Concept
The Vesting Clause
As chief executive, including the “take care” clause
The President as Chief Executive
The Vesting Clause
Article II opens with one sentence: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 The sentence does two things. It places the power in a single person rather than a council, and it names the power only by a label, “the executive Power,” without saying what the label contains.
That gap is the difficulty. Elsewhere Article II lists particular tasks; Section 3, for example, directs the President to receive ambassadors and to commission the officers of the United States.2 What, then, does the opening sentence add to such a list? One answer is that it only identifies who holds the listed powers. The other is that it vests a general executive authority, which the later clauses emphasize or qualify. The answer a court accepts decides how much the President may do without a statute and how far Congress may shape or confine the office.
The subsections below take the sentence in order: its text and purpose first, then the two readings, each built from the same words. Later sections test both against disputes over removal, enforcement, and emergency action, where outcomes often turn on which reading the Court applies.
Text and Purpose
The vesting sentence reads best beside its counterparts. Article I vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress, and Article III vests the judicial power in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish. Buckley v. Valeo set the three grants side by side.3 Each branch’s power sits in its own article, and only the legislative grant carries a limiting phrase.
That phrase, herein granted, ties Congress to the powers the Constitution grants it. Article II’s sentence has no such phrase, and supporters of broad presidential authority treat the omission as meaningful. The President, they say, may exercise any executive power, even one that no other clause of Article II mentions; that is how they defend executive agreements with foreign leaders as inherently executive.4 The next subsection gives the narrower reading, which treats the sentence as naming who holds the power and leaves its content to the clauses that follow.
The Framers vested the power in one person on purpose. They considered and rejected proposals for multiple executives and for a council of advisers with separate authority, declining to weaken the Executive by dividing the executive power.5 Hamilton explained the thinking in Federalist 70: “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government,” and it is “essential to the steady administration of the laws.”6
A strong executive was not an unchecked one. The Constitution blends power on purpose, creating areas of overlapping responsibility. The President takes part in lawmaking by recommending and vetoing legislation, and Congress reaches execution through its power to impeach executive officials and the Senate’s right to reject the President’s nominees.7 Congress also writes the statutes the executive carries out. Administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it, and the courts, when a case or controversy arises, can enforce those limits.8
These limits produce a distinction that recurs throughout the chapter: executing a law is not making one. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, as Buckley quotes it, the Court said that the Constitution “limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad,” and that it “is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”9 The facts of that case come later. For now, the question to put to any presidential directive is whether it carries out an existing statute or creates a binding rule on its own authority.
What separates the orders is whether a statute already supplies the binding duty. Agencies carry out statutes inside the executive branch and are subject to presidential supervision, though how far that supervision reaches is disputed.10 That dispute can wait, because the first order operates within a statute and the second operates with none.
Because Article II vests the whole executive power in one officer, the Court has called the President the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a case about the scope of presidential immunity, the Court said the grant “establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.”11 Those responsibilities include enforcing federal law and conducting foreign affairs. They also include managing the Executive Branch, a task for which, in the Court’s words, “imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.”12 Clinton v. Jones repeated the passage in a footnote.13
Section 1 ends with the oath the President takes before entering office, which includes a promise to “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States.”14 Section 3 turns that pledge into an express charge that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”15 the subject of the next major section.
The Enumerated-Powers View
The narrow reading starts from the whole of Article II, not from its first sentence alone. It takes Section 1 to say who holds the executive power, a single President, and takes the power’s content from the clauses that follow.17 Section 2 makes the President Commander in Chief, lets the President require written opinions from the principal officers of the executive departments, and grants the powers to pardon, to make treaties with the Senate’s consent, and to nominate and, with that consent, appoint officers.18 Section 3 adds the duties to receive ambassadors, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to commission the officers of the United States.19 On this view the President may exercise those powers and the implications fairly drawn from them, and no others.
James Madison was among those who disputed the broader reading. He contended that the opening language of Article II was “simply to settle the question whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title.” On that account the President has no unenumerated powers, and such authority would be inconsistent with a Constitution creating a government of limited authority.20
Three arguments carry the narrow view, and each gives a separate reason to distrust a grant in bulk.
The first argument is that a general grant would make the specific ones pointless. If the opening sentence already conferred every executive power, there was no reason to write that the President commands the armed forces, may require written opinions from department heads, may pardon, or must receive ambassadors. Interpreters assume that each clause does some work, and a reading under which a whole list of clauses does none counts against itself. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer the Solicitor General’s brief called the Vesting Clause “a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable.” Justice Jackson answered that, if so, “it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling ones,” and he regarded the clause instead as “an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.”21 A dissent in Myers v. United States reached the same point by canon: general words of a grant are limited when followed by words of special import, and a careful drafter would hardly emphasize a general grant by adding narrower ones without explanation.22
An essay that rests a presidential act on “the executive power” alone should therefore ask which clause names the function. A pardon for a federal offense needs no help from the Vesting Clause, because Section 2 grants the pardon power by name,23 and Section 3 commits the receipt of ambassadors to the President.24 The steel seizure had no clause of that kind behind it. The Government sought the seizure power in three clauses of Article II, the Vesting Clause, the Commander in Chief Clause, and the Take Care Clause, and Jackson rejected each as a source of that power.25 The narrow view thus draws its line between a function the text names and a function the President asks a court to infer from the vesting sentence.
