the express aiming element. In addition, Frank purchased geo-targeted advertising that ensured the column would be displayed primarily to users located in State B. This deliberate choice of advertising placement shows that Frank took affirmative steps to reach an audience within the forum state. Such targeting is not incidental but purposeful, and it increases the likelihood that readers in State B would encounter the defamatory statements. Because the governor of State B would feel the reputational harm in the state where he lives and holds office, Frank could reasonably anticipate that the effects of the tort would be suffered in State B. The combination of subject-matter focus and geo-targeted distribution distinguishes this case from situations in which a defendant merely makes information available on the internet without regard to any particular forum. Frank's actions created a direct connection between the defamation and State B, making it fair to require him to defend the lawsuit there. The absence of physical presence in the forum does not preclude jurisdiction when the intentional conduct is aimed at the state and produces foreseeable harm there. These circumstances support the conclusion that the State B court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Frank. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones emphasized that intentional conduct directed at the forum creates the necessary minimum contacts. Here the bribery accusation ties directly to State B activities. The geo-targeting resembles the distribution of the National Enquirer in California in Calder. This purposeful direction makes it reasonable for Frank to anticipate being haled into court in State B. The lack of physical contacts is not dispositive when the tortious effects are targeted. Courts have found jurisdiction in similar internet defamation cases where the plaintiff resides in the forum and content focuses on forum activities. The advertising campaign amplifies the aiming by ensuring greater exposure in the forum. These factors collectively establish that personal jurisdiction is appropriate under the Due Process Clause. Arguments against Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Frank: Although the column mentioned a State B official and project, Frank's overall conduct does not demonstrate the express aiming required by the effects test. Frank has consistently described the column as part of a broader national commentary on government corruption, and the piece remained accessible on the open internet to readers throughout the country. The availability of the column nationwide indicates that it was not crafted exclusively for a State B audience, and the national character of the commentary weighs against finding that the tort was aimed specifically at the forum. Frank maintains no physical presence in State B. He has never visited the state, owns no property there, and conducts his work entirely from State A. These limited contacts underscore that any connection to State B arises solely from the content of the column rather than from ongoing business or personal activity within the forum. The use of geo-targeted advertising, while increasing visibility in State B, does not transform the column into conduct expressly directed at that state alone. The advertising choice may reflect an effort to reach interested readers wherever they reside, including those outside State B, rather than a focused attempt to cause harm exclusively within the forum. Moreover, the reputational harm, although potentially felt in State B, was not the primary or exclusive effect of the publication. Because the column addressed issues of national political significance, the injury could reasonably be expected to extend beyond State B to a wider audience concerned with government integrity. Requiring Frank to litigate in State B based on the location of the plaintiff and the subject matter of one article would risk subjecting defendants to jurisdiction in every state where a public official might claim injury, undermining the limits imposed by due process. These considerations indicate that the State B court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over Frank. Conclusion: Although the arguments against jurisdiction carry substantial weight given the national scope of the commentary and Frank's lack of physical contacts, the arguments supporting jurisdiction are more persuasive. The specific accusation regarding a State B project and official, coupled with the deliberate use of geo-targeted advertising to reach State B readers, establishes express aiming at the forum and foreseeable harm within the state. This combination satisfies the effects test and comports with due process, even in the absence of physical presence. The effects test remains the controlling framework and the facts align closely with Calder, making dismissal inappropriate.