Concept
Related Justiciability Doctrines
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Related Justiciability Doctrines
Article III gives federal courts power over “cases” and “controversies,” and the Court has long read those words to mean that the Framers expected federal judges to use their power only to resolve live, real-world conflicts.1 The ban on advisory opinions states that expectation most directly, and Flast v. Cohen called it “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.”2 Three neighboring doctrines enforce the same expectation at different moments in a lawsuit’s life. Standing asks whether the plaintiff has suffered a personal injury that a court can remedy. Ripeness asks whether the plaintiff has come too early, and mootness asks whether a genuine conflict has gone away with time.3 A fourth line, the political-question doctrine, leaves some disputes to the political branches. It has its own reading and appears here only as a pointer.4
The advisory-opinion ban does double duty. It limits federal judicial authority on its own, and it also serves as the reference point for applying the other doctrines, which is why courts so often defend a ruling on standing, ripeness, or mootness as necessary to avoid a de facto advisory opinion.5 Each doctrine therefore asks the same question in a different setting. A plaintiff with no remediable injury, a dispute that has not yet taken shape, and a dispute that has already ended all leave the court with nothing to decide except a legal question in the abstract.
Courts trace two principles to the constitutional text: the ban on advisory opinions and a concern for the counter-majoritarian difficulty.6 The second concern surfaces when plaintiffs with only a political interest sue to thwart governmental action, and those are the suits in which standing tends to fail.7 Standing thus draws on both principles, while ripeness and mootness each guard chiefly against advisory rulings. The subsections below take the three doctrines in the order a lawsuit meets them, beginning with standing and the question whether a court can actually remedy the plaintiff’s injury.
Standing and Redressability
Standing has a core component that comes directly from the Constitution: the plaintiff must allege a personal injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.8 The Court calls the doctrine an essential part of Article III’s limit to cases and controversies and requires three showings. The injury must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. It must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. And a favorable decision must be likely to redress it.9 The first two showings are treated fully elsewhere in this treatise. Redressability gets the attention here because it ties standing most directly to the advisory-opinion ban.
The third element requires that the injury be redressable by the courts through the remedy sought.10 A court redresses an injury only when its decree would change the state of affairs that causes it. If a favorable ruling would not correct a cognizable injury, the ruling would be purely advisory and beyond the authority Article III confers.11 Remedies differ in how easily they meet this demand. Traditional suits for money damages invariably have standing,12 because a damages award compensates a harm already suffered. A plaintiff who asks for several forms of relief must establish standing separately for each. A past injury can support a claim for damages while a threatened future injury is too speculative or remote to support an injunction.13
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons applies that principle. Police put Lyons in a chokehold during a traffic stop, and he sued the city for damages and for an injunction against future chokeholds. The damages claim presented no standing problem. The injunction claim failed, because Lyons could not show a real and immediate threat that he would be choked again.14 Without that threat, an order against chokeholds would redress no injury to him and would operate instead as a general regulation of police practice. One plaintiff, one defendant, and one encounter thus produced a justiciable claim and a nonjusticiable one, and the only variable was the remedy requested. Students often find standing once for the lawsuit and carry the finding across every remedy. The correct method is to check each remedy separately.
The requirement also follows the case upward. A party seeking relief from a court of appeals or from the Supreme Court must show that a ruling in its favor would redress the injury caused by the adverse lower-court decision, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction must demonstrate standing at each stage.15 An appellant who would remain exactly as injured after a reversal has asked for an opinion. An appellant whose injury a reversal would cure has asked for a remedy.
Ripeness
Ripeness governs timing. A plaintiff with a claim worth hearing must still bring it when the facts have taken shape, because a suit filed too soon often lacks the concrete facts that let a court decide with confidence, and it may be unclear whether anything will ever happen that creates an Article III controversy.17 Deciding an unripe case wastes the court’s time, risks unnecessary confrontation with another branch of government, and may produce a decision that is merely advisory.18 That last risk ties ripeness to the ban on advisory opinions taught earlier in this chapter. Standing asks who may sue, and ripeness asks when.
United Public Workers v. Mitchell shows a claim that came too early. Government employees challenged the Hatch Act, which restricted their political activities, and the Court refused to hear the challenge. The precise nature of their intended activities was unclear, and there was “no threat” of interference “beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regulations.”19 Poe v. Ullman disallowed an attack on a Connecticut birth-control statute for a similar reason: prosecutorial inertia showed there was no substantial threat that the law would be enforced.20
The mechanism behind Mitchell is the one behind the advisory-opinion ban. A statute restricting “political activity” reaches a wide range of conduct, some of which the First Amendment may protect and some of which the government may prohibit. A court cannot sort the two without knowing what a particular plaintiff will do. A ruling on the broad claim would therefore either approve or condemn the entire statute on a guess, or announce how the law applies to conduct no one has described. Either decree would leave the plaintiffs’ concrete legal relations unsettled, and a decree that settles nothing is advice.
