Concept
Physical Takings
Takings
Physical Takings
When the government physically acquires private property for a public use, the Takings Clause imposes a categorical obligation to pay just compensation. The Court counts condemnation, physical possession without title, and occupation of property, such as recurring flooding, among the clearest takings.1 That obligation makes physical takings the one branch of the doctrine that runs without balancing. The label per se marks the difference: the owner proves the invasion or appropriation, and the court does not weigh the public benefit the government claims or the economic impact on the owner.2
Use restrictions run on a different track. A regulation that merely reduces property value or prohibits the most beneficial use is generally not a taking if economically viable uses remain, and courts weigh the economic impact on the claimant, the interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.3 The third factor links the two tracks. A taking may more readily be found when the interference is a physical invasion by government than when it arises from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life.4 Physical takings carry that factor to its limit.
The per se label answers one question only: whether a taking occurred. How much the government owes is a separate question, and the cases below keep the two apart. In a formal condemnation action the Constitution requires no jury, but where one is used it typically fixes just compensation, while the court decides public use and necessity; the government pays the award plus interest accrued from the time of the taking, and condemnees generally cannot recover attorneys' fees.5 In the physical-takings cases, the size of an occupation, its duration, and any payment the government has made all bear on that second question, and none bears on the first.6
Balancing also leaves room to argue about how far a decision reaches, and the alarm can prove overstated. One commentator called Murr, a regulatory-takings decision taken up later in this chapter, “the worst property rights decision in a generation,” yet a longtime critic later conceded that “the sky didn't fall” and that lower courts had not applied it in a draconian fashion.7
The five subsections below build the physical branch in stages. The first covers the classic permanent occupation, the second extends the rule to entry that is temporary or recurring, and the third extends it from land to goods. The last two answer arguments the government made in defense of a physical appropriation: that the owner kept an interest in the property, and that the owner chose to take part in the market.
Permanent Physical Occupation
A permanent occupation is the plainest physical taking, and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. presented it in a minor form. The question was whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property, authorized by government, is a taking for which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require just compensation.8 New York law required landlords to let cable television companies place cable facilities in their apartment buildings, and the facilities occupied at most one and a half cubic feet of the landlords' property. The Court held that the law effected a taking.9
The holding did not depend on the value of the cable program or on the loss to the owner. Requiring a building owner to allow a cable box on her rooftop was a physical taking without regard to the claimed public benefit or the economic impact on the owner, because such an appropriation is “perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests.”10
That conclusion follows from what an occupation does to ownership. Property rights in a physical thing are the rights to possess, use, and dispose of it, and a government that permanently occupies the thing destroys each of them.11 The owner cannot possess the occupied space or exclude the occupier from it, and the power to exclude is among the most treasured strands in the owner's bundle of rights. The owner also loses all control over the space, because a permanent occupation forever denies the owner any power to control its use; the owner can make no nonpossessory use of it.12
Because the injury is the loss of these rights, the size of the footprint does not decide whether a taking occurred. It decides how much is owed. Once the fact of occupation is shown, a court considers the extent of the occupation in fixing compensation, and for that reason there is less need to consider the extent in deciding whether there is a taking in the first instance.13 A cable box in the corner of a roof supports a taking claim even if it supports only a modest award.
The Court restates the rule in a single sentence: “[A] permanent physical occupation of property authorized by government is a taking,” as it said in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States.14 The rule turns on what the government authorized, so the occupant's identity does not matter. A permanent physical occupation authorized by state law is a taking whether the State or a party authorized by the State is the occupant.15 The statute supplies the government action, and the compelled presence of someone else's equipment supplies the injury.
Loretto did not invent the rule. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., a dam built under state authority permanently flooded the plaintiff's land, and the Court held that land actually invaded by water, or by a structure placed on it so as to destroy or impair its usefulness, has been taken. In St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., telegraph poles planted in city streets were a permanent and exclusive use of the space they occupied.
