Concept
The Baker v. Carr Framework
Political question doctrine
The Baker v. Carr Framework
Baker v. Carr gave the political question doctrine its working vocabulary. Justice Brennan's opinion held that an equal protection challenge to the apportionment of a state legislature is justiciable, and it gathered earlier decisions into a single list of considerations that mark a question as political. The term needs care, because not every question involving politics is a political question. It refers to questions that courts treat as nonjusticiable because the political branches, not the judiciary, must resolve them.1 Its roots reach back to Marbury v. Madison, which recognized some “[q]uestions in their nature political.”2
Baker identified six considerations, any one of which can mark a question as political:
- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
- a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
- the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
- the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
- an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and
- the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, a court should not dismiss for nonjusticiability on the ground that a political question is present. The doctrine concerns political questions, not political cases.3
The Court now clumps the six into three groups, and the sections below follow that grouping.4 The first group asks whether the Constitution itself assigns the issue to another branch. The second asks whether the law gives a court a measure to apply, and whether any answer would first require a policy choice that belongs to someone else.5 The third asks what a judicial ruling would do to the working relations among the branches. Baker's holding comes first, because it shows the framework at work on a dispute that looks political and falls outside the doctrine.
Baker's Holding
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to the apportionment of a state legislature is justiciable and is not barred by the political question doctrine. The holding makes full sense only against the facts. Tennessee's constitution allocated seats in its General Assembly among the counties according to the number of qualified voters in each, and it called for a fresh count and reapportionment every ten years. The legislature complied each decade from 1871 through the 1901 Apportionment Act.6 For more than sixty years afterward every proposal to reapportion failed, while the state's population grew from about two million to about 3.6 million and its eligible voters from roughly 487,000 to about 2.1 million.7 People had moved from rural counties to the cities, yet the legislature, controlled by lawmakers from the shrinking rural districts, refused to redraw the lines.8 A vote in an old rural district therefore carried far more weight than a vote in a city that had grown.
The plaintiffs sued under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the 1901 statute produced a “debasement of their votes,” so that their ballots counted for less than ballots cast elsewhere in the state.9 They also alleged that relief through the state's own political process was difficult or impossible because of how the legislature was composed.10 A three-judge federal district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.11 Its own explanation shows what kind of dismissal it was. The court agreed that the legislature was violating the plaintiffs' rights and that the evil should be corrected, but it concluded that the remedy did not lie with the courts, because some constitutional rights cannot be enforced judicially.12 The dismissal rested on a judgment about the reach of judicial power and expressed no doubt that a constitutional violation had been alleged.
The Supreme Court reversed, and its reasoning begins by separating two questions the district court had run together. A case falls outside federal jurisdiction when it does not arise under federal law or does not present a case or controversy. A case is nonjusticiable when the court's inquiry goes forward and asks whether the asserted duty can be judicially identified, whether its breach can be judicially determined, and whether protection for the right can be judicially molded.13 The voters' claim arose under the Fourteenth Amendment and fell within the district court's jurisdiction, so the only open question was whether it presented a political question.14 The Court answered in two steps.
The first step met the strongest objection to hearing the case: that an apportionment claim rests on no federal right except the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, and that Guarantee Clause claims were nonjusticiable.15 The Court accepted that those cases were political questions and asked why. A review of them showed that the political question arises from the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the federal government, and the federal judiciary's relationship to the States does not produce it.16 Luther v. Borden shows the pattern. Asked which of two competing bodies was the legitimate government of Rhode Island, the Court refused to decide and rejected the argument that the Guarantee Clause supplied a basis for adjudication.17 Its conclusion rested partly on doubts that judicial standards could measure republicanism, partly on the instability a ruling against the recognized government might cause, and it treated Article IV, Section 4 as committing the question to Congress.18 Those cases were political because a textual assignment to Congress combined with the lack of any judicial yardstick. The fact that state government was the subject was incidental.
