Concept
Limits on the Power
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
Limits on the Power
Jones supplies the standard for every Section 2 problem in this chapter. Congress may rationally determine what the badges and incidents of slavery are and translate that determination into effective legislation, and the legislation is valid even when it reaches purely private conduct. A court reviewing such a statute asks only whether Congress’s determination was rational. That leniency operates within boundaries, because a rationality inquiry presupposes that Congress has acted and that what it acted on can fairly be called a badge or incident of slavery.
Runyon, Sullivan, and Griffin show the power at its widest. Runyon reached a private school’s refusal to contract, Sullivan a community association’s refusal to approve a lessee, and Griffin a private conspiracy of violence; in each, Congress had enacted a statute that the Court read to cover the conduct and then sustained under Section 2. Those results tempt a reader to treat the Amendment as a general grant of authority over private racial wrongs. Four questions cut against that reading. Does the broad concept of a badge operate without a statute? What kind of conduct counts as a badge? Whom does the power protect? And will the limits the Court has placed on enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment carry over to Section 2?
The first two questions mark lines the Court has drawn. The third is partly settled and partly open, and the fourth is open. On an exam, Jones supplies the framework; the next step is to ask which boundary the statute in the problem approaches.
Statute Required for Broad Reach
Jones draws the line this subsection depends on. The Court observed that the Amendment itself abolished slavery, and it left open whether the Amendment itself does anything more, calling that “a question not involved in this case.” What the Court did decide is that the Enabling Clause empowers Congress to do much more, because the clause “clothed ‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.’”1
Two sources of authority therefore operate side by side. Section 1 works on its own, and a court can enforce it without a statute. Section 2 supports legislation, and the broad concept of a badge or incident of slavery does its work there. That division explains why the expansive reading taught in the earlier sections depends on a statute. When a litigant invokes the Amendment directly, with no federal law enacted under Section 2, the Court has taken a highly restrictive view of its own power to remedy private and state misconduct under Section 1, even as it defers to broad exercises of congressional power under Section 2.2
Apart from slavery itself, the condition the Court has treated as directly forbidden by Section 1 is essentially peonage: compelling a person to work off a debt under threat of legal penalty. Peonage fits the text because it is involuntary servitude in the ordinary sense, labor extracted by compulsion. Racial discrimination in the sale of a house is different. Congress may treat it as a badge of slavery and reach it by statute, as Jones shows,3 but a court asked to strike down the same practice under Section 1 alone would be stretching the self-executing text beyond the conditions it describes.
The Enabling Clause itself allocates the judgment about badges. The passage Jones quotes asks who is to decide what appropriate legislation is to be, and it answers: “The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.”4 A court enforcing the broad concept directly would have no statute fixing the conduct covered and no congressional judgment to review for rationality. Confining Section 1 to conditions like peonage leaves the open-ended question of what counts as a badge with the branch the clause names.
Neither challenge has a federal statute behind it, so each turns on the condition the state law authorizes. The housing law licenses private discrimination that Congress could reach under Section 2, but the Court has not held that Section 1 forbids it of its own force. The debt law compels labor under threat of imprisonment, the very servitude the text describes, so Section 1 reaches it without help from Congress.
Jones concerns Congress’s Section 2 power, while this subsection concerns what a court will enforce without a statute, so the narrow reading of Section 1 retreats from nothing in Jones. Jones expressly left open whether Section 1 itself reaches more than the abolition of slavery, which makes the narrow view a description of what has been held directly forbidden and not a holding that nothing more is.5
A problem that says only that a state law permits racial discrimination in housing, and asks whether the law violates the Thirteenth Amendment, invites a reflex recital of the rational-determination standard. That standard governs a federal statute enacted under Section 2. The first move is to ask what the challenger relies on. If the claim rests on a congressional statute, Jones applies and the court reviews the determination for rationality. If the claim rests on Section 1 alone, the question is whether the condition is slavery or peonage-like compelled labor, and a practice that is merely a candidate badge of slavery will probably not qualify without legislation.
Purpose Versus Impact
Memphis v. Greene shows that a practice does not become a badge of slavery merely because it falls more heavily on Black residents.7 Memphis closed a street, and the closing incidentally set up a barrier between white and African-American communities.8 The Court rejected the Thirteenth Amendment claim because the disparate impact on Black citizens “could not be fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery.”9 Two features of the record carried that conclusion. No one had shown racially discriminatory motivation, and the Court treated adverse impact by itself as insufficient, because a contrary holding “would trivialize the great purpose of that great charter of freedom.”10
The line follows from what the label means. A badge of slavery is a practice that carries slavery’s subordination forward, and race itself supplies that connection when it decides who may buy a home. Jones upheld the statute on that footing, because Congress could rationally conclude that the burdens and disabilities of slavery include restraints on the right to purchase and lease property.11 A decision that burdens one group more than another without a racial reason does not carry that subordination forward in the same way. If every racially uneven result qualified, the Amendment would become a general rule against disparities, and the tie to slavery that justifies the deferential Section 2 standard would fall away. The Court’s word “trivialize” names that danger.
