Concept
Family and Intimate Conduct
Other rights and interests
Family and Intimate Conduct
Washington v. Glucksberg lists the liberties the Due Process Clause has protected: the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, and to use contraception.1 The right to direct a child’s education and upbringing rests on two early decisions. Meyer v. Nebraska reversed the conviction of a teacher who taught German to young children, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters struck down an Oregon law forbidding parents to send their children to private schools.2 The sexual conduct of consenting adults appears nowhere on the list, yet the Court has had to decide whether it belongs there, and its answer has changed. Marriage, contraception, and abortion are treated separately. This unit takes the two areas where the Court had to classify an interest before it could review the law: parental rights and adult sexual conduct.
Both areas are hard for the same reason. Decisions about raising children and about intimate life are among the most personal a person makes, so a state that regulates them intrudes near the core of liberty. The state nonetheless has interests of its own: the welfare of children, who cannot protect themselves, and the community’s moral views about sexual conduct, whose weight is the central dispute in the second area. A blanket rule in either direction would ignore one side, so the cases weigh, and the weighing starts with the sorting step that opens this chapter. If the Court treats the interest as fundamental, the state must show a compelling purpose and means necessary to reach it. If not, the law needs only a rational relation to a legitimate purpose, and a law that fails even that test falls, as the prohibition on private adult sexual activity did in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court found no relation to any legitimate government interest.3
The sorting turns on two tools from earlier in this chapter, the history-and-tradition inquiry and the careful description of the right, and they point in different directions in the two areas. In parental rights, a long line of decisions supplies the tradition. In adult sexual conduct, the Court’s position moved, and the movement is the lesson.
Parental Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and the Court has read “liberty” in that clause to include the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.4 The plurality in Troxel v. Granville called that interest perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests the Court has recognized. It traced the interest from Meyer and Pierce through Prince v. Massachusetts, Stanley v. Illinois, and Quilloin v. Walcott to the present, and it concluded: “it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”5 Fundamental status ordinarily points toward the demanding tier of review, though the Troxel plurality never announced a standard of review. The right also works in two settings that one label can hide. In the first, a fit parent makes everyday decisions about upbringing, and a court may not override them merely because it prefers another choice. In the second, the parent holds continuing custody, and the state may end it only for a reason and only through proper procedure.
The reason for protecting parental decisions so strongly appears in language from Pierce that the Troxel plurality quoted: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”6 The family is the channel through which a society passes down its values,7 and the law presumes that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in their children’s best interests, a presumption that Justice Stevens, dissenting in Troxel, accepted as rebuttable.8 That presumption does the structural work. If a fit parent’s decision is presumed to serve the child, a judge who overrides it substitutes one reasonable judgment about the child’s welfare for another, and the override changes only who holds the power to decide. The plurality drew the matching conclusion: when a parent adequately cares for the children, the state normally has no reason to inject itself into the private realm of the family.9 A rule that let a judge substitute whatever view seemed better would empty the liberty of content, because some alternative can nearly always be described as better.
The facts of Troxel show both ideas at work. Jenifer and Gary Troxel were the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie, whose mother, Tommie Granville, had never married the Troxels’ son Brad. After Brad and Granville separated, he lived with his parents and brought his daughters to their home for weekend visits, and the Troxels kept seeing the girls after Brad’s suicide in May 1993, until Granville moved to limit the time.10 The Troxels petitioned under a Washington statute providing that “[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time” and that a court may order visitation “when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.”11 The trial court ordered one weekend a month, one week in the summer, and four hours on each grandparent’s birthday, more than Granville was willing to allow.12 The Washington Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.13
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, joined by three other Justices, held the statute unconstitutional as applied to Granville and her family. Its reasoning has two layers.14 The first layer concerns the statute. The plurality called it “breathtakingly broad.” It places no limit on who may petition or when a court may grant the petition, it lets any third party subject a parent’s visitation decision to state-court review, and it requires no deference to a fit parent’s decision once a petition is filed.15 A judge’s view of the child’s best interest therefore prevails over that of a fit custodial parent.