The overflight cases show that the occupied space need not lie on the surface. In United States v. Causby the Court reasoned that an easement of flight, if permanent and not merely temporary, would normally be the equivalent of a fee interest, because it would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface, and that the planes' never touching the ground was as irrelevant as the absence of the feudal livery of seisin on a transfer of real estate.16 Superadjacent airspace at low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface, so the owner has a claim to it as an incident of ownership, and invasions of it fall in the same category as invasions of the surface.17
A permanent right of passage works the same way even though no one stays. A permanent physical occupation occurs where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently on the premises.18 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court said that a requirement that the owners provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby, a permanent grant of continuous access, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit.19 The permit setting belongs to the later sections on exactions. The point here is only that a public easement of passage counts as an occupation.
The rule reaches only occupations the owner is made to accept. Where the owner voluntarily permitted the initial occupation, later regulation that perpetuates it does not effect a Loretto-like taking.20 In Yee v. City of Escondido, mobile home park owners attacked a rent control ordinance, but they had voluntarily rented their land, neither the city nor the state compelled them to keep renting, and state law let an owner who wished to change the use of the land evict tenants on six or twelve months' notice.21 The Court noted that a different case would be presented if a statute compelled an owner over objection to rent property or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.22 FCC v. Florida Power Corp. reached the same result for a federal order requiring utilities to lease pole space to cable companies, because the original lease was voluntary. The exactions cases, taken up below, arguably expand the Loretto rule beyond these limits.23
Temporary and Recurring Access
The permanent-occupation rule raises an obvious question: does it reach only invasions that never end? Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid answers that it does not. A California regulation granted labor organizations a right to take access to an agricultural employer's property to solicit support for unionization, and it required employers to admit organizers for up to three hours a day, 120 days a year.25 An employer who interfered with that access risked sanctions for an unfair labor practice.26 When organizers from the United Farm Workers sought access to property owned by two growers, Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company, the growers sued.27
The lower courts treated the schedule as decisive. The District Court denied preliminary relief and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the regulation was no per se taking, because it did not allow the public to access the property in a permanent and continuous manner and so called for Penn Central balancing, and a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed on similar grounds. A dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc argued that the regulation appropriated a traditional easement in gross and was therefore a per se taking.28 The Supreme Court held that California's access regulation is a per se physical taking.29
The lower courts' premise was mistaken. A physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary, and duration affects only compensation. Nor does intermittent use of the right make it any less an appropriation, because the government has taken an interest in the right to physically invade the property.30
The reasoning is Loretto's. The power to exclude is among the most treasured strands in the owner's bundle,31 and a regulation that gives outsiders a legal right to enter closed property takes that power away for as long as the right lasts. During each hour of access the owner cannot say no, so the injury is the same kind of injury a permanent occupation causes, smaller only in amount. Amount is what compensation measures, and the extent of an occupation is a relevant factor there and not in deciding whether a taking occurred.32 The Court's cases already counted recurring flooding, an intermittent occupation, among the clearest takings.33
A footnote in Loretto had suggested otherwise. It said that the permanence and absolute exclusivity of an occupation distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude, and that such limitations, as PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, and the intermittent flooding cases reveal, are subject to a more complex balancing process, because they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of the rights to use and exclude others.34 Cedar Point answers that argument. A government grant of a right to enter is an appropriation even when the right is exercised intermittently, so the temporary character of the entry goes to compensation.35
The holding concerns physical entry. A time-limited restriction on development is a different matter. One court of appeals, reviewing a temporary planning regulation, reasoned that it was conceptually no different from a restriction that permanently denies use of a discrete portion of the property, because a regulation that affects only a portion of the parcel, whether limited by time, use, or space, does not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use.36 The section on temporary moratoria returns to how courts treat such restrictions.
A rule that reached every government-authorized entry would sweep in a great deal of ordinary government activity, and three limits keep it in bounds.
