Concept
Three Paths to Preemption
Supremacy clause and preemption
Three Paths to Preemption
Two sovereigns legislate for the same people, so their laws can conflict or work at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause answers with a clear rule: federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” and the judges in every state are bound by it, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”1 Under that principle Congress has the power to preempt state law.2 The clause settles rank, and agency regulations count as federal law for the purpose, so the hard question is whether a conflict exists that requires preempting state law.3 Arizona v. United States framed the inquiry in just those terms: whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement the state provisions in dispute.4
Preemption comes in two types, conflict and field, and either may be express or implied.5 Courts therefore work through three paths, the last of which divides in two. Congress may say in the statute that state law is displaced (express preemption). Where the text is silent, a court may infer an intent to displace state law altogether from a federal framework “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or from a federal interest “so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” (field preemption).6 Or the court may find a conflict: compliance with both laws is a physical impossibility (impossibility preemption), or the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (obstacle preemption).7
One question governs all three paths. “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case,” so whether federal law preempts state law in a given case depends entirely on what Congress intended.8 The paths differ only in where the evidence of that intent appears. An express clause puts it on the face of the statute, which greatly simplifies the question; field and conflict preemption require the court to infer it from the scheme or from the clash.9 Once found, the mechanism is the same on every path: Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors, a state law imposes conflicting restrictions or confers conflicting rights, and the federal law takes precedence.10
Two cautions apply throughout. First, the categories overlap. The Court has said they are not “rigidly distinct,” and it has observed that field preemption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption, since a variety of state laws can collide with a federal statute either because a private party cannot comply with both or because the federal objectives are frustrated.11 A single state law can therefore be attacked on several theories, and a careful answer tests it against each. Second, preemption is a ruling about statutory meaning, and Congress can change it. When the Court holds a state law preempted, it declares only that the state law is inconsistent with federal law, so Congress may pass a federal law denying the inconsistency. Preemption and dormant commerce clause decisions are the only constitutional decisions of federal courts that Congress may reverse by ordinary statute.12
Express preemption, where Congress writes its purpose into the text, is the simplest path and comes first.
Express Preemption
An express clause changes what the parties argue about. Congress’s intent to displace some state law is settled, and the dispute concerns how far the words reach. Because the court’s “sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress,” and Congress may displace state law by saying so “in express terms,” the analysis starts with the clause itself.13 The “plain wording of [that provision] . . . necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”14 From there the parties contest which state actors the words bind, which subjects they cover, and whether they capture court-made rules as well as statutes and regulations.
Two rules keep courts close to the text and away from expansive readings. Many preemption claims reach fields that the states have traditionally occupied, and there courts start from the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not superseded unless that was the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”15 The assumption carries into the reading of the clause itself: when its text supports more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”16 Courts likewise reject “uncritical literalism” when a clause sounds limitless.17 The presumption has its own section below; it matters here because it already operates when a court decides what a clause covers.
The wording sets the scope, and clauses differ in how wide they cast the net. The Airline Deregulation Act reaches state law that “relate[s] to” an air carrier’s rates and services, and it displaced a common-law tort claim arising from an airline’s frequent flyer program: the mileage credits relate to rates because they eliminate or reduce ticket prices, and the upgrades and flight access relate to services.18 A motor-carrier clause built on the same connective reached a city’s placard and parking requirements in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles. Its terms still bound it, however, and Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelke confirms that it does not preempt a state law that regulates motor carriers on a matter unrelated to the transportation of property.
The cigarette-labeling statute narrows its reach with different words. It bars any state “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health” with respect to cigarette advertising or promotion. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly the Court held that the statute preempts state regulations targeting cigarette advertising, while “[s]tates remain free to enact generally applicable zoning regulations, and to regulate conduct with respect to cigarette use and sales.”19 The line runs between a rule aimed at cigarette advertising, which is “inevitably motivated by concerns about smoking and health,” and a rule about signs in general.20 A billboard ordinance that limits the size and placement of every product’s signs, cigarettes included, therefore falls outside the clause.
