Concept
Extending Jones
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
Extending Jones
Jones settled a narrow point: Congress may use Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to forbid a private seller from refusing to sell a home because of the buyer’s race. The reasoning runs wider than the facts. Section 2 “clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery,” and that power may be addressed to private conduct as well as public.1 A test built on badges and incidents raises an obvious question: which other private practices can Congress reach the same way? Three decisions answer it, and each pairs a statute with a different kind of private conduct.
| Decision | Statute | Private conduct reached |
|---|---|---|
| Runyon v. McCrary | § 1981 (contracts) | A private school’s refusal to admit qualified Black children |
| Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park | § 1982 (property) | A corporation’s refusal to approve a share assignment to a Black lessee |
| Griffin v. Breckenridge | § 1985(3) (conspiracy) | A private conspiracy driven by racial animus |
Each decision reached private conduct under Section 2 without any showing of state action. The pattern is deference: the Court has been more willing to defer to broad exercises of Section 2 power against private discrimination than to expand its own power to remedy private racial discrimination.2 For each decision, ask what practice was challenged, which statute reached it, and why Congress could treat the practice as part of slavery’s legacy.
Contract Rights: Runyon
Section 1981 does for contracts what § 1982 does for property: it regulates the making and enforcing of contracts and related rights.3 Courts assumed for decades that a § 1981 claim required state action, because the statute had been recodified after the Fourteenth Amendment. Only in the modern civil rights era did the Supreme Court consider it in a new light.4 Runyon v. McCrary put the question for a private school: does federal law forbid it to deny admission to qualified applicants solely because of race, a contract right?5 The Court answered yes and held § 1981 valid as applied to private school admissions.6
The record explains why an admissions decision counted as a contract. The schools had advertised and offered their services to members of the general public, promising educational services in return for payment. That was an offer of a contractual relationship, and the children were refused solely because they were Black. The Court called the exclusion a “classic violation” of § 1981.7 The advertising carries the weight: it converted an admissions decision into a refused contract.
The statutory step ran straight through Jones. A private person who refuses to sell property solely because the buyer is Black violates the buyer’s right to purchase on equal terms with whites. Likewise, a private offeror who refuses to give a Black person, solely because of race, the same opportunity to contract that it gives white offerees violates the right to “make and enforce contracts.”8 The constitutional step needed no state action, because Section 2 may be addressed to private conduct.9 The analogy is easy to draw. A person who cannot contract on the same terms as white persons cannot buy services such as schooling or sell labor on chosen terms, so a racial barrier to contracting looks like a surviving burden of slavery in the same way a barrier to buying a home does.
The schools also argued that applying § 1981 violated their privacy rights, and the Court rejected the contention. Privacy might extend to a genuinely private social club, but it did not insulate private schools that advertise and offer their services to the general public from appropriate federal legislation.10 The public offer marks where the defense stops. A school that solicits strangers has little in common with a group that picks its own companions.
Section 1981 also reaches employment, because the employment relationship is a contractual one. In modern law the statute applies to public and private employers and to unions.11 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union applied it to a private party’s race-based refusal to promote a Black employee.12 Congress later codified the private reach in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides that the rights § 1981 protects “are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”13
The outer edge of § 1981 comes from the statute, not from Section 2. In Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, Justice Scalia wrote that § 1981 was not meant to be an “omnibus remedy for all racial injustice,” and he warned that a broader reading would produce “satellite litigation of immense scope.”14 Read that as a limit on what the statute covers, not on what Congress may do under Section 2.
Community Facilities: Sullivan
Jones concerned the sale of a home, and Sullivan tested how far the same reasoning travels into the arrangements around a lease. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., the Court extended Jones to hold that discrimination in certain community facilities in connection with the rental of property entitles the injured party to a private right of action for damages under § 1982.16 The case stays within property law. Its question is how many benefits tied to a lease the right to lease reaches.