The second step applied that understanding to the voters. The question was whether state action was consistent with the Federal Constitution, so no issue had been decided, or remained to be decided, by a political branch coequal with the Court.19 The voters also did not need the Court to make policy determinations for which manageable standards were lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and courts had long been able to decide whether a discrimination reflects no policy and is simply arbitrary and capricious.20 Federal courts test state laws against the Fourteenth Amendment as a matter of routine, so the claim asked them to do ordinary judicial work.
The posture of the case reinforces this structure. The usual answer to a political question is that the political process will resolve it, and that answer is weakest where the process is the broken part. The voters alleged that Tennessee's own political process offered no realistic relief because of how the legislature was composed,21 and lawmakers whose seats depend on the disparity have little reason to correct it. A federal court that declined to hear the claim would leave the voters with no forum.
How does a court tell a genuine equal protection claim from a Guarantee Clause claim wearing an equal protection label? Baker answers through Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, where the Court refused to decide whether a state may adopt legislation by initiative or referendum.22 The corporation there attacked a tax enacted by initiative and invoked due process and equal protection alongside the Guarantee Clause. Baker read the first two grounds as raised only to support the contention that the tax was invalid because of the way it had been passed. The company did not say it could not be taxed, did not claim it had been denied a hearing on the amount, and pointed to nothing in the tax itself that infringed its rights.23 The attack aimed at the framework of the state's government, a demand that the state show itself republican in form, and the Court treated it as political.24 The Tennessee voters complained of something done to them: their own votes counted for less than others', and equal protection standards measure that harm. Baker added a caution, that an equal protection claim must not be so enmeshed with political question elements as to present a political question itself, and it found the voters' claim clear of that problem.25 The constitutional label on a complaint therefore decides nothing. What matters is whether the gist of the claim is that a specific state action treats the plaintiffs unequally or that the structure of the state's government is illegitimate.
Baker's holding was narrow. The Court held only that the district court had jurisdiction, that the complaint stated a justiciable cause of action on which the voters would be entitled to appropriate relief, and, because the defendants raised the issue, that the voters had standing. It declined to consider what remedy would be most appropriate, noting only that it had no cause to doubt the district court could fashion relief if violations were found.26 It did not decide whether the 1901 apportionment violated equal protection, and it said only that equal protection standards were familiar, without stating the test for apportionment claims.27 That test came later. Two years afterward Reynolds v. Sims applied the Equal Protection Clause to require state legislative districts of substantially equal population, the principle known as one person, one vote.28 Baker thus answers whether a court may hear the claim, and Reynolds and its successors answer whether the voters win.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, and his objections preview a debate that returns later in this unit. In his view the Equal Protection Clause offers no clearer guide to apportionment than the Guarantee Clause, so invoking the Fourteenth Amendment could not supply the judicial competence the Guarantee Clause lacked. Apportionment, he argued, mixes geography, demography, tradition, and the practical effects of political institutions in ways that courts are not equipped to evaluate.29 He added that talk of vote debasement is circular until some standard fixes what a vote should be worth. The majority answered that equal protection standards were familiar and well developed. The objection returned in Rucho v. Common Cause, which concerned partisan gerrymandering, the use of redistricting to “load the dice” in favor of the party that designs the election map. There the Court found a political question.30
Textual Commitment
The first consideration on Baker's list is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, and the modern Court treats it as the strongest sign that a case should be dismissed.31 A coordinate political department is Congress or the President, the branches that stand beside the judiciary in the constitutional structure. Marbury itself recognized such commitments when it described the President's political powers, such as the veto, as powers he exercises in his own discretion and for which he answers only to his country and his conscience.32 The factor asks one question: which branch does the Constitution make the final decider of the matter in dispute?33 If the answer is Congress or the President, the court stays out and that branch's judgment stands. Because the doctrine concerns political questions and not political cases, the commitment must appear in the dispute itself, and a subject that merely sounds political does not suffice.34
The factor carries the most weight because of what a ruling on a committed question would do. If the text makes the Senate or the President the final judge of a matter, a court decision on that matter would override the branch the Constitution chose and would turn the courts into supervisors of their coordinate branches. A commitment found in the text also gives the firmest ground for abstaining, because it rests on the document's own allocation of authority and not on the judges' sense of prudence. The remaining considerations call for more flexible judgment, which is why this one anchors the analysis.