The same clause sorts a state fraud claim the other way. Smokers who had used “light” cigarettes for more than fifteen years sued under Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging that the advertising falsely conveyed that the cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine than regular brands. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the federal labeling statute preempted the claim.21 In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good the Supreme Court held the claim not preempted, because a duty not to deceive applies to commercial speech generally and is not a requirement based on smoking and health. It also applied the rule that an ambiguous clause is read to disfavor preemption.22 Set beside the airline and motor-carrier clauses, the cigarette clause shows that scope follows wording. “Related to” asks only whether a state law connects to a named subject. “Based on smoking and health” asks what the state requirement rests on, so a rule can touch cigarette sellers and still escape it.
Some clauses are drafted so broadly that the question becomes whether the state law is connected closely enough to count. ERISA’s clause supersedes state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff a Washington statute that revoked a divorced spouse’s beneficiary designation was challenged under both the express clause and traditional conflict principles. The Court concluded that the statute was expressly preempted and for that reason addressed only the express argument.23 ERISA’s own text builds a sequence of questions. Does the state law “relate to” a plan? If not, nothing further is required. If so, does it regulate insurance, banking, or securities and so fall within the saving language? If it does, does the deemer clause apply?24
Clauses that bar state “requirements” or “standards” raise a further question of reach: does the word cover a jury verdict, or only a statute or regulation? Justice Breyer’s illustration in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr shows why the answer is often yes. If a federal rule requiring a two-inch wire preempts a state agency rule requiring a one-inch wire, then leaving untouched a tort suit that faults the manufacturer for not using a one-inch wire would give a single state jury more power than state lawmakers have, though the effects are identical.25 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. reached that result. The Medical Device Amendments bar a state requirement for a medical device that differs from, or adds to, a federal one, and the Court held, 8–1, that the clause expressly preempts design and informational-defect claims against the maker of a device that received premarket approval from the FDA.26 Its reasoning was that tort liability, like regulation, changes behavior and so creates requirements. Justice Ginsburg, alone in dissent, urged a presumption against preemption.27
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. met a different clause and reached a different result on the express question. The Safety Act contained both an express preemption provision and a saving clause, and its term “safety standard” can be read to mean an objective rule prescribed by a legislature or an agency, not the case-specific decisions of judges and juries that resolve common-law claims.28 A saving clause preserving common-law liability assumes that a significant number of common-law cases exist to be saved, so a reading of the express clause that swallowed them would leave the saving clause nothing to do. The contrast with Riegel shows that the word Congress chose (“requirement” in one statute, “safety standard” in the other) and the presence of a saving clause together decide whether tort claims fall inside an express clause.
A saving clause preserves certain state laws from an express clause’s sweep, which lets Congress mark the boundary from the other side. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 contains both an express clause and a savings clause.29 Title VII uses a related device, the disclaimer. Two of its sections are a “reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,” so in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra the Court saw “no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title VII.”30 A saving clause can also shelter a named category of state law from inside a broad clause. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting a federal immigration provision expressly preempted state laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who employ unauthorized workers, “other than through licensing and similar laws,” and Arizona’s statute allowed, and in some cases required, suspension or revocation of an employer’s licenses.31 The Court held, 5–3, that the licensing provisions fell squarely within the saving clause.32
Neither kind of clause ends the inquiry. State laws are also preempted when they conflict with federal law,33 so a state rule that falls outside the express clause, or inside a saving clause, must still be tested for conflict. Geier applied that rule to a statute with both an express clause and a saving clause. The saving clause kept the tort claim out of the express clause, but it did not bar the ordinary working of conflict principles, and nothing in the statute suggested that Congress wanted to add a “special burden” for the party asserting preemption.34 Whiting ran both steps in order. After placing the licensing provisions within the saving clause, the Court asked separately whether the law otherwise conflicted with federal law and found that it did not.35
Field Preemption
When Congress has said nothing about preemption, a court can still find that it meant to take over a whole subject. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. supplies the classic list of ways to show that purpose. First, the scheme of federal regulation may be “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”37 Second, the federal act may touch a field in which the federal interest is “so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”38 Third, the object sought by the federal law and the character of the obligations it imposes may reveal the same purpose.39 Rice began from the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not displaced without a clear and manifest purpose of Congress. That assumption matters most where the states have traditionally occupied the field, and it has its own section below.40
Each indicator is circumstantial evidence on one question: did Congress want a single regulator for this subject? A scheme detailed enough to cover a subject from end to end suggests that Congress considered the topic and settled it, so a state rule can add nothing without disturbing the balance Congress struck. A dominant federal interest points the same way from the other direction. On subjects the Constitution entrusts to the national government, such as foreign policy, rules that vary from state to state defeat the purpose of national control.41 The third indicator asks what the federal law is trying to accomplish and what duties it imposes, which can reveal a purpose of uniformity even when the text never says so.
