Concept
Medical Treatment and Death
Other rights and interests
Medical Treatment and Death
The cases in this section ask what the Due Process Clause does when a person's life is at stake. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court said that the liberty the Clause protects goes beyond freedom from physical restraint and carries heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights, including the rights to marry, to have children, and to bodily integrity.1 It then added that it had assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted life-saving medical treatment.2 The verb "assumed" is chosen with care, and it governs everything that follows.
A law that restricts a business practice or a household arrangement burdens how a person lives. A decision about treatment near the end of life concerns whether the person lives, and the state claims a stake in the answer: a general interest in preserving human life and a narrower one in preventing the end of a life the person would not have chosen to end.3 The Court responds by separating two choices that look alike from a distance, refusing treatment that prolongs life and obtaining help to end it. The legal tradition behind each choice explains where the line falls.
Washington's own statutes show how familiar the line is. Its criminal ban on causing or aiding suicide, enacted in 1975, sits beside a Natural Death Act passed four years later, which provides that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is not a suicide and, in the same chapter, disclaims any authorization of mercy killing.4 The method for sorting such choices comes from the Court's caution about new liberties. Extending constitutional protection to an asserted interest places the matter, to a great extent, outside the arena of public debate and legislative action, so the Court first asks whether history and tradition protect the interest.5 The first subsection takes up the interest in refusing treatment. The second takes up the claim to assistance in suicide, where the tradition runs the other way.
Refusing Unwanted Treatment
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health is the Court's leading discussion of a person's liberty to refuse medical care. A young woman had suffered brain damage in a car accident and remained in a persistent vegetative state, a condition similar to permanent coma, and her parents asked to discontinue the hydration and nutrition delivered through a feeding tube.6 Missouri law required them to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their daughter would have wanted to die in those circumstances. They argued that the standard was too high and that the state should defer to the judgment of her closest family members.7 The Court upheld the requirement.8 The decision thus answers two questions: whether a person has a constitutional interest in refusing treatment at all, and what a state may demand before treatment is withdrawn from a patient who can no longer speak.
On the first question, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion assumed, for purposes of the case, that a mentally competent person has a liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment.9 He reached that assumption by reviewing state-court decisions on similar questions and Supreme Court cases supporting recognition of a general liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.10 But finding a liberty interest, he wrote, does not end the inquiry, because whether a constitutional right has been violated is decided by balancing the person's liberty interest against the relevant state interests.11 That choice of method matters because the classification of an interest fixes the tier of review. By balancing, the majority treated the interest as significant without declaring it fundamental. Describe Cruzan, then, as assuming a liberty interest. It did not announce a fundamental right to refuse treatment.
Glucksberg later explained what the assumed interest rests on. The right assumed in Cruzan was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. It drew on the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, an unconsented and unwanted touching of the person, and on a long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment.12 That grounding is the history-and-tradition inquiry from earlier in this chapter applied to a particular claim. Because a physician who treated a patient without consent committed a wrong against that patient, the refusal was legally protected long before any constitutional question arose, and the constitutional interest descends from protection the legal system already gave. The Cruzan dissenters described the same tradition: the right to be free from unwanted medical attention is firmly entrenched in American tort law and grounded in the earliest common law, which treats each person as "master of his own body."13
The interest reaches artificial feeding as well as conventional treatment. Justice O'Connor, whose vote was needed for the majority, wrote separately to explain that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from the Court's prior decisions and that refusing artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within it.14 Justice Scalia wrote that no liberty interest was involved at all, because the law had never recognized a right to commit suicide.15 His view drew no majority: Justice O'Connor's vote plus the four dissenters formed a clear majority opposed to his position.16 That count explains why the interest is described as existing even though the opinion of the Court only assumed it.
The second question concerns the standard of proof. When a patient is incompetent, Missouri required the guardian or close family to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have rejected life-sustaining treatment, and the Court held that the state could insist on that standard.17 The rule serves the state's narrower interest in preventing a life from being ended when the person would not have wanted that outcome.18 A standard of proof decides who bears the risk of a mistake. A mistaken withdrawal of life support cannot be undone, and a patient who cannot speak has no chance to correct it, so strong proof places the risk of doubt on the side from which an error can still be repaired. For the same reason, the state did not have to defer to the family's own judgment about what the patient would have wanted, because it could insist on proof of the patient's wishes.19
The interest is real, but the Court has never treated it as absolute. A concurring opinion in Glucksberg agreed that the common-law right to refuse treatment is neither absolute nor always weighty enough to overcome valid state interests. It pointed out that legislation punishing refusal of vaccination has been upheld and that a state ordinarily may interfere with a suicide attempt, as by forcibly bandaging a self-inflicted wound, and it concluded that in most cases the individual's interest in physical autonomy gives way to the state's interest in preserving human life.20 Two decisions show how much the setting matters. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the state's goal of preventing smallpox outweighed an individual's interest in refusing vaccination. In Washington v. Harper, the Court sustained forced antipsychotic medication of prisoners whose mental disorder made them likely to harm themselves or others, asking only whether the policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.21 A refusal that is protected at a hospital bedside can therefore be overridden for public health or institutional safety, because the interest is always weighed against what the state is protecting.