The statutory claim in Memphis failed for a separate reason, and the two rulings should be kept apart. The Court found that the city’s actions did not involve any discrimination impairing the kind of property interests the legislation was designed to proscribe: the record showed no benefits granted to white citizens that would have been refused to Black citizens, and no significant loss in the value of property owned by Black citizens.12 That ruling turned on facts about the property interests the statute protects, so it supplies an independent reason the claim failed and does not restate the constitutional point.
A closing that burdens Black residents more heavily than white ones will not always fail, and the dividing fact is the reason behind it. The Court’s conclusion may well have been different had evidence established that the street closing was purposefully designed to segregate the neighborhoods.13 A fact pattern that reports only how hard an action fell on Black residents has skipped the question Memphis puts first: why did the actor behave as it did?
The purpose requirement differs from the limit the 1883 Court drew. In the Civil Rights Cases the Court refused to treat denial of admission to inns, public conveyances, and theaters as a badge of slavery. It reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment vindicates “those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship,” not “social rights,” and that “mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”14 That line sorted practices by the kind of right at stake. Memphis sorts by whether the challenged practice was racially purposeful. Both show that the concept of a badge or incident of slavery is not completely elastic,15 but they draw the boundary at different places.
Requiring a discriminatory reason is familiar from other Reconstruction-era doctrine. Under the Equal Protection Clause a state may not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race except under the narrowest of circumstances, and the victim must prove both state action and purposeful racial classification, along with disproportionate racial impact.16 Griffin’s requirement of “invidiously discriminatory animus” behind a private conspiracy under § 1985(3) points the same way.17 In each setting the doctrine asks why the actor behaved as it did, and Memphis places the badge concept in the same company.
Who the Power Protects
The Section 2 power protects people of any race, and beyond race its reach is unsettled. Jones allows Congress to prohibit private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property as a badge or incident of slavery, and the power depends on a link between a practice and slavery’s legacy. In Jones the practice was race-based exclusion from the property market, which Congress could rationally tie to the burdens slavery imposed.19 The question of who the power protects therefore reduces to which kinds of discrimination can be tied to that legacy, and the answer has three layers. Race is the settled core. The Court has read statutes enforcing the Amendment to cover groups other than African Americans. And whether Section 2 reaches private discrimination on non-racial grounds is undecided.
Section 1 does not turn on race. It outlaws all forms of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude,” whether or not related to race,20 so a person of any race held in compelled labor stands within the Amendment itself. The harder questions belong to Section 2, where Congress reaches practices short of servitude by treating them as badges and incidents of slavery. That power requires a rational connection between the practice and what slavery imposed, and the connection is easiest to show when the practice is racial.
A plaintiff of any race may invoke the racial core. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. the Court held that a white person may state a cause of action under § 1981, so a white employee fired for a racial reason has the same statutory claim that a Black employee fired for that reason would have.21 The justification for reaching racial discrimination attaches to the practice, so it applies whoever the victim is. The plaintiff must still show that race was the reason for the employer’s action, which fits the purpose requirement drawn from Memphis. A white employee dismissed for a non-racial reason has no claim, just as a Black employee in that position would have none.
The Court has also applied these statutes to groups beyond African Americans and whites. A person of Jewish ancestry may state a cause of action under § 1982 in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, and a person of Arab ancestry may do so under § 1981 in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji.22 Those are holdings about what the statutes cover. The Court has yet to hold that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power may be exercised beyond the context of racial discrimination, and an answer that treats the ancestry cases as extending Section 2 to non-racial classes claims more than they decided.23
Beyond race and ancestry the holdings stop. In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic the Court declined to decide whether animus toward women falls within § 1985(3).24 Declining to decide leaves the question open and does not resolve it against extension. The structure of the power explains the caution. Congress’s determination must be rational, which requires a plausible connection between the practice and slavery’s legacy, and Jones and Griffin, the decisions that supplied that connection, concerned race. Their clear-eyed focus on race gives reason to conclude that the badges-and-incidents principle would not support a ban on sex-based abuse.25
Arguments run the other way, and they remain arguments and not holdings. Section 1 is not confined to race, Griffin required animus that was “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,” and the history of the nation’s treatment of women is connected in some measure to the history of American slavery.26 Defenders of an extension add an analogy: if religious discrimination is close enough to race discrimination to identify badges and incidents of slavery, then perhaps even a fortiori sex discrimination is close enough too.27 One account of the modern understanding holds that the power reaches beyond race to protect individual freedom generally, and it points to the 2009 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which amended the federal hate-crime law to cover crimes based on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability.28 A statute that reflects that understanding is still not a decision sustaining it.