Once a court finds that Congress occupied a field, the inquiry about any state law narrows to one question: whether “the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”42 Rice shows the test at work. Illinois argued that its commission should be allowed to supplement the federal Warehouse Act unless the commission’s actions ran counter in fact to federal policy, because the state system might operate in harmony with the federal “measure of control.”43 The Court held the commission could not act on matters the federal act covered. On matters the act left alone, “Congress has not foreclosed state action,” and objections about asserted conflicts were “premature.”44 An occupied field therefore reaches as far as federal regulation reaches, and no farther.
The test explains why state rules that duplicate or complement the federal ones fall along with contradictory ones. A federal regime that gives one agency control of a subject also gives it discretion over when and how to enforce, and a state rule laid on top of that regime acquires an enforcement discretion the federal program does not control. When every state does so, the scheme dissolves into a patchwork. Hines v. Davidowitz is the classic illustration. The Court found that Congress intended the federal plan for registering aliens to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system,” and because that “complete scheme” touched on foreign relations, the states could not “curtail or complement” federal law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”45 Arizona v. United States applied Hines to a state misdemeanor for willfully failing to carry a federal alien registration document. It held that Congress had occupied the field of alien registration, so even complementary or parallel state regulation was impermissible.46 A later section takes up that provision in detail. The rule it illustrates is that a state law mirroring the federal one gains no protection from the mirroring.
A field can also be defined by the balance a federal scheme strikes. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., Florida had protected boat-hull designs against copying, and the Court held the statute preempted. Congress had considered extending limited protection to industrial design, whether through the copyright laws or by relaxing the limits on design patents. It refused to do so in the copyright laws and has declined to alter the available patent protection, so the question whether to protect such designs belonged to Congress.47
Courts weigh two kinds of cues in deciding whether a field is occupied. The first is the breadth of federal coverage: how many aspects of the subject the federal scheme regulates, and how closely. The second is the nature of the subject: whether it is traditionally national, as immigration and foreign relations are, or traditionally local, as health and safety are. The rule of thumb for fixing a field’s scope is to define it as narrowly as the language permits, so as not to limit unduly the police powers of the states, and Pacific Gas & Electric illustrates it: a state’s refusal to license a proposed nuclear reactor for economic reasons was not preempted by federal occupation of the field of nuclear safety.48 The cues can pull in opposite directions, which explains why two comprehensive federal schemes produced different results. In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., pervasive federal regulation of blood-plasma collection did not displace county rules for plasma donors, because the local rules addressed health and safety within the states’ police power and nothing showed that they would undermine the federal scheme. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal a city’s curfew on jet flights fell, because federal regulation of the airways and airport noise was pervasive and curfews adopted community by community would ripple through the national system and disable the FAA.49 Where a state’s subject is rooted in historic police power, pervasiveness alone leaves the case for field preemption weak, and it takes pervasiveness joined with a real capacity to undermine federal control to overcome the presumption.