Four Justices dissented in Cruzan and would have treated the interest as fundamental.22 They began from the concession, by both the majority and Justice O'Connor, that a liberty interest exists, and they reasoned that the interest must be fundamental because tort law's long protection of bodily integrity roots it deeply in the Nation's traditions.23 They then applied the standard of Zablocki v. Redhail: a requirement that significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right cannot stand unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.24 An evidentiary rule, they added, must meet that standard just as a substantive prohibition must, if it significantly burdens a fundamental liberty interest.25 Their view did not command a majority, which is why the Court balanced and did not demand close tailoring. Cruzan thus displays both tiers from the opening of this chapter in a single case. The interest that the majority assumed and balanced would have drawn close scrutiny from the dissenters.
Glucksberg drew the boundary of this interest in one comparison. The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted treatment, yet the Court said the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct, and it gave no intimation that the right to refuse treatment could be transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide.26 The tradition that supports the first act does not stretch to the second, and the next subsection takes up that claim.
Assisted Suicide
Washington v. Glucksberg held that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, so Washington's ban on assisting suicide needed only a rational relation to legitimate government interests, a requirement the Court found unquestionably met.28 The holding has two stages that track the two tiers of review from the start of this chapter. The first stage sorts the claim into a tier. Once the claim lands in the deferential tier, the second stage is short, because a law burdening an ordinary liberty interest survives whenever a legitimate purpose and a reasonable connection to it can be found. The opinion therefore turns on why the Court refused to call this claim fundamental, and each reason answers an argument the challengers made.
Washington's statute made it a felony to knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide.29 Terminally ill patients and physicians challenged it as an infringement of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.30 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, and separate concurrences followed.31 The Court upheld the ban on its face, meaning in all of its applications, and as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who seek medication prescribed by their doctors.32
The Court reached the first stage by applying the inquiry described earlier in this chapter: describe the claimed right carefully, then ask whether history and tradition protect it. It framed the issue narrowly, as whether liberty includes a right to commit suicide that itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.33 At that level of description it found a long and nearly uniform tradition against the claim. Assisted suicide had long been banned and was still illegal in nearly every state, and the law's treatment of it had been one of rejecting nearly all efforts to permit it.34 The challengers argued that their interest fit the Court's substantive due process cases even if it did not fit the Nation's history and practice. Holding for them, the Court answered, would have required reversing centuries of legal doctrine and practice and striking down the considered policy choice of almost every state.35 A claim that fails this threshold never reaches strict scrutiny, so the state did not have to prove necessity or a compelling purpose, and the burden stayed with the challengers. The threshold also restrains the subjective elements of due process review and spares courts from balancing competing interests in every case.36
The patients' strongest precedent was Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, because both situations involve a competent adult's choice about the end of life. The Court answered that the right assumed in Cruzan was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. It rested on the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery and on a long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment.37 Assisted suicide has never enjoyed similar legal protection, even though the decision to pursue it may be just as personal and profound, and the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.38 The source of a right decides how far it reaches. A liberty grounded in the law of battery protects a person against forced treatment, and the tradition behind it says nothing in favor of a request for help in ending a life. Cruzan itself recognized that most states outlawed assisted suicide, and the Court gave no intimation that the right to refuse treatment could be transmuted into a right to assistance.39
The patients also relied on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, whose discussion of liberty speaks of the most intimate and personal choices a person may make. The Court read that language as describing, in a general way, activities and decisions that earlier cases had already identified as deeply rooted in history and tradition or fundamental to ordered liberty.40 That many protected liberties sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise.41 The reason is structural. Nearly any choice about one's own life can be called intimate, so a test that protected choices on that ground would dissolve into each judge's view of which choices matter most, which is the subjectivity the tradition requirement exists to restrain.42 Casey's abortion holding is not at issue here, only its autonomy language.
With the claim classified as non-fundamental, the remaining question was whether the ban is rationally related to legitimate state interests, and the Court found several. They were saving human life, assuring proper treatment for those suffering from depression or mental illness, preserving trust in the doctor-patient relationship, protecting vulnerable groups such as the poor, the elderly, and persons with disabilities from those who might seek to bring about their premature death, and guarding against euthanasia.43 Each interest connects to the ban through its own logic. A request to die can accompany a treatable mental illness, so a ban that keeps the request from being fulfilled preserves the chance that the illness is treated. Patients rely on physicians to heal, and that reliance weakens if physicians may also be the means of ending a life. The last two interests share a line-drawing worry: if assistance were lawful for competent adults who ask, it would be hard to police whether a given request was truly voluntary, and hard to keep the practice from reaching people who never chose it. The Court noted that a New York task force had unanimously concluded that legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose profound risks to many people who are ill and vulnerable.44 Rational basis review does not ask whether the ban is the wisest response, so a ban resting on these interests is sustained. An answer that says Washington proved a compelling interest has applied the wrong tier, since the state's burden of proof never arose.
Classifying the claim as non-fundamental also leaves the underlying question with voters and legislatures. The states were in the middle of that debate: voters in Washington and California had rejected assisted-suicide initiatives, while Oregon voters had approved one for competent, terminally ill adults.45 A holding that no fundamental right exists lets each state keep choosing, and it does not itself forbid a state from permitting assistance, as Oregon's measure shows. The Court closed by saying that its holding "permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."46
Separate opinions bear only lightly on the holding. Justice Souter, relying on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, would have asked whether the statute sets up an arbitrary imposition or purposeless restraint, and the majority declined to adopt an approach that would largely abandon its restrained methodology.47 Other concurrences voiced concern for palliative care for the terminally ill, which suggests that the rigor of the holding might be mitigated in different circumstances, and the Court left open the possibility that a later challenger could claim a fundamental interest.48 On an exam the majority's reasoning is the rule, and the concurrences earn a sentence only when a problem asks whether the question is closed.