Mitchell does not mean that a plaintiff must wait for the penalty to fall. The alternative would be to tell citizens that someone can test a statute only by violating it and risking punishment. As the saying goes, “the only way to determine whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it.” Congress intended the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 to spare plaintiffs precisely that risk.21 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, prescription-drug companies challenged a regulation that gave an authoritative interpretation of a statute and bore directly on their day-to-day business. The Court found the impact “sufficiently direct and immediate” for review at that stage. The regulation put the companies in a dilemma that the Declaratory Judgment Act was meant to ameliorate. They could change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials at great cost, or they could keep their present course and risk prosecution.22
Two more decisions show that the distance from enforcement is not the test. In Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, a state law prohibited the discharge of sewage from boats, and state officials announced that they would not enforce it until land-based pump-out facilities existed, a process that would take years. The Court nonetheless found the suit ripe, because enforcement was inevitable and the boat owners had to begin installing new facilities on their boats in anticipation of it.23 The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases reached the same result for railroads challenging the conveyance of their property to Conrail. Where the inevitability of a statute’s operation against certain individuals is patent, a delay before its provisions take effect does not defeat a justiciable controversy.24
Placed side by side, the cases isolate the variable. The Hatch Act was already in force, yet the Mitchell plaintiffs lost. The sewage statute would not be enforced for years, yet the boat owners won. What separates the ripe claims from the unripe one is the certainty with which the law will reach the plaintiff. In Lake Carriers the command was fixed, its application to the owners’ boats was certain, and the owners had to spend money now, so the Court faced an injury already forming and a legal question that later events would not change. In Mitchell the Act’s application depended on conduct the plaintiffs had not specified, and a decision would have rested on facts the Court could only imagine.
Ripeness thus leaves a middle ground. A plaintiff may sue before enforcement but must show that the law’s operation against the plaintiff is real and not speculative. The next subsection turns to the opposite timing problem, a dispute that was live when filed and has since gone away.
Mootness
Ripeness targets actions brought too soon, and mootness targets actions brought too late. If events before or during the litigation eliminate the plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome, the case is no longer one an Article III court can resolve.26 The repeal or replacement of a statute can moot an action to enjoin its operation. A government official’s commitment not to enforce a law can moot a pre-enforcement challenge. Acceptance of a settlement offer can moot a damages action, and changed life circumstances can moot a request for an injunction or declaratory order.27 In each situation, the court can no longer give the plaintiff any effectual relief.28
A moot case leaves the court with only an abstract question, which is why mootness applies the advisory-opinion ban. DeFunis v. Odegaard states the principle plainly: “federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”29 The usual rule therefore demands an actual controversy at all stages of appellate or certiorari review, not simply on the day the action is filed.30
Mootness overlaps with the redressability element of standing, and the difference is one of timing. If a court could not have redressed the injury from the moment the case was filed, the plaintiff lacks standing. If the injury was redressable at filing and became irredressable later, mootness typically applies. Standing generally comes to the fore in suits against the government, while mootness arises in suits against governmental and private defendants alike.31
Marco DeFunis, a white applicant denied admission to the University of Washington Law School, sued on the ground that the school’s affirmative action program denied him equal protection. The suit was not a class action. A preliminary injunction let him attend while the case was pending, so by the time it reached the Supreme Court he was a third-year student, and the university stated that he would be allowed to finish no matter what the Court decided.32 The dispute had been live at filing, since a denial of admission is an injury a court can remedy. What ended it was the school’s assurance. Because he would complete his studies at the end of the term for which he had registered, whatever the Court decided, the Court concluded that it could not consistently with Article III consider the constitutional issues the parties presented.33 A ruling for the school would not remove him, and a ruling for him would give him nothing more, so any opinion would have announced the law on admissions policies in the abstract.
The Court also rejected the argument that the case fell within the exception for wrongs “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” DeFunis would never again run the gauntlet of the admissions process, so the question was not capable of repetition as to him. Nor did it threaten to evade review, because if the school’s procedures remained unchanged, a later case attacking them would reach the Court with relative speed.34
The same passage of time can spare a case, and Roe v. Wade shows how. A pregnant single woman in Texas sued in 1970 for a declaratory judgment that the state’s criminal abortion law was unconstitutional and for an injunction against its enforcement. By the time the Supreme Court decided the case in 1973 she was no longer pregnant, and Texas argued that the case was moot.35 The Court agreed that the case had presented a controversy when filed. It then reasoned that the normal 266-day gestation period is so short that a pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If termination made such a case moot, pregnancy litigation would seldom survive beyond the trial stage, and appellate review would be effectively denied.36 Pregnancy also often comes more than once to the same woman, and the Court called it “a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.”37
Why did the passage of time end one case and spare the other? Both plaintiffs had live claims at filing, and neither had a continuing personal stake when the Court heard the case. The difference lies in the two parts of the exception. A court will not dismiss when the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated before it ends and there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.38 Roe satisfied both parts, since a pregnancy ends within months and can recur for the same woman. DeFunis satisfied neither, because he was finished with the admissions process and a later challenger’s case would not be shut out by timing. The exception keeps a harm that always runs its course in a few months from escaping appellate review altogether. The recurrence requirement keeps it from becoming a license to decide any question of public importance after the plaintiff’s stake has ended. Two errors follow from missing this: testing the plaintiff’s stake only at the date of filing, and invoking the exception because a question seems important when it actually turns on short duration and likely recurrence for the same plaintiff.
Two further limits complete the picture. A defendant cannot moot a case merely by stopping the challenged conduct after being sued. The Court has explained that this exception is necessary to foreclose a defendant from “engag[ing] in unlawful conduct, stop[ping] when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick[ing] up where he left off.”39 In the class-action context, the mooting of a named plaintiff’s claim need not always moot the whole action.40 The Court calls the mootness bar a component of Article III’s jurisdictional limits yet recognizes exceptions on practical grounds such as conserving judicial resources, deterring bad behavior, and ensuring individual fairness. That pairing raises the question how pragmatic exceptions can coexist with a rule said to state the constitutional minimum for a case or controversy.41