Textually demonstrable does not mean that a clause must name both the branch and the subject. The commitment may be express or implied, and a court finds it with the ordinary tools of constitutional interpretation: the language of the provision, its history, its place in the structure of the document, and precedent.35 Coleman v. Miller shows an implied commitment. The Court there held that how long a proposed amendment remains open for ratification, and what effect an earlier rejection has on a later ratification, are committed to congressional resolution and involve criteria of decision that necessarily escape the judicial grasp.36 Answering them would have required appraising a great variety of political, social, and economic conditions that are hardly within the range of evidence a court can receive.37 The Court called the questions essentially political and not justiciable, because those conditions are appropriate for the political departments to consider.38 Not every Justice agreed. A separate opinion would have held that more than a reasonable time had elapsed and would have reversed the judgment of the Kansas supreme court.39 A rule that demanded express words would leave a structural assignment open to review because the drafters left it unwritten, and that result would defeat the purpose of the factor.
Because finding a commitment takes interpretation, courts decide whether one exists and how far it reaches. Baker called the question whether a matter has been committed to another branch a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation and a responsibility of the Supreme Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.40 Nixon v. United States repeated the instruction: courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and decide whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed.41 The reason is structural. If the branch claiming authority could decide whether its authority was final, any branch could place any contested act beyond review by declaring it committed to itself, and the doctrine would swallow judicial review. The section on the limits of the doctrine develops this judicial corollary.42
Nixon v. United States works through the interpretive tools in an impeachment setting. The Impeachment Trial Clause gives the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments,” and the Court read the word “sole” as showing that the authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else.43 The rest of the clause lists what the Senate must do: take an oath or affirmation, convict only by a two-thirds vote, and sit with the Chief Justice presiding when the President is tried. The word “try,” in 1787 and later, had meanings broad enough that the Court would not read it as an implied limit on how the Senate proceeds.44 A removed federal judge therefore could not ask a court to require the full Senate, rather than a committee, to hear the evidence, because the manner of trial belonged to the Senate. The conclusion drew on the clause's language together with history, precedent, and policy, which is the full interpretive toolkit.45 Nixon also showed that the Baker factors overlap, since the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that the text commits an issue to another branch.46 The next section takes up standards as a consideration in its own right.
The Nixon reading was contestable, and the dispute teaches something about the factor. The Senate's “sole” power to try parallels the House's “sole” power to vote articles of impeachment, so the word can be read as sorting the roles of the two chambers and not as excluding the courts.47 Finding a commitment is itself a judgment about what the constitutional text means, which is why this inquiry can come close to a ruling on the merits.48 Powell v. McCormack points the other way. There the House excluded an elected member under its power to judge the qualifications of its members. After interpreting that clause, the Court concluded that the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude a duly elected member who meets the qualifications the Constitution expressly prescribes, so the exclusion fell outside any commitment and was reviewable.49 A clause that mentions a branch's authority therefore opens the inquiry, and the extent of the commitment settles it.
Standards and Policy Choices
The second and third considerations on Baker's list are a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue, and the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. They are best learned together, because they describe one concern from two angles. The second asks whether the Constitution supplies a measure a court can apply to the dispute. The third asks whether any answer would come only after the court first chose among competing goals that belong to elected officials. The modern Court reads the two as setting a similar boundary, since federal judicial power reaches the kinds of decisions that English and American courts have traditionally made.51 A court can therefore decide a question only when the law gives it a yardstick for the answer.
