Concept
Total Regulatory Takings
Takings
Total Regulatory Takings
A regulation that cuts an owner's property value, even sharply, usually is not a taking. Rules that merely reduce value or bar the most beneficial use generally escape the clause when economically viable uses remain, and courts judge them under the Penn Central factors: the economic impact on the claimant, the interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.1 That balancing governs restrictions on use. A direct physical appropriation is a per se taking, and the Court does not ask whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use.2 The government has the same categorical duty to pay when it takes your car as when it takes your home.3
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council adds one narrow exception inside the use-restriction category. A regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest the restraint serves.4 The state can avoid payment only by showing that background principles of property and nuisance law already barred the use, so that the use was never part of the owner's title.5 This is the second of two categorical rules; the first covers regulations that force the owner to suffer a physical invasion.6 The second rule matters because the physical-occupation rule reaches only a small fraction of takings claims, and the ad hoc Penn Central test left considerable uncertainty about the rest.7
The Court gave the total-deprivation category its own rule because the assumptions behind balancing give out at the extreme. Ordinary regulation adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life and secures an “average reciprocity of advantage” to everyone concerned. When no productive use is permitted, it is less realistic to assume that is happening.8 The functional reason for letting regulation lower values without payment, that “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” does not reach the relatively rare case in which government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.9 States also routinely use eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands that prevent development, or to acquire such lands outright, which suggests the practical equivalence of negative regulation and appropriation.10
The category stays narrow. The owner must prove that the regulation permits no economically beneficial use of the land, and the owner carries that burden.11 A steep loss that leaves some use goes back to Penn Central, and the loss is measured against the parcel as a whole. Whether a temporary ban on all use is a total taking is a separate question that Lucas does not answer; the next unit takes it up.12
The Lucas Categorical Rule
David Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina. When he bought, both were zoned for single-family residential construction, and neither the state, the county, nor the town restricted that use.14 The state then enacted the Beachfront Management Act, whose construction bar stopped him from building on them. Lucas sued, contending that the bar took his property without just compensation. He did not dispute that the Act was a valid exercise of the police power. He argued that its complete extinguishment of his lots' value entitled him to compensation whatever the legislature's purposes. After a bench trial, the court agreed.15
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. It ruled that when a regulation is designed “to prevent serious public harm,” no compensation is owed, whatever the regulation does to the property's value.16 The United States Supreme Court therefore had to decide whether a valid, harm-preventing regulation can still require payment when it eliminates all value. In one category of cases it can. The Court had described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest: regulations that compel the owner to suffer a physical invasion, and regulations that deny all economically beneficial or productive use of land.17 Accepting the trial court's finding that the lots were valueless, the Court held that a regulation depriving real property of all economically viable use is a taking, unless the state proves the regulation does no more to restrict use than state courts could do under background principles of property law or the law of nuisance.18 It remanded for the South Carolina courts to decide whether state law already barred Lucas's intended use.19
The rule demands more than a steep loss. The owner must prove that the regulation prohibits all economically beneficial uses, not just the use the owner intended.20 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island shows how little must remain to take a claim out of the rule. The owner there said his parcel, mostly wetlands, would have been worth $3,150,000 if developed with 74 homes, but state law let him build one, leaving it worth $200,000, a loss of 93.7 percent, or in his words “a few crumbs of value.” The Court held that the right to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property “economically idle,” so Lucas did not apply.21 The Court added that once a taking is otherwise established, a state may not evade the duty to compensate by leaving the owner a token interest.22
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court said that anything less than a “complete elimination of value” requires Penn Central analysis.23 The categorical rule is limited to the “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted,” and a diminution of 95 percent rather than 100 percent calls for Penn Central.24 A fact pattern that reports a loss of more than ninety percent is therefore asking whether any economically beneficial use remains. If one does, the owner is in Penn Central balancing. If none does, the owner has a Lucas claim, subject to the background-principles defense.