The first limit separates takings from trespass. Isolated physical invasions not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access are assessed as torts and are not appropriations of a property right.37 What marks a taking is the grant of a right to enter, however seldom the entry occurs.
The second limit exempts entry that background principles of property law already allowed. Many government-authorized invasions are consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, including common-law privileges to enter in cases of necessity or to enforce the law.38 The owner never held a right to exclude in those circumstances, so a rule that tracks the old privilege takes nothing the owner owned. The California regulation had no such footing: unlike a law enforcement search, no traditional background principle of property law required the growers to admit union organizers.39
The third limit covers access an owner cedes in return for a benefit. The government may require owners to cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits without causing a taking, which is why ordinary health and safety inspection regimes generally will not be takings.40 The California regulation fell outside it, because it was not germane to any benefit provided to agricultural employers or to any public risk, and it therefore amounted to a straightforward appropriation of private property.41 The sections on land-use exactions return to the conditions the government may attach to benefits.
Personal Property Appropriations
The Takings Clause protects “private property,” and nothing in its wording confines that phrase to land. Horne v. Department of Agriculture applied the point to a question the government raised: whether its categorical duty to pay just compensation when it physically takes possession of an interest in property covers only real property. The Court held that it does not. The Fifth Amendment protects private property without distinguishing among types, and the principles behind the clause, which reach back to Magna Carta and the colonial charters, protected against uncompensated takings of personal property as well as real property.43
Precedent points the same way. The Court has long recognized that a patentee's invention cannot be appropriated by the government without just compensation any more than patented land can be. Regulatory-takings doctrine, Penn Central and Lucas, governs restrictions on use, while a direct physical appropriation is a per se taking requiring compensation, as Loretto reaffirms.44 The Court put the rule in everyday terms: “The Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”45 A court of appeals had earlier applied Loretto's per se rule to a statute directing federal officials to keep former President Nixon's papers and tapes, in Nixon v. United States.
The dispute arose under a marketing order for raisins. Growers generally shipped their raisins to a handler, who physically separated the raisins due the government, called “reserve raisins,” paid the growers only for the remainder, and packed and sold those “free-tonnage raisins.” The Raisin Committee acquired title to the reserve raisins and decided how to dispose of them in its discretion. It could sell them in noncompetitive markets, for example to exporters, federal agencies, or foreign governments; donate them to charitable causes; release them to growers who agreed to reduce their raisin production; or dispose of them by any other means consistent with the purposes of the program.46 Proceeds from Committee sales were principally used to subsidize handlers who sold raisins for export.47 The Hornes did not comply with the reserve requirement, and the government fined them the fair market value of the raisins, $483,843.53.48
On remand, the Ninth Circuit treated the reserve requirement as a use restriction. It reasoned that the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal property and that growers kept an interest in proceeds from sales of the reserve raisins.49 The Supreme Court rejected both premises. This subsection takes up the first; the next two take up the second premise and the claim that selling raisins is a voluntary choice.
The Ninth Circuit's view had a source in Lucas. There the Court cited the ban on selling eagle feathers as an example of regulation of goods, and then said that for land, the notion that title is held subject to an implied limitation allowing the State to eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause.50 Commentators read Lucas to mean that its per se rule does not reach regulation of personal property, given the State's traditionally high degree of economic control over commercial dealings, and that many restrictions on the use of goods may be upheld even if they leave a type of goods virtually worthless.51 Horne treated that passage as a statement about regulation. Lucas addressed regulatory takings and not direct appropriations, and people do not expect their property, real or personal, to be occupied or taken away.52
Two questions had been run together. How far the government may restrict the use of goods without paying depends on what owners expect from regulators, and owners of goods expect a good deal. Whether the government may carry the goods away without paying depends on no such expectation, since no owner of land or goods anticipates it, and the longstanding distinction between acquisitions and regulations remains.53 The answer for goods is therefore the same as for land.
