Concept
The Right to Marry
Fundamental rights
The Right to Marry
Marriage gives the Court its clearest example of a fundamental right that liberty and equality protect together, and three decisions mark the stages of the doctrine. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court struck down laws against interracial marriage. In Zablocki v. Redhail, it held unconstitutional a Wisconsin law that forbade certain adults who owed child support to marry unless a judge gave permission, and it wrote that “[o]ur past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance.” In Obergefell v. Hodges, it held that same-sex couples share the right, repeating the principle announced long before in Skinner: “The right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”1
Two features recur in these cases. The Court draws on both clauses, and in Obergefell it described liberty and equal protection as reinforcing each other, each leading to a stronger understanding of the other.2 And the right has an edge, because not every law that touches marriage triggers heightened review. Casebooks put a larger question behind both features: is substantive due process an appropriate home for ground rules that constitutionalize family law? The Court has answered in practice by recognizing individual rights in the family context, including some not exercised within a traditional nuclear family.3
The four subsections follow the order of decision. Loving pairs an equal protection holding about race with a due process holding that names the freedom to marry as fundamental. Zablocki removes race and applies heightened review to a law that burdened marriage alone. The third subsection draws the boundary between direct and substantial interference and ordinary regulation, and the fourth shows Obergefell building on the earlier cases.
Loving v. Virginia
Loving v. Virginia held that a state ban on interracial marriage violates both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and the two holdings do different work. The equal protection holding subjects a racial classification to a very heavy burden of justification, however evenly the statute applies. The due process holding names the freedom to marry as a fundamental right protected by liberty, and later marriage cases build on that half. Chief Justice Warren framed the question as one the Court had never addressed: whether a Virginia scheme that prevented marriages solely on the basis of racial classifications violates both clauses. The Court concluded that the statutes could not stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.4
A Virginia grand jury indicted the Lovings for violating the state's ban on interracial marriages, and they pleaded guilty. The trial judge sentenced them to one year in jail but suspended the sentence for twenty-five years on the condition that they leave Virginia and not return together during that time.5 Marrying elsewhere would not have protected a couple either, because Virginia law also reached a white person and a colored person who went out of state to marry and then returned to live there as spouses. Such a marriage was governed by Virginia law as if solemnized in the state, and the couple's cohabitation was evidence of the marriage.6
The ban belonged to a long tradition. Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial classifications, and penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and had been common in Virginia since the colonial period. The existing scheme dated from the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the extreme nativism that followed the First World War. Its central features were an absolute prohibition on a white person marrying anyone but another white person, a bar on issuing a marriage license until the official was satisfied that the applicants' statements about their race were correct, certificates of racial composition kept by local and state registrars, and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions on racial intermarriage.7
Virginia conceded that its power over marriage has limits. The state court was right that marriage is a social relation subject to the police power, but Virginia did not argue that the power is unlimited notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, and it could not have done so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma.8 Its defense had two layers. The first was an equal application theory: read in light of the framers' statements, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that penal laws with an interracial element apply equally, so that members of each race are punished to the same degree.9 The second layer assumed the first. If equal application took the statutes outside the ban on racial classifications, the only question was whether any rational basis supported treating interracial marriages differently, and because the scientific evidence was in doubt, the Court should defer to the legislature.10
The Court rejected the first layer, and that rejection disposed of the second. When a statute draws no racial line, the Court asks only whether any rational foundation supports the distinction and defers to the legislature. A statute with racial classifications is different: equal application does not immunize it from the very heavy burden of justification that the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally imposed on state laws drawn according to race.11 Virginia's rational-basis argument fell with the first layer, because it began from the premise that equal application removed the racial-classification problem.12
Virginia found support for equal application in Pace v. Alabama, which upheld a conviction under a statute that punished adultery or fornication between a white person and a Black person more heavily than the same conduct within one race, reasoning that the statute did not discriminate because each participant received the same punishment.13 The Court had already said, in McLaughlin v. Florida, that “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.”14 The clause requires a court to ask whether the classifications a statute draws constitute arbitrary and invidious discrimination, and matching penalties do not answer that question.15
The state's appeal to the framers fared no better. Statements bearing on Congress's intent in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment pertained to specific statutes and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. The sources that did address the Amendment were, at best, inconclusive: its most avid proponents intended to remove all legal distinctions among persons born or naturalized in the United States, and its opponents wished it to have the most limited effect.16
With equal application gone, nothing could justify the classification. Virginia prohibited only interracial marriages involving white persons, which showed that its racial classifications had to stand on their own justification as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.17 The state court in Naim had identified the law's purposes as preserving the racial integrity of the state's citizens and preventing “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of racial pride,” which the Court called obviously an endorsement of White Supremacy.18 Under the standard for racial classifications, the state carries the burden: the statute is presumed unconstitutional, and the state can overcome the presumption only by clearly establishing an overriding purpose that makes the classification necessary, not merely rationally related, to a permissible state policy.19 Virginia could not do so, because there was patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination. The Court therefore held that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.20 On an exam, treat a racial classification in a marriage statute as a trigger for strict scrutiny, and dismiss equal punishment of both partners as no defense.21
The Court gave a second, independent ground. Obergefell later read the opinion in two steps: the Court first declared the prohibition invalid for its unequal treatment of interracial couples, and “[w]ith this link to equal protection” went on to hold that the prohibition offended central precepts of liberty. In the Loving Court's words, “[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.”22 The freedom belongs to the individual: the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations, and the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race “resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”23
The two clauses ask different questions. Equal protection compares how the state treats groups, while due process asks whether the state may take a personal choice away at all, which is why the Court could describe the injury as a deprivation of liberty suffered by all the state's citizens. Later cases inherit the due process half, because it supplies a right that can be defended even when a statute draws no racial line.