That boundary protects what gives a judicial ruling its authority. A court speaks with the force of law when it applies a rule that existed before the dispute and binds the judge as it binds the parties. When no such rule exists, a judge who rules anyway must fill the gap with a personal view of good government, and an official whom voters cannot remove makes the choice. Unpredictability follows as well, because courts without a rule would likely reach disparate and inconsistent results from case to case. The policy-determination consideration has its own logic. If the first step in resolving a dispute is to decide what the ideal outcome would be, the question was political at the outset, and the legal-sounding steps that follow only carry out a choice that was never legal.
Baker itself shows the standards consideration absent. The Tennessee voters did not need the Court to make policy determinations for which manageable standards were lacking, because judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar.52 Reynolds later supplied the rule: legislative districts within a state must contain substantially equal numbers of constituents.53 A court applying that rule counts the residents of each district and compares the totals. It never has to say what good representation looks like, and that is why the claim is a legal one.
Partisan fairness offers nothing to count. In Rucho v. Common Cause the Court disclaimed the existence of any discoverable or manageable standard against which to evaluate partisan-gerrymandering claims.54 A court asked whether a map treats a party fairly would first have to choose a definition of fairness, such as proportionality between statewide votes and seats, adherence to traditional districting criteria, or the largest number of competitive districts, and then decide how much partisan advantage is too much. The Constitution endorses none of those choices. Its text points toward the political branches instead. The Elections Clause assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of Congress and gives Congress the power to “make or alter” any such regulations,55 and Congress has regularly exercised that power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.56
The two kinds of claim sit at opposite ends of one spectrum. Voters who show that one state legislative district holds ten times the population of another invoke a rule that decides their case by arithmetic. A party's supporters who show that a map yields fewer seats than their statewide vote might produce invoke a grievance, but no constitutional rule tells a court how many seats a party's votes should buy. Both suits attack how a state draws district lines, so the subject matter is the same. The difference is whether the Constitution hands the court a measure, and a later section develops the full partisan gerrymandering holding.
These two considerations rarely operate alone. They more often supply evidence on the first Baker consideration, because a lack of judicially discoverable standards, or the need for a nonjudicial policy choice, supports the conclusion that the Constitution has committed the question to a political branch.57 Coleman v. Miller shows the pattern. Whether a proposed amendment has been pending too long depends on a great variety of political, social, and economic conditions that the Court found hardly suited to evidence in a courtroom and well suited to the political departments,58 and it held that the question involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.59 In Luther v. Borden the Court's doubts that judicial standards could measure republicanism supported its conclusion that Article IV, Section 4 commits that issue to Congress.60 In each case the missing yardstick pointed toward a branch the text had already chosen.
Whether standards are adequate depends partly on how a court views the merits of the underlying claim, which makes this consideration easy to misapply. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker argued that the Equal Protection Clause supplies no clearer guide to apportionment than the Guarantee Clause, because apportionment involves geography, demography, tradition, and a host of other considerations.61 Standards for reapportionment seem ample if the Constitution basically requires numerical equality among districts, and elusive if apportionment must account for many complicated factors. The same overlap marks Rucho, where the finding that no manageable standard exists has been read as a merits ruling in disguise, since it left legislators free to adopt even openly partisan maps.62 A claim framed around a measurable legal rule invites a court to decide it, and a claim that asks the court to select a vision of good government invites dismissal.