Section 1982 descends from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gave all citizens “the same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”17 The petitioners sued under that Act for money damages and injunctive relief. A member of a private corporation had sought to transfer his membership share to a Black lessee, and the corporation refused to approve the assignment. The Court held that the corporation could not refuse approval on the basis of the lessee’s race.18 Later decisions describe Sullivan as holding § 1982 validly applied to a private corporation’s race-based refusal to approve a member’s transfer of shares to a Black assignee.19
The holding follows from the connection between the share and the tenancy. If an association could condition the benefits attached to a lease on the tenant’s race, the right Jones protected would be hollowed out by indirect means, because a lease stripped of its amenities is a lesser lease. Calling the benefit a membership share did not change the analysis. Sullivan extended § 1982 beyond Jones by holding that the distinction between real and personal property, in characterizing the membership share, is immaterial, because § 1982 covers both types of property.20
The Court also rejected the Virginia trial court’s finding that the corporation was a truly private social club. The Court observed that “[t]here was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness. It is open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race.”21 The rejection matters because of what Runyon later said: privacy might extend to a genuinely private social club.22 A club label therefore carries weight only when the facts back it. On an exam, state the privacy limit Runyon recognized, then ask which facts would make the association genuinely private.
Private Conspiracies: Griffin
Section 1985(3), which the Court’s opinions also cite as § 1985(c), gives a remedy against conspiracies to deprive persons of equal protection or of equal privileges and immunities. For two decades the Court read it narrowly. In Collins v. Hardyman (1951), it construed the section to reach only conspiracies under color of state law, and it found no cause of action where members of a political club alleged that the defendants had broken up their meeting.24 Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) discarded that reading. A unanimous Court held § 1985(c) applicable to certain purely private conspiracies to deprive persons of civil rights.25 Like Jones, Griffin required two answers: what the statute covers, and whether Congress had power to make it cover private conduct.
The second answer is the one that carries Jones from refusals to deal into private group action. The Equal Protection Clause cannot do the work alone, because a victim of racial discrimination under it must prove state action, along with purposeful racial classification and disproportionate racial impact.26 The Griffin Court found it unnecessary to decide whether Congress had power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the provision. Justice Stewart relied instead on Congress’s power to reach private conduct under the Thirteenth Amendment.27 The petitioners were African-Americans who charged private individuals with a conspiracy to deprive them of their rights.
The holding carries its own limit. Reading the law to cover private action did not mean that it applies “to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,” but only to those with an “invidiously discriminatory motivation.” The statutory language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that “there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.”28 Animus here means hostility directed at the victim because of the group to which the victim belongs. Without that requirement, any agreement to wrong a third person would carry federal liability, and the statute would become a general law of torts.
The Court has drawn the same line around commercial motives. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, a 5-4 decision, a union was alleged to have violently interfered with nonunion workers’ First Amendment rights not to associate with a union. The Court found no cause of action under § 1985(3), requiring proof that “the state is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the state,” and it refused to read the section to “reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus.”29
Why does Section 2 reach a private conspiracy at all? Because the right at stake is one the law secures to all free members of society. The right to use public highways and thoroughfares is such a right, so a private conspiracy to deny it to African Americans can rationally be described as a badge or incident of slavery.30 Section 2 reaches the badges and incidents of slavery, not slavery alone.31 Griffin thus applies the deferential Jones test to private group action, as Runyon applied it to a refusal to contract.
The statutory limits surface again in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, a § 1985(3) dispute over access to abortion clinics. The Court declined to decide whether animus toward women falls within the proscription of § 1985(3).32 Congress later largely superseded the decision with the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994.33 Bray therefore raises a question about what § 1985(3) covers, not about the scope of Section 2. Whether the enforcement power reaches discrimination beyond the racial context is a separate question, although the Court has construed statutes enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment as including discriminations against groups other than African Americans.34 That question returns near the end of this chapter.
Step two does most of the work on an exam, because the violence in most fact patterns is obvious and the contest is over the reason for it.