The second argument is historical. A grant of all conceivable executive power would resemble the royal prerogative. Jackson observed that the unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the Framers was the prerogative George III exercised, and that the Declaration of Independence’s description of its evils made him doubt they meant to create their new Executive in his image.26 The same Myers dissent quoted an older argument about boundaries: executive power “is not a thing so well known, and so accurately defined, as that the written constitution of a limited government can be supposed to have conferred it in the lump,” since the English, French, and Russian executives, and the theorists who described them, differed on its extent.27 A label with no agreed content sets no limit in advance, so the officer who invokes it ends up deciding what it contains.
Two older statements point the same way, though they carry different weight. Chief Justice Taney, in Ex parte Merryman, read Article II as specifying the President’s powers “in precise and plain words” and as narrowly confining them, because the Framers had withheld many powers of the English executive that they thought dangerous to liberty and had conferred “those powers only which were deemed essential to secure the successful operation of the government.”28 An argument reported in Ex parte Milligan, which is argument and not a holding, maintained that the President “is not clothed with any executive power, except as he is specifically directed by some other part of the Constitution, or by an act of Congress.”29 The same argument blamed much confusion on mistaking executive power for kingly power: “Our executive is in no sense a king, even for four years.”30
The third argument rests on structure. Article II has no counterpart to the Necessary and Proper Clause that Article I gives Congress, so nothing in the Executive Article extends the listed powers to whatever might prove convenient.31 Jackson added that the Take Care Clause gives “a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law,” while the Fifth Amendment gives “a private right that authority shall go no farther,” which together signify the principle that “ours is a government of laws, not of men.”32 The Government defended the seizure as a response to an emergency: the order was made on findings that action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe, and in meeting that emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers.33 The narrow view meets such a defense by asking which clause grants the power. That demand for an anchor in the text gives a court a question it can answer.
The narrow view does not require a literal reading of each clause. Jackson regarded the Vesting Clause as “an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated,”34 and William Howard Taft, who served as President and later as Chief Justice, put the test this way: a President can exercise no power unless it is “fairly and reasonably based on a specific grant of power in Article II.” Theodore Roosevelt had taken the opposite position, that executive power is limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions in the Constitution or in statutes.35
The Commander in Chief Clause shows both sides of that test. It undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under presidential command and implies more than an empty title. But it cannot support every presidential action that involves force, as though it vested power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy.36 The argument reported in Milligan drew the limit more tightly: any war power of the President is nothing more than the power of commanding the armies and fleets that Congress causes to be raised, and to command them is to direct their operations.37 An order directing troops already under command is therefore a fair implication of the clause, while an order taking over a domestic industry has no anchor in it.
Step three decides most problems. The narrow view is easy to misdescribe as hostile to implied powers, but it accepts those that flow fairly from a listed clause. The broad reading, set out next, answers the surplusage argument by treating the later clauses as emphasis or qualification of a general grant.
The Plenary and Unitary View
The broad reading starts from the same sentence and finds its main support in what the sentence omits. Article I vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted”; Article II vests “the executive Power” with no such phrase. Proponents infer that the President may exercise any executive power, even one that no other clause specifies.39 The inference also shifts the burden. On the narrow reading a claimed power needs a clause that names it. On the broad reading the vesting sentence has already placed the whole executive power in the President, and the question becomes which later provision takes part of it away.