In state criminal law, Pennsylvania v. Nelson frames the inquiry as three questions. Is the federal scheme so pervasive that Congress must have meant the states not to supplement it? Is the federal interest so dominant that Congress must have meant to preclude state action? Would state enforcement present a serious danger to effective federal enforcement?50 The first two questions track Rice, and the third adds the practical concern that state prosecutions could interfere with federal ones. State and federal criminal statutes punishing identical or substantially identical conduct often coexist, and courts have often upheld the state statute on the theory that Congress did not make its law exclusive. Some state criminal laws have nevertheless fallen because federal legislation occupied the field.51
An exam stem that describes a state rule tracking the federal rule almost word for word invites the answer that no conflict exists and therefore no preemption. That answer holds only if Congress left the field open. Where the field is occupied, the absence of conflict is irrelevant. The analysis starts with the field and the evidence of congressional intent, and only then asks whether the particular state rule falls inside it.
Three limits qualify all of this. First, courts rarely find field preemption in environmental cases, in part because many federal environmental laws contain savings clauses that let states regulate more stringently than the federal government.52
Second, even an occupied field may be drawn narrowly. In English v. General Electric Co. the Court treated nuclear safety as a preempted field but required that a state law “have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels.” A whistleblower’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fell short, because any effect on safety policies was not direct or substantial enough.53 The later section on nuclear power returns to the line between safety and economics, where federal law occupies the entire field of nuclear safety concerns except for powers expressly ceded to the states, so that a state moratorium grounded in safety falls inside the prohibited field.54
Third, the Court may prefer to decide on conflict grounds. In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi a footnote treats the field and conflict positions as complementary. If a state simply takes a position on foreign policy with no serious claim to a traditional state responsibility, field preemption may be the right doctrine. Where a state acts within its traditional competence in a way that affects foreign relations, it may make sense to require a conflict whose clarity or substantiality varies with the strength of the state’s interest.55
Impossibility Preemption
Impossibility is the narrowest ground for conflict preemption. State law yields when “it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law.”57 The test looks at the regulated party, not at the two lawmakers: each government issues a command, and when obeying one means disobeying the other, the Supremacy Clause tells the party which command controls. Because the collision is physical, a holding of preemption is “inescapable” and “requires no inquiry into congressional design.”58
The standard is narrow for a reason that follows from its function. A state rule that is stricter than, or merely different from, a federal rule usually leaves the regulated party able to satisfy both by following the stricter one, so the commands do not collide. A looser test would displace state law whenever federal policy differed, and it would leave little work for the presumption against preemption taken up below. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul marks the line. California barred the sale of avocados testing under 8 percent oil, while federal marketing orders certified Florida avocados as mature under standards that attached no significance to oil content. The Court found no impossibility, because Florida growers could meet the state minimum by leaving the fruit on the trees longer.59 Real impossibility would look different: a federal order forbidding the marketing of any avocado above 7 percent oil, set against a California rule excluding any avocado below 8 percent.60 A conflict of that pure kind is easy to spot and relatively rare.61
Most disputes are harder than the marijuana case, because they turn on what federal law leaves open to the particular defendant. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing shows how much depends on that question. Mensing and Demahy sued generic drug manufacturers under state tort law for failing to give an adequate warning. Federal law did not let the generic makers strengthen their labels on their own, because the unilateral change process open to brand-name makers was closed to them, and state law demanded a stronger warning.62 The two duties therefore ran in opposite directions. The plaintiffs answered that the manufacturers never asked: had they gone to the FDA for help, they might eventually have been able to strengthen the label. The Court rejected that answer because conjecture can dissolve almost any conflict. “We can often imagine that a third party or the Federal Government might do something that makes it lawful for a private party to accomplish under federal law what state law requires of it.” Followed to its logical conclusion, the plaintiffs’ argument would let the manufacturers persuade the FDA to rewrite its generic drug regulations entirely or talk Congress into amending the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.63 The operative rule is that a party who cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s special permission and assistance, which depends on a federal agency’s exercise of judgment, cannot independently satisfy them for preemption purposes.64
Wyeth v. Levine came out the other way on a claim that looked nearly identical, a state tort claim that a brand-name manufacturer’s warning was inadequate. There the FDA’s CBE regulation “permitted a brand-name drug manufacturer like Wyeth ‘to unilaterally strengthen its warning’ without prior FDA approval,” so the federal rules allowed the company, “of its own volition,” to strengthen its label in compliance with its state duty.65 Set beside PLIVA, the two cases differ in one variable. Both involved state failure-to-warn duties and FDA-regulated drug labels, and what changed was whether federal law let the defendant change the label by its own act. The brand-name maker could, and the generic maker could not, because the federal statutes and regulations that govern the two are meaningfully different. The special regulation of generics is also what allowed that market to expand and bring drugs to the public more quickly and cheaply. The Court declined to “distort the Supremacy Clause in order to create similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme,” and it noted that Congress and the FDA remain free to change the law.66
Courts also assume compliance with the state duty. Preemption cases “ordinarily assume compliance with the state-law duty in question,” and they do not turn on whether a private party might ignore state law, paying a fine instead, or on how likely enforcement is.67 Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett carried the same reasoning from failure-to-warn claims to a design-defect claim against a generic maker.