What makes the reserve requirement an appropriation is that the thing itself changed hands. Actual raisins were transferred from growers to the government and title passed to the Raisin Committee. The reserve raisins had to be segregated and held for the government's account, and the Committee disposed of them at its discretion to further the program's purposes.54 Growers lost the entire bundle of rights in the appropriated raisins, the rights to possess, use, and dispose of them, except for the speculative hope that some residual proceeds might remain.55 That is the position of an owner whose car has been taken, and it differs from that of an owner who is told where the car may be driven.
The other side of the line is Andrus v. Allard, which held that a ban on selling eagle feathers was not a taking as applied to traders of bird artifacts. The regulations did not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there was no physical invasion or restraint on them; it was crucial that the owners retained the rights to possess and transport their property and to donate or devise the protected birds.56 The Court also rejected the claim that the ban violated the owners' Fifth Amendment rights because it wholly deprived them of the opportunity to earn a profit from the relics.57 Set beside Horne, the comparison shows which fact carries the analysis. Both programs were regulatory in form, both involved goods, and both cost the owners money, but only the raisin order made the owners hand the goods over.
Justice Thomas joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately on the public-use condition covered earlier, a requirement distinct from the duty to pay.58
Retained Interests Do Not Cure
The government's second argument was that it took nothing because the growers kept something. Growers retained an interest in any net proceeds after deductions for export subsidies and the Committee's expenses, and the government said that interest kept the arrangement out of the per se rule. In the years at issue, those proceeds were less than production costs in one year and nothing in the next.60
The Court rejected the argument: when there has been a physical appropriation, “we do not ask whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use of the item taken.”61 The question that drives regulatory balancing, how much value remains with the owner, is the wrong question once the government has taken the property itself. A grower who loses raisins to the government stands where an owner stands whose car has been taken, because the government's duty to pay is categorical.62
Three features of the raisin order explain why the retained interest could not carry the weight the government put on it. The growers kept little: they lost the rights to possess, use, and dispose of the reserve raisins, and what remained was the speculative hope that residual proceeds would be left after the government deducted its expenses.63 The hope was also in the taker's hands, because the interest depended on the Committee's discretion and could be worthless, as it was for one of the years at issue.64 And a contrary rule would undo the categorical duty. If a promise of residual proceeds could turn a physical taking into a regulation, the government could escape the rule in any program by attaching a payment clause that only the government could shrink to zero.
Loretto shows the same principle with a different kind of retained value. The cable box took only a small part of a rooftop, and the owner kept the rest of the building, yet the installation was a taking without regard to the public benefit or the economic impact on the owner.65
The contrast with Allard shows what an owner must keep for a claim to stay in regulatory territory. The ban on selling eagle feathers left the owners in possession, free to transport the artifacts and to donate or devise them, and it compelled no surrender and imposed no physical invasion or restraint, so the loss of the profit from selling did not make out a taking.66 The raisin order required physical surrender of the raisins and a transfer of title. The Allard owners kept rights they controlled themselves, over goods still in their hands. The growers kept a claim on money whose existence and amount the taker controlled, over goods that were gone.