Hamilton’s defense of Washington’s neutrality proclamation shows the argument at work. Washington declared neutrality during the war between England and France in 1793, and Hamilton, writing as Pacificus, defended the act as a proper exercise of the power vested in the President by the “general grant” of executive power; Congress applauded the decision.40 As Chief Justice Taft later recounted in Myers v. United States, Hamilton’s argument was that the Constitution, by vesting the executive power in the President, gave him the right, as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign nations, to interpret national treaties and to declare neutrality.41
Hamilton met the objection from the later clauses by treating them as examples, not limits. He pointed to the different wording of the two vesting clauses as confirming his reading of the executive grant. He then named the exceptions to it, among them the legislature’s power to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal, and concluded: “With these exceptions, the executive power of the United States is completely lodged in the President.”42
That reasoning gives the broad view its answer to the surplusage objection. If the vesting sentence is the foundation, each later clause still has work to do: it stresses a function that was already executive, or it marks where another branch shares in it. Taft recounted the reasoning of Madison and his associates in the First Congress’s removal debate: the words of Section 2 that follow the general grant were either “an enumeration and emphasis of specific functions of the Executive, not all inclusive,” or limitations on the general grant, and limitations “should not be enlarged beyond the words used.”43
The Myers majority applied the reading to the removal of executive officers, and there it prevailed. Taft treated Hamilton’s neutrality argument as following exactly the reasoning that Madison and his associates used in the First Congress’s removal debate, so the same reading of Section 1 carried from foreign affairs to personnel.44 He recounted the argument that the natural meaning of “executive power” includes the appointment and removal of executive subordinates: if those were not an exercise of the executive power, “what were they?” They were not legislative or judicial power as usually understood.45 The Court concluded that Article II grants the President “the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers,” a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.46 The Court later summarized the holding this way: Congress could not by statute divest the President of the power to remove an officer in the Executive Branch whom he was initially authorized to appoint.47 The facts of Myers and the later limits on its rule belong to the removal sections below. What matters here is that the broad reading won on a claim about control of the President’s own subordinates.
The unitary-executive theory carries the grant a step further. If the whole executive power sits in one person, the theory runs, officials who exercise any part of it must answer to that person. One version gives the President almost complete discretion over the exercise of executive power within the executive branch; broader versions identify certain actions as executive in character whether they occur inside the branch or beyond it.48
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson stated the theory most sharply. His test asked two questions: whether conducting a criminal prosecution, and the investigation that decides whether to prosecute, is the exercise of purely executive power, and whether the statute deprives the President of exclusive control over that power. If both answers are yes, a statute that vests purely executive power in someone other than the President is void.49 Two points support the premise. The Framers rejected proposals for multiple executives and for councils with separate authority, so they left the executive power undivided.50 And, the dissent argued, when prosecutors are selected by and removable by an elected President, unfair prosecution carries a political cost to that President, a check that weakens when a court-appointed counsel exercises the power beyond the President’s full control.51
The Morrison majority nonetheless upheld the independent counsel statute, because the Attorney General’s power to remove the counsel for good cause left the Executive Branch with sufficient control.52 The premise has since returned. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the Court stated that the executive power, all of it, is vested in the President, who must take care that the laws be faithfully executed. A strong version of the theory casts doubt on the constitutionality of independent agencies, which are shielded to some degree from presidential control. Others respond that limits on presidential control over subordinate officials fit the Framers’ desire to check the accumulation of power in that branch and to facilitate apolitical policy decisions based on agency expertise.53
How far Congress may limit removal is the subject of the later removal sections, but two points bear on the theory here. The Court’s test for a limit on the removal of an officer who performs executive functions is functional: it asks the extent to which the limit “prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”54 And if Congress may restrict the removal of a particular officer, it can enforce the restriction through judicial review of the removal decision, which puts no additional burden on the President’s exercise of executive authority.55
A second strand of the broad reading concerns what the executive power contains, not who controls those who exercise it. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, a separate opinion of Justice Thomas observed that the Constitution’s specific allocations cannot account for all the foreign affairs powers the Federal Government exercises. Neither political branch is expressly authorized to communicate with foreign ministers, issue passports, or repel sudden attacks, yet the President has done these things with Congress’s support since the earliest days of the Republic.56 The point supports a residual foreign affairs power over functions no clause allocates. Because the opinion is a separate one, it states one Justice’s reading and no holding of the Court.
The Court has accepted the broad reading selectively. It prevailed for control of executive officers in Myers. In Youngstown, by contrast, the Government defended the seizure of the steel mills as within the aggregate of the President’s constitutional powers as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, and the mill owners answered that the order was lawmaking, a function the Constitution confides to Congress.57 The dissent, quoting Hamilton, called energy in the executive essential to “the steady administration of the laws,” found it “apparent that the Presidency was deliberately fashioned as an office of power and independence,” and added that the Framers “created no autocrat capable of arrogating any power unto himself at any time.”58 The Court rejected the seizure over that dissent, and Jackson, concurring, would not read the Vesting Clause as “a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power.”59
The two cases differ in what they claimed. Myers concerned authority over the officers who carry out the law, which the executive power and the Take Care Clause already pointed toward. Youngstown concerned an order seizing private mills, and Jackson found that none of the three clauses the Government invoked supported it.60 An essay that leans on the vesting sentence should sort its facts accordingly. The argument is strongest for presidential control of executive officers, where the Court has accepted it. In foreign affairs it rests on Hamilton’s neutrality reasoning, Washington’s practice, and one Justice’s opinion. A claim that the executive power alone authorizes seizing private property is the claim that failed in Youngstown.