Prudential Factors
The last three considerations on Baker's list are the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches, an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, and the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. They are prudential, and each rests on a judgment about how courts should treat the other branches. Justice Souter, concurring in Nixon v. United States, described the doctrine as deriving in large part from prudential concerns about the respect owed the political departments, and he cited Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter.63 A judgment of that kind is more flexible than a textual commitment, and the Court's practice has narrowed it accordingly. The current Court is more skeptical of these categories and keeps the finality concern alive in particular settings, and in the cases where it has applied the doctrine at all it has focused almost entirely on textual commitment and manageable standards.64
The respect factor asks whether a court could resolve a dispute only by showing disrespect to Congress or the President, and its weakness is easy to see. A federal court sometimes must read the Constitution differently from another branch, and if disagreement alone counted as disrespect, no court could ever invalidate a statute or an executive act. In Powell v. McCormack the House argued that adjudicating its exclusion of an elected member would produce a conflict with a coordinate branch. The Court answered that fixing Powell's right to sit required nothing more than interpreting the Constitution, which falls within the traditional role of courts and shows no lack of respect due a coordinate branch.65 Our system requires courts on occasion to interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with another branch's construction, and the resulting conflict cannot justify avoiding the judicial responsibility.66 The same reasoning answered the objection in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, where a challenge to a one-House veto was treated as an intrusion on legislative authority. If that characterization made the question political, virtually every challenge to a statute's constitutionality would be political, and no policy behind the doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive may decide the constitutionality of a statute.67
The multifarious-pronouncements factor fails in the same cases for a related reason. The worry is that two departments will announce different answers to one question and the nation will seem to speak with two voices. When the Supreme Court is the final interpreter, its answer controls, so no rival answer survives. Powell made that point by reminding that the Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, and Chadha made it by observing that, since the constitutionality of the statute was for the Court to resolve, there was no possibility of multifarious pronouncements.68 The concern keeps real force where the executive's statement is itself the nation's position. Baker observed that some foreign-relations questions uniquely demand a single-voiced statement of the government's views, and it added that it is error to suppose every case touching foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.69 Courts ordinarily follow the executive on which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory, yet once sovereignty is politically determined, courts may examine the resulting status and decide independently whether a statute applies there.70 The factor therefore shapes foreign-affairs cases without operating as a blanket rule, a point a later section develops.
The finality concern does the most work in practice, and its reason is reliance. Some decisions must be settled so that everyone who depends on the answer can act on it, and reopening them in litigation spreads doubt across everything built on them. Baker found this need dominant in the political departments' determination of when a war has ended, because an emergency demands prompt and unhesitating obedience.71 In Coleman v. Miller the Court treated attributing finality to the political departments, together with the lack of satisfactory judicial criteria, as the dominant considerations behind its refusal to review how long a proposed amendment stays open for ratification.72 The status of a constitutional amendment must be an answer the whole country can rely on, and the conditions bearing on it are for the political departments to weigh.73 Baker carried the same reasoning to the enacting process: the respect due coequal departments, and the need for finality and certainty about a statute's status, make courts reluctant to inquire whether a statute complied with all requisite formalities as it passed.74 In Nixon v. United States the Court added that opening the Senate's impeachment procedures to review would expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.75 If a President were impeached, the legitimacy of any successor would suffer while the courts worked and during any retrial before a differently constituted Senate. A court would also face unanswered questions about relief, such as whether it could reinstate a removed judge or order a new judgeship once the seat had been filled.76 Justice Souter's concurrence added that the unusual need for unquestioning adherence and the risk of multifarious pronouncements confirmed the result.77
Finality is a feature of the particular dispute and not of its subject matter. Baker explained that deference to the political departments on wartime questions rests on isolable reasons, so where a program is important but not central to the emergency effort, and clearly definable criteria for decision are available, the political question barrier falls away.78 The date a war ended is a determination the nation must treat as settled. A challenge to a wartime rent-control program is different, because rent control is a public program of importance yet not central to the emergency effort, and a court may inquire whether the exigency on which the law depended still existed.79 Even in the impeachment setting, Justice Souter allowed that a conviction by coin toss might call for a judicial response, because the political question doctrine is a tool for maintenance of governmental order and will not be applied to promote only disorder.80
These factors rarely decide an exam problem alone. Baker requires that one of its formulations be inextricable from the case before a court dismisses, and the Court has leaned almost entirely on textual commitment and manageable standards when it has found a political question.81 A fact pattern that says only that a ruling might irritate Congress or embarrass the President describes the weakest basis for dismissal. The better questions are whether the dispute needs a final, stable answer that litigation would unsettle, as with ratification, removal, or the end of a war, and whether the court would be doing nothing more than interpreting the Constitution as its final authority. A yes to the first favors dismissal, and a yes to the second removes the respect and single-voice concerns entirely.