History did not narrow that right. Interracial marriage was illegal in most states in the nineteenth century, yet a later opinion confirmed that the Court was correct to find marriage an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.24 Obergefell drew the lesson. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, received practices would serve as their own continued justification, and new groups could never invoke rights once denied.25
The age rule shows that Loving does not subject every marriage regulation to the same review. Minimum-age requirements and similar rules that merely delay exercise of the right are unlikely to be tested under strict scrutiny.26 Virginia's scheme differed in two ways: it drew its line by race, and it prohibited marriage outright for anyone on the wrong side of that line.
Zablocki v. Redhail
Zablocki v. Redhail carried the freedom to marry beyond race. Wisconsin forbade certain adults who owed child support to marry unless a judge gave permission, and the Court held the law unconstitutional, observing that its past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance.27 That statement draws on earlier decisions about privacy and family life, among them Carey v. Population Services International.
The Court invalidated the law under the Equal Protection Clause, and the case shows how a fundamental right drives that analysis. The law barred fathers who were behind on support payments from marrying without judicial approval. As Obergefell later explained, the equal protection analysis depended in central part on the holding that the law burdened a right “of fundamental importance,” and the essential nature of the marriage right made the law's incompatibility with equality apparent.28 The statute drew its line by support obligations rather than race, so the right itself, and not the status of the people burdened, raised the level of review.
The level of review is heightened and demanding. A concurring opinion described the majority as subjecting every state regulation that “directly and substantially” interferes with the decision to marry to “critical examination” or “compelling state interest” analysis.29 Later treatment places the case in the strict scrutiny family: a law that directly and seriously interferes with the decision to marry, as by prohibiting a person from marrying, imposes an undue burden on the right and triggers a generally fatal strict scrutiny.30
Separate opinions show how else the case could have been framed. One concurring opinion would have asked not whether the law denied equal protection but whether “the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity to any individual to show that his is not the type of case which would justify resort to it,” satisfies due process.31 Another concurring opinion stressed the economic character of the classification. A noncustodial parent whose children are public charges could not marry even after meeting every court-ordered obligation, so among parents who had fulfilled those obligations the rich could marry and the poor could not, a form of discrimination that opinion called totally unprecedented and inconsistent with the tradition of administering justice equally to rich and poor.32 The dissent saw no basis for heightened review and would have held the statute, despite its imperfections, sufficiently rational.33
Direct and Substantial Interference
Zablocki drew its own boundary: “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship” are not subjected to rigorous scrutiny.34 Heightened scrutiny attaches only to laws that directly and seriously interfere with the decision to marry. A law that burdens marriage slightly or indirectly returns to rational basis review, however fundamental the right is in the abstract.