The four dissenters in PLIVA, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, drew the line elsewhere.68 They noted that Wyeth had not treated a brand-name maker’s need for FDA approval as making compliance impossible in every case: because the defendant bore the burden to show impossibility, the Court required “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the] label.”69 On that view the generic makers, who conceded they could have asked the FDA to initiate a change, had not carried the same burden. The dissent also answered the majority’s concern that a narrow view of impossibility would render conflict preemption meaningless, since conflict preemption may be found even absent impossibility where state law “stands as an obstacle” to Congress’s purposes.70 The two opinions disagree about who bears the risk of federal agency discretion. The majority treats dependence on an agency’s judgment as defeating independent compliance, while the dissent treats an available federal process as a possible path to compliance that the defendant must show was closed.
The physical-impossibility formula has its critics. A concurring opinion has observed that the Court has not explained why a narrow “physical impossibility” standard is the best proxy for when state and federal law directly conflict. If federal law gives a right to engage in behavior that state law prohibits, the two laws give contradictory commands even though an individual could comply with both by refraining.71 The decisions above nonetheless apply the physical-impossibility formulation, so that remains the test to run.
Obstacle Preemption
Impossibility asks whether a regulated party can physically obey both laws. Obstacle preemption reaches the many cases in which the party can obey both and the state law still defeats what Congress set out to do. The Court states the test as whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”73
The test has two moving parts: the court first identifies the federal objective and then measures the effect of the state law on it. Both steps call for judgment, and “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”74 Reading the whole statute matters because Congress’s aim usually lives in the design of a scheme, in who is given discretion, who is penalized, and what is left unregulated, and a single provision read alone can point the wrong way. Hines v. Davidowitz, the source of the standard, conceded that no rigid formula can fix the meaning of every act of Congress, and that labels such as conflict, repugnance, or interference are not infallible tests.75 What remains is a purposive reading of the particular statute, and the cases below show three places where courts find the purpose.