Step four is where the analysis is contested, since the race-focused precedents point one way and the breadth of Section 1 and the analogy to race point the other. The exam-ready answer states that uncertainty without announcing a result.
Open Questions After Boerne
Jones remains the governing standard for Section 2, but the Court has since reworked the law of enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment and has not said whether that reworking reaches the Thirteenth. Jones holds that Congress, acting under the enforcement power, may prohibit private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property as a badge or incident of slavery. In City of Boerne v. Flores the Court required that remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment be congruent and proportional to the violation it targets, a requirement taught with the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. The Court has not considered how that reformulation might affect Section 2, and commentators have wondered whether it will adjust its approach. One commentator calls Jones “arguably a remnant of the past,” yet the Court has never explicitly questioned the Jones standard, and lower courts continue to invoke it.30
The question matters because Jones and Boerne ask different things of Congress. Jones asks only whether Congress could rationally determine that a practice is a badge or incident of slavery. A congruence-and-proportionality test demands more, a fit between the statute and the violation it addresses, so legislation that satisfies Jones might fail if the Boerne approach were carried over to Section 2.
Many commentators nevertheless expect Jones to survive. Even if the Court were to apply Fourteenth-Amendment-like congruence-and-proportionality analysis to Section 2, there is reason to believe it would not retreat from the holding of Jones.31 The natural argument is that slavery was the wrong Section 1 abolished, so legislation aimed at its persisting consequences is easy to defend as a fitting response, most clearly when the target is overt race-based discrimination in housing sales and other commercial activity. A related view holds that Jones already matches what the framers expected: Congress would define the badges and incidents of slavery, and the courts would defer to any reasonable construction.32 Until the Court speaks, both positions are arguments and Jones is the rule.
Federal hate-crime legislation shows how the question arises in real cases. Section 249(a)(1) of title 18 punishes anyone who, “whether or not acting under color of law,” willfully causes bodily injury because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person.33 The color-of-law phrase removes any state-action requirement, and the statute requires no conspiracy, so it reaches farther than the § 1985(3) provision sustained in Griffin.34 In United States v. Cannon, United States v. Hatch, and United States v. Metcalf, the Fifth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits held § 249(a)(1) a valid exercise of the Section 2 power as applied to racially motivated violence.35 Their reasoning follows the Jones method of asking what Congress could rationally conclude. Master-on-slave violence enforced the attacker’s racial superiority and the victim’s powerlessness, and Congress could conceive that modern racially motivated violence tells the victim to stay in a subservient position.36 Critics answer that the statute removes no legal disability imposed on former slaves or their descendants and only adds federal penalties for conduct that was already illegal.37
The same reasoning has much less to stand on when the violence is sex-based. The sex-based-violence provision of the Violence Against Women Act at issue in United States v. Morrison could be defended under Section 2 only by stretching the badges concept past race, and the focus of Jones and Griffin on race discrimination gives reason to think the principle would not carry a ban on sex-based abuse.38 Arguments on the other side exist: Section 1 is not limited to race, Griffin left room for other class-based animus, and the nation’s treatment of women is connected in some measure to the history of slavery. Those arguments remain untested, and the Court has reserved the related question whether animus toward women falls within § 1985(3).39
A second open question involves a limit that did not exist when Jones was decided. The anti-commandeering rule, which restricts Congress’s power to command state governments, has emerged since Jones as a limit on lawmaking under the commerce power but not under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.40 Which side Section 2 falls on is unsettled. The Court could reason that restrictions on private conduct under the Thirteenth Amendment are akin to restrictions imposed under the commerce power and therefore subject to the rule, or it could view the Amendment as more closely analogous to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, where the rule appears inapplicable.41
That the question arises at all reflects the Amendment’s independent role. The Thirteenth Amendment continues to play an important role, independent of both the commerce power and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers, in defining congressional authority.42 Its independence matters most where neither commerce nor state action reaches the conduct, as with some private violence.
Steps three through five carry the uncertainty, and the strongest answers state it without announcing a result the Court has not reached.