The second layer concerns what the trial court did with that power. It made only two slender findings: the Troxels’ large, loving family could offer the children cousins and music, and the children would benefit from time with them. It announced a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation, and it gave no significant weight to the meaningful visitation Granville had already offered.16 Each defect strips away a protection that the presumption of parental fitness supplies: the statute gave the parent’s decision no effect, and the court presumed in the grandparents’ favor. The plurality concluded that the case involved “nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville concerning her children’s best interests,” and that the Due Process Clause does not permit a state to infringe a parent’s childrearing decisions “simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”17 As a working rule, the plurality required that a court reviewing a fit parent’s decision give it at least some special weight.18
Troxel is narrower than its reputation. The plurality rested on the statute’s sweep and on the way the trial court used it, so it declined to decide whether the Due Process Clause requires every nonparental visitation statute to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child. It said it would be hesitant to hold such statutes invalid as a per se matter.19 None of the six opinions commanded a majority, and although seven Justices agreed that these statutes may at times violate parents’ liberty, they could not agree on general principles for the area.20 The level of scrutiny remains unsettled as well. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, noted that none of the other opinions articulated a standard of review; he would apply strict scrutiny, under which Washington lacks even a legitimate interest in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision about visitation with third parties.21 The dissents pull toward flexibility. Justice Stevens wrote that the parent’s liberty interest is not so inflexible as to shield every arbitrary parental decision absent a threshold finding of harm, and Justice Kennedy would have made the result turn on factual variations, such as whether the person seeking visitation is a stranger or a de facto parent.22 Justice Stevens added that these cases are not a contest between parents and the state alone, because the child’s interests are implicated in every case the statute reaches.23
Troxel protects a fit parent’s decisions from a judge’s second-guessing. Removal of children from a parent raises a different question, which Stanley v. Illinois answers. Illinois took the children of married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect. Its dependency statute, however, defined “parents” to exclude unwed fathers, so the state could declare an unwed father’s children dependent without proving his unfitness, which the law presumed.24 The Court held that the interest of a man in the children he has sired and raised undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection, and that his interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children is cognizable and substantial.25 That holding recognizes the interest itself, which is the substantive half of the decision. The procedural half follows. Procedure by presumption is cheaper and easier than individualized determination, but it forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care.26 The state’s interest in caring for the children is de minimis if the father is shown to be fit, so convenience cannot justify refusing him a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.27
A presumption cannot replace a hearing, and the reason lies in what justifies removal. The state’s only reason to take children from a parent is that the parent is unfit, so a presumption of unfitness removes from the case the one fact that gives the state a reason to act. The two halves of the doctrine ask different questions about that reason. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate justification, and because custody is a fundamental right it requires proof that terminating custody is necessary to a compelling purpose, such as preventing abuse or neglect.28 Procedural due process asks how the government must establish that justification, and it requires notice, a hearing, and clear and convincing evidence before parental rights are permanently ended.29 Stanley also rested on equal protection: because all Illinois parents are entitled to a hearing on fitness before their children are removed, denying one to unwed fathers while granting it to everyone else violated the Equal Protection Clause.30
The right has two limits, and the first comes from the child and the state. A parent’s interests are balanced against the child’s own interest in preserving relationships that serve the child’s welfare and against the state’s long-recognized role as parens patriae, its authority to protect those who cannot protect themselves, children included.31
The second limit is that the right depends on an actual relationship, and Lehr v. Robertson marks the line against Stanley. In Lehr, a putative biological father who had never established an actual relationship with his child had no constitutional right to notice of the child’s adoption by the man who had married the child’s mother, because parental liberty interests “do not spring fullblown from the biological connection between parent and child” and instead “require relationships more enduring.”32 Biology was present in both Stanley and Lehr; what separated them was whether the father had raised his children. Pierce’s description of the right as “coupled with the high duty” fits that requirement, since a father who has not yet nurtured the child has not taken on the duty that accompanies the right. Even biology and an established relationship together do not make the right absolute: in Michael H. v. Gerald D., a father with both lost to a statutory presumption that the mother’s husband was the child’s parent.33
The first and third steps carry most of the weight on an exam. A claimant with no relationship never reaches the demanding inquiry, and a visitation order fails only when the court brushed aside a fit parent’s decision, which is far narrower than saying that grandparents may never obtain visitation.
Adult Sexual Conduct
Private sexual conduct between consenting adults is the interest on which the Court first refused constitutional protection and then reversed itself. In Bowers v. Hardwick the Court upheld Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute as applied to two adult men in a home; in Lawrence v. Texas it overruled Bowers and held a Texas ban on same-sex sodomy invalid under the Due Process Clause.37 Bowers is no longer good law, but its description of the claim explains why its answer differed from Lawrence’s. Both decisions apply the same clause and ask about history. They differ in how they describe the right and how they read the history, and those two differences account for the change.