The boundary exists because fundamental rights restrain government; they do not require it to supply the means of exercising them. The freedoms to marry, to use contraceptives, and to choose an abortion are all fundamental liberties, yet the government need not pay for the wedding, the contraceptives, or the abortion, and all the Constitution usually requires is that the government not actively interfere, whether through criminal punishment or otherwise.35 Other fundamental rights show the same pattern. The right to vote exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections, so the decisions come out on both sides.36
Traditional marriage rules fall on both sides of the line, and age does not decide which. Requirements that merely delay exercise of the right, such as minimum ages and waiting periods for divorce, are unlikely to face strict scrutiny. Even some traditional restrictions that permanently interfere with marriage, such as laws against bigamy and incest, may not be regarded as unduly burdening the right.37 A long history of exclusion cannot shelter a serious interference, however. Interracial marriage was illegal in most states in the nineteenth century, and the Court still found marriage to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference.38
The Social Security cases show what falls on the deferential side. In Califano v. Jobst, the Court acknowledged that terminating benefits upon marriage might affect a person's desire to marry, yet held that a general rule is not invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by it or because some who did marry were burdened by it. It unanimously concluded that Congress could assume a married person is less likely than an unmarried one to depend on his parents for support.39 Bowen v. Owens rejected a challenge to a survivor-benefit provision that continued benefits for a widowed spouse who remarried after age sixty but denied them to a similarly situated divorced widowed spouse, in essence a divorce penalty.40
Both decisions rest in part on deference to legislative choices about how to allocate scarce funds in a program like Social Security. Lines must be drawn, and the Court is reluctant to second-guess the legislature absent discrimination against a suspect class or a clear infringement of a fundamental right. The cases do not deny that marriage is a fundamental right or that the government generally must meet strict scrutiny before interfering with it.41
Critics attack the line from both sides. A concurring opinion in Zablocki objected that the majority gave no principled way to tell the two kinds of regulation apart: because state regulation in this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, the degree of “direct” interference offers neither guidance to legislatures nor a basis for judicial oversight.42 The dissent pressed the comparison with Jobst from the other direction. Wisconsin's statute made some proposed marriages legally impossible for financial reasons, and in a similar number of extreme cases the Social Security Act made a proposed marriage practically impossible for the same reasons, so the dissent saw no difference in the burden that justified heightened review.43
Because it is often unclear whether a law will be found to impinge on the right to marry, a dual analysis is wise in cases of doubt. Approach the problem first on the assumption that the law imposes an undue burden, then on the assumption that it does not.44
Either outcome is defensible on the cases, which is why a close fact pattern calls for the dual analysis.45
Steps two and three do most of the work. A law that conditions the legal ability to marry sits on the Zablocki side almost automatically, while a law that attaches a cost to being married needs a showing of serious burden before it can rise above Jobst.
Extension to Same-Sex Couples
Obergefell v. Hodges extended the freedom to marry to same-sex couples, and it did so under both clauses. Justice Kennedy opened by observing that the Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights allowing persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity, and that the petitioners sought to find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.46 The Court held that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and that under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses couples of the same sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. It overruled Baker v. Nelson and held the challenged state laws invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.47
The majority tied that holding to the importance the Court had long attached to marriage. It wrote that the annals of human history reveal the “transcendent importance of marriage,” whose lifelong union has always promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.48 The holding extends that promise to same-sex couples.
How a court describes a right can decide the case. Fundamental rights include liberties “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” but at a sufficiently general level of abstraction any liberty can be justified as consistent with the nation's traditions, while at a very specific level few nontextual rights would be justified.49 Obergefell resolved the point as Loving had, by refusing to let past exclusion define the right: the Court has rejected the approach under which received practices serve as their own continued justification, for both the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.50 Loving, Turner v. Safley, and Zablocki each treated the right to marry as one right and then asked whether the state could justify excluding the class before it.
The equal protection holding rests on the same fundamental right. The Court found the marriage laws unequal in essence: same-sex couples were denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and were barred from exercising a fundamental right, a denial that, against a long history of disapproval, works a grave and continuing harm. The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits that unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.51 The structure is the one Zablocki used, where the equal protection analysis depended in central part on the holding that the law burdened a right of fundamental importance.52 A liberty holding also reaches further than an equal protection holding alone. In Lawrence, the Court explained that it addressed Bowers directly because a ruling on equal protection alone would leave open whether a prohibition drawn differently, covering same-sex and different-sex conduct alike, would be valid.53
The opinion says little about the standard of review. It spends little time on the government interests at stake in same-sex marriage bans, although the connection between interest and means is ordinarily the key to equal protection analysis, and a casebook asks whether equality is inherent in dignity itself, so that any deprivation of dignity also violates equality.54 The principal dissent made the same observation: nothing in the equal protection discussion resembled the usual means-ends framework.55 Some readers treat the opinion as holding that discrimination in access to the fundamental right to marry warrants strict scrutiny, a path to heightened review limited to marriage, and note that the Court found no evidence that recognizing same-sex marriage would harm the institution of marriage or the children raised by same-sex couples.56 The Court did not decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation generally receive heightened scrutiny, so the question remains open where no fundamental right is involved.57
The Court also rejected the idea that same-sex couples should await legislative action. An individual can invoke constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and the legislature refuses to act, because the Constitution was meant to withdraw certain subjects from political controversy, and fundamental rights depend on the outcome of no elections. Whether advocates of same-sex marriage enjoy or lack momentum in the democratic process is of no moment.58 Standing poses no obstacle to such a suit, since plaintiffs who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals may sue.59
The Court's earlier decision in United States v. Windsor had applied the same commitments against the federal government. The Defense of Marriage Act sought to injure the very class New York sought to protect, and in doing so it violated basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the federal government.60 Congress cannot authorize the states to violate equal protection either, so neither level of government can validate an unconstitutional exclusion.61