Payments and retained value belong to the compensation stage. The government also asked for a remand to calculate what compensation would have been due had the Hornes complied with the reserve requirement, and to consider regulatory benefits. The Court declined. Just compensation is normally measured by the market value of the property at the time of the taking, the government had already calculated that amount when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins, $483,843.53, and the government did not suggest that the marketing order itself afforded the Hornes compensation in that amount. The Hornes were therefore relieved of the fine and the associated civil penalty.67 Once a physical appropriation exists, any payment from the government is relevant only to just compensation and not to whether a taking occurred.68
Conditioning Market Access
The government's last defense was that growers choose to sell raisins. They could plant other crops or sell their grapes for other uses, the government said, so the reserve requirement was the price of a privilege.70 The Court held that a governmental mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a condition on permission to engage in commerce is a per se taking. The ability to sell produce in interstate commerce is not a governmental benefit that the government may condition on a waiver of constitutional protection.71
Voluntariness cannot carry the argument because nearly any appropriation of property used in an activity can be described as avoidable by giving up the activity. A grower can stop growing, a landlord can stop renting, and a builder can stop building. If that availability defeated a takings claim, the government could turn any physical appropriation into a regulation by announcing that the activity is a privilege. Loretto had already rejected the argument that an owner can avoid a taking by choosing to stop the activity that triggers the governmental demand.72 The cable company there argued that the burden depended on how the owner chose to use the building, and the Court said that “use-dependency” argument proves too much: it would let the government require a landlord to devote a substantial part of a building to vending and washing machines, with the profits going to the owners of those services and no compensation for the lost space, or to requisition apartments as permanent government offices. The right of a property owner to exclude a stranger's physical occupation of his land cannot be so easily manipulated.73
The Court did not hold that conditions may never accompany an owner's dealings with the government. The government relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., which stated that as long as the applicant is aware of the conditions under which data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary submission of data in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.74 Horne distinguished that case. Requiring disclosure of trade secrets in exchange for a valuable government benefit, a permit to sell hazardous chemicals, differs from requiring growers to surrender a portion of their crop as a condition of selling the rest in interstate commerce.75
The differences track what each side of the transaction gave and received. A registration is something the government grants that the applicant did not already hold, and the applicant asks for it knowing the terms, so the disclosure is the agreed price of something new. A grower who sells raisins is using property the grower already owns, and the government supplies nothing in return for the reserve. The first condition is part of an exchange. The second is a demand for part of the owner's own property with nothing offered in exchange. Whether a condition is valid therefore depends on whether something real sits on the government's side of the bargain.
The same line separates ordinary uses from true benefits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. The argument there was that the Nollans were on notice, when they requested a new development permit, that approval would carry a condition ensuring public lateral access to the shore, so they could have had no expectation of exercising a right of exclusion afterward, just as in Monsanto.76 The Court answered that the right to build on one's own property, though its exercise may be subject to legitimate permitting requirements, cannot remotely be described as a governmental benefit. An announcement that a permit will entail yielding a property interest therefore does not establish the voluntary exchange found in Monsanto, and the Nollans' rights were not altered because they acquired the land after the Commission had begun to implement its policy.77 Horne carried that logic from building to selling, since neither is a benefit the government hands out. The sections on exactions return to permit conditions that demand property.
Horne also rejected a second analogy, a charge for access to what the state itself owns. In Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, Maryland required oyster packers to remit a share of the marketable shells, or their money equivalent, as the price of harvesting oysters, and the Court found no taking because the wild oysters belonged to the state. Raisins are private property, so a demand for part of them is a taking and not a price.
Cedar Point supplies a further limit that applies to benefits the government does grant. The government may require owners to cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits without causing a taking, which is why ordinary health and safety inspection regimes generally will not be takings; the California organizer-access regulation was not germane to any benefit provided to agricultural employers or to any public risk.78 A restaurant that must admit health inspectors as a condition of its license has received something, the license, and the inspection is aimed at the risk that license creates.
Voluntariness does matter in one setting, and seeing where keeps the argument from being overread. The Yee park owners had voluntarily rented their land, and neither the city nor the state compelled them to keep renting, because an owner who wished to change the use of the land could evict tenants on notice.79 There the owners chose the relationship, so no occupation was compelled. Voluntariness therefore answers a different question from the one Horne decided. It helps explain why no physical taking occurred when the owner chose the relationship, and it fails as a defense once the government has demanded the property.80
The second and third questions do most of the work. The raisin growers lost at the second, because selling their own crop is an ordinary use of their own property, and the pesticide applicant lost at the third, because the registration was a benefit the government created and the disclosure was part of the price.