The Bowers majority began by stating the issue as whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and that description decided most of what followed.38 The Court reviewed the privacy decisions on which the challenger relied, including Pierce, Meyer, Griswold, and Roe, and found that none resembled the asserted right: those cases deal with specific subjects such as child rearing, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, and say nothing about a general freedom from regulation of sexual behavior.39 It then ran the tradition inquiry that Glucksberg later formalized, which asks whether an interest is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and requires a careful description of the asserted right.40 On its reading of the record, the majority found the opposite of deep roots: sodomy was a common-law crime, the original thirteen states forbade it when they ratified the Bill of Rights, all but five of thirty-seven states had sodomy laws in 1868, and every state outlawed it until 1961.41 To claim such a right was, the Court said, “at best, facetious.”42 The majority also tied its caution to the Court’s own position. It warned that the Court is most vulnerable when it makes constitutional law with little root in the language or design of the Constitution, and it likened the recognition of new fundamental rights without clear authority to the era when the Court used the Clause to review economic legislation.43 Because the Court found no fundamental right, it applied no heightened scrutiny, and the statute stood.44
The dissents in Bowers show how much turned on the description of the claim, and each changed a different variable. Justice Blackmun changed the description, saying the case concerned “the right to be let alone,” the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one’s private life, and he added that long condemnation of the conduct does not answer whether the Constitution protects it.45 Justice Stevens changed the question. The Georgia statute reached heterosexual as well as homosexual sodomy, so he asked first whether a state may prohibit the conduct totally by a neutral law, and only then whether the state could save the statute by announcing that it would enforce the law against homosexuals alone.46 On the first question he reasoned that a governing majority’s traditional view of a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason to uphold a law against it, since neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation.47
Lawrence arose under a Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law that criminalized sexual intimacy by same-sex couples but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, and the petitioners were adults whose conduct was private and consensual.48 The Court faced three questions: whether the convictions violated equal protection, whether they violated the liberty and privacy the Due Process Clause protects, and whether Bowers should be overruled.49 It chose to decide the case on due process grounds, which required it to reconsider Bowers.50 The Court began from Griswold, which protected the marital bedroom, and traced the step beyond marriage to Eisenstadt, which invalidated a ban on distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons and described the right of privacy as belonging to the individual, “married or single.”51
Two features separate Lawrence from Bowers. The first is the description of the right. The Bowers majority asked about a right to engage in certain sexual conduct; the Lawrence Court said that this framing failed to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake and demeaned the claim, just as it would demean a married couple to say that marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.52 Described as an interest in the autonomy of intimate relationships, the claim draws on the whole line of privacy decisions and not on the history of one practice, which is the description the Bowers dissenters had urged.
The second feature is the history. The Court found that Bowers erred about ancient roots: there is no long-standing American history of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter, laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the twentieth century, and earlier sodomy laws generally were not enforced against consenting adults acting in private.53 The Court also said that history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry, so even a well-established tradition of prohibition would not have ended the analysis.54 That treatment is looser than the Glucksberg method, which calls the Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices the crucial guideposts that direct and restrain the analysis.55
The Court held that the Texas statute “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”56 The opinion never calls the liberty fundamental and states no level of scrutiny. The dissent therefore read it as applying rational-basis review while overruling Bowers’ holding to the contrary, and others read its language as signaling more searching review.57 An answer that says the Court applied strict scrutiny asserts more than the opinion says. The safer statement is the ground the Court gave, that no legitimate state interest justified the intrusion, which is also why this unit placed Lawrence among the cases in which a law failed even the deferential tier. The failure follows from what the state could offer. When the participants are consenting adults acting in private, no other person is harmed and no protected relationship is invaded, so the only justification left is the majority’s view that the practice is immoral, and that view cannot alone carry a prohibition.58 Justice O’Connor would have reached a similar result under equal protection, because the Texas law reached only same-sex conduct, but the majority rested on due process, and Justice Kennedy worried that an equal protection ruling would let Texas reenact a ban covering all sodomy.59
The decision protects a limited set of facts. The Court emphasized that the petitioners were adults and that their conduct was private and consensual, and it took care to distinguish the case from others that might later arise.60 Those facts are also the ones that remove the state’s usual justifications, because a state that prosecutes conduct involving a minor, a person who did not consent, or a commercial exchange can point to a person or interest it is protecting.
The opinion’s logic leaves open how far it reaches to other private conduct that states still criminalize, such as adultery, fornication, incest, or bigamy; an answer should flag that question as unresolved and should not state a rule.61 Justice Thomas’s dissent shows the opposite pole. He called the Texas law uncommonly silly and said he would vote to repeal it as a legislator, yet he found no general right of privacy in the Constitution that would let the Court strike it down.62 The dissenters generally saw a return to Lochner-era review of legislation, and whether Lawrence was a limited ruling about a fundamental aspect of liberty or a sign that the Court would review social and economic laws under a true reasonableness test remains an open question.63