The whole rule rests on a finding of total loss, and not everyone accepted that finding. Justice Kennedy, concurring, called it “a curious finding.” Justice Blackmun's dissent opened with the charge that the Court “launches a missile to kill a mouse.” It argued that Lucas could still exclude others, picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the land in a movable trailer, and could sell the lots to neighbors or to buyers who wanted to be near the ocean without a house. If those uses and that resale value count, there was no total loss. A rule that depends on total loss will seldom be triggered, because government actions rarely eliminate value entirely.
The aftermath shows how contingent the finding was. South Carolina settled the litigation in 1993 by buying Lucas's lots for just under $1.6 million. A year later it sold them, and a home was built on one lot, which was permissible because the legislature had amended the Act in 1990 after coastal owners, in the wake of Hurricane Hugo, demanded the right to rebuild.27 The purchase is the practical equivalence the Court had in mind: the state paid for land it had regulated into idleness. When a state pays through condemnation, the award carries interest from the time of the taking, though condemnees generally cannot recover attorneys' fees or other litigation expenses.28
Police Power Is No Defense
South Carolina's highest court treated Lucas's concession about validity as the end of the case. The Act, it reasoned, was a police-power measure to prevent serious harm to the public, and such measures fall within a long line of decisions rejecting due process and takings challenges to a state's use of police powers to stop activities akin to public nuisances: Mugler v. Kansas (manufacture of alcoholic beverages), Hadacheck v. Sebastian (a brick mill in a residential area), Miller v. Schoene (diseased cedar trees near orchards), and Goldblatt v. Hempstead (a quarry in a residential area).30 From those cases the court drew its rule: a regulation designed “to prevent serious public harm” requires no compensation, whatever it does to the property's value.31
The Supreme Court rejected that rule for total deprivations, for three connected reasons. First, the harm-preventing rationale proves too much. Penn Central had already explained that these decisions rest not on any supposed “noxious” quality of the forbidden uses, but on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to a policy, not unlike historic preservation, expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property.32 That explanation describes nearly every valid regulation, so it cannot also pick out the few that must be paid for.
Second, the label is unstable. A given restraint will be seen as mitigating “harm” to adjacent parcels or as securing a “benefit” for them, depending on the observer's evaluation of the relative importance of the use the restraint favors. Practically all human activities, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes, interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference.33 State courts had split on this very point. One allowed an owner to be barred from filling wetlands without compensation because the fill would deprive adjacent coastal habitats and fisheries of ecological support, in Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board. Another required compensation for an owner barred from filling a tidal marsh, in Bartlett v. Zoning Commission of Old Lyme, despite the town's laudable goal of preserving marshland. Professor Michelman had identified the same “basic difficulty” in 1967: without a neutral benchmark, a regulation that purports to prevent public harms, and so triggers no compensation, can just as easily be seen as one that extracts a benefit from the owner for the public.34
Third, none of the decisions that used harmful-use logic involved an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's land.35 The Court therefore would not let harm prevention excuse payment for a total deprivation, and it put a different question in its place. A state seeking to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with.36
The older decisions survive on their facts. In Hadacheck, an ordinance prohibited brickyards in an area designated for residential use, and the Court held it valid as applied to an existing brickyard even though the property fell in value from $800,000 to $60,000.37 The owner kept land with value, so the case sits comfortably beside the categorical rule. Outside the total-deprivation category, the police power keeps its force. When a state reasonably concludes that the health, safety, morals, or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need not accompany the prohibition.38
Justice Blackmun would have kept the older rule. In his view the line of cases from Mugler onward, among them Powell v. Pennsylvania, Hadacheck, Miller, Goldblatt, and Keystone, holds that a prohibition on uses that valid legislation declares injurious to the community is not a taking, even when the owner's property becomes valueless. The majority answered that a harm-preventing justification can be formulated in practically every case, so a test that asks only whether the legislature recited one amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a “stupid staff.” Courts have some leeway in reading existing state law, it added, but not remotely as much as a legislature has in crafting reasons for a confiscatory regulation.39 The two sides disagree about who supplies the answer. The dissent would accept the legislature's judgment that a use is harmful. The majority looks to the law that already defined what the owner held.