The doctrine exists because Congress rarely pursues a goal by commanding as much of it as possible. A statute more often selects means: it hands an official discretion, limits whom it penalizes, or invites a gradual mix of alternatives. A state law aimed at the same goal through different means can unravel that selection while leaving every regulated party able to obey both laws, and impossibility never touches it. The cost is that courts must infer purposes from a statute’s structure, and that inference is the target of the textualist criticism taken up in a later section.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council locates the objective in a grant of discretion. Massachusetts had barred state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma. Three months later Congress passed a federal Burma statute that imposed sanctions and authorized the President to modify them, to add new ones on a finding of repression, and to suspend them in the interest of national security.76 The Court held that the state law undermined the intended purpose and “natural effect” of three features of the federal Act: its delegation of effective discretion to the President, its limit of sanctions to United States persons and new investment, and its directive to proceed diplomatically toward a multilateral strategy.77 The first feature carried the most weight. The state sanctions were immediate and perpetual, so the President could not lift them as a reward for progress, which left him “less to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage.”78 Massachusetts also argued that Congress’s failure to preempt expressly implied approval of the state law. The Court answered that silence is ambiguous: the absence of an express clause may reflect only the settled character of implied preemption, and a conflict under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on Congress recognizing it.79
Geier locates the objective in a choice among methods. The federal motor-vehicle safety standard deliberately gave manufacturers a range of choices among passive restraint devices. The choice was meant to produce a mix of devices introduced gradually over time, which the Department of Transportation expected to lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage technological development, and win consumer acceptance.80 A state tort duty to install airbags would have required the manufacturers of all similar cars to use airbags and not other systems, which would have obstructed the variety and mix of devices the regulation sought and the gradual phase-in it imposed. Nothing in the statute suggested that Congress wanted to complicate ordinary conflict preemption with an added “special burden.”81
The boundary of Geier appears when the federal government has declined to act. In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine the Coast Guard decided not to require propeller guards, and the Court unanimously rejected both express and implied preemption of a state tort claim for failing to use one. The Court reiterated its reluctance, on federalism grounds, to infer preemption from a refusal to regulate. A decision not to require a guard did not logically conflict with state liability for failing to use one, since using a guard would violate neither law.82 The two cases differ in the federal objective. The Department of Transportation affirmatively chose a mix of devices as its means of promoting safety, while the Coast Guard’s refusal to mandate a feature chose no particular means that a guard would disturb.
The same brake claim would meet a different fate if the agency had explained that its stopping distance reflects a deliberate balance of cost against safety and that manufacturers should not be pushed past it. The objective would then be a chosen point and not a floor. How the objective is characterized decides many cases, and the agency’s own stated reasons for its rule are usually where the characterization is found.
Edgar v. MITE Corp. locates the objective in a balance among competing interests. No one claimed that compliance with both the Williams Act and the more burdensome Illinois takeover law was impossible, so the question was whether the Illinois Act frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way.83 A plurality found that it did, although a firm could have obeyed both statutes.
The three cases locate the objective in three different places: a grant of discretion in Crosby, a chosen mix of methods in Geier, and a balance between competing interests in MITE. In each, the objective was a means or a balance and not a result to be maximized, and the state law failed by altering what Congress chose. That explains why sharing Congress’s goal gives a state no protection. In Garamendi, California’s Holocaust-era insurance disclosure law sought compensation for victims, a goal the National Government shared. The Court answered that “[t]he fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means,” because the state law obstructed the National Government’s chosen “calibration of force” in using a voluntary approach.84 Arizona’s §5(C), which targets unauthorized work, pursued the same goal as federal immigration law, the deterrence of unlawful employment, yet it involved a conflict in the method of enforcement, and a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.”85 In Boggs v. Boggs a state community-property rule that would let a predeceasing spouse’s transfer defeat part of the survivor’s ERISA annuity clashed with the statute’s provisions and objectives.
Not every state law that touches a federal field obstructs it. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. the question was whether Ohio’s trade-secret law “clashes” with the objectives of the federal patent laws, and the Court examined the objectives of both bodies of law to decide, ultimately leaving the Ohio law in place.86 The contrast is Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. To allow a state to prevent the copying of an article too slight an advance to be patented “would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the public,” and states could then give perpetual protection to articles that federal law protects for only 14 or 17 years or not at all.87 The difference lies in what the state law takes away. Sears-style protection withdraws from the public something federal law has released, while trade-secret law leaves the federal bargain intact.
When a state acts in a domain it has traditionally governed, courts also weigh the strength of the state’s interest. Garamendi reasoned that it is reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, in deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before state law is declared preempted.88 California’s interest looked weak because the disclosure law, “quite unlike a generally applicable ‘blue sky’ law,” singled out policies issued to European residents in Europe at least 55 years earlier.89 In the domestic-relations setting, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo asks whether the state law does major damage to clear and substantial federal interests.90 A state pursuing ends long regarded as part of its governmental domain is harder to preempt than one entering new or nontraditional territory, but the advantage has limits. When the conflict with federal goals is pronounced, as in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, “[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material.”91