The validity of a regulation and the duty to pay for it are separate questions. Lucas never disputed the Act's validity, and the Court still held that the loss of all economically beneficial use required compensation unless the use was already outside his title.40 The public use requirement, covered earlier in the chapter, is a different inquiry again; the Court has rejected a public-use challenge to a taking for private development, though in one case by a bare 5-4 vote.41
Background Principles Exception
The categorical rule carries one defense, and it rests on a simple premise: the Takings Clause pays for property the owner actually held. A state defending a total deprivation may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with.43 The inquiry is antecedent because it comes before any weighing of what the regulation accomplishes. If state law already denied the owner the right to do what the regulation forbids, the regulation removes nothing the owner owned, and no payment is due even though the land is left idle.
The source of such limits is the law that already governed the land. A limitation severe enough to prohibit all economically beneficial use cannot be newly legislated or decreed without compensation. It must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.44 Put operationally, the regulation must do no more than duplicate the result that adjacent landowners could have won in a private nuisance action, that the state could have won under its power to abate nuisances affecting the public generally, or that some other part of state law would have produced.45 A legislature that could create the limit by announcing it could describe every total ban as a limit on title, and the categorical rule would never apply.
The navigational servitude shows both sides of the inquiry. The interests of a riparian owner in submerged lands bordering a public navigable water were held subject to the government's servitude in Scranton v. Wheeler. Imposing the servitude on a marina that the owner had created and made navigable at private expense was held to be a taking in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.46 The government's act was the same in both cases. The results differ because in the first the servitude was already part of what the owner held, and in the second it was a new burden on what the owner had built. Lucas said that confiscatory regulations must be treated the same way.
The Court gave two examples of regulations that fall on the permitted side of the line. The owner of a lake bed who is denied a permit for a landfilling operation that would flood others' land is owed nothing, and neither is the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant who is directed to remove all improvements after the plant is found to sit astride an earthquake fault. Either regulation may eliminate the land's only economically productive use, but neither proscribes a use that was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles. The use was always unlawful, and the state could at any point have made the implication of those principles explicit.47 The lake-bed owner shows the mechanism in its simplest form: the flooded neighbors could have sued and stopped the fill, so the permit denial gives the state only what the neighbors already held against the owner.
The nuisance exception is not coterminous with the police power. As a dissent in Penn Central put it, the question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others. In Curtin v. Benson, the Court held that barring an owner from grazing cattle on his land inside Yosemite National Park took his property, although the government could have required him, without compensation, to fence the land or otherwise keep his cattle off others' land.48
Because the state must show that the use was already forbidden, the inquiry tracks nuisance law, and Lucas looked to the Restatement of Torts for it.49 A court asks how serious the harm is that the proposed activity poses to public resources or neighboring land, how socially valuable the activity is and how well it suits the locality, how easily the harm could be avoided, and whether similarly situated owners have long engaged in the same use, which ordinarily suggests that the common law never prohibited it.
Once the owner shows a total loss, the burden shifts to the state, which must show that property or nuisance law justifies the restriction.50 Lucas set the standard high. South Carolina had to do more than offer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas wanted were inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim.51 A state, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation. It had to identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses the owner now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found, as it would have to do if it sued to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance.52 The Court doubted that it could. It seemed unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land, and they rarely support prohibition of the “essential use” of land, citing Curtin v. Benson.53
Nuisance is the most familiar background principle but not the only one. A colonial statute giving the public access rights to all “Great Ponds,” lakes over ten acres, and carried into state law at the founding, is a background principle of that state's law. So is the common-law rule of capture for wild animals in Pierson v. Post, which grew from the principle that a wild animal before its capture was the property of the state. From that principle came the rule that statutes may regulate capture, and from those statutes came protection of endangered species. At each step the background principle gives the government a defense to a total-taking claim.54 The same idea runs through the physical-takings cases. Many government-authorized physical invasions are not takings because they are consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, including common-law privileges to enter in cases of necessity or to enforce the law.55
The baseline can be challenged even when a court, rather than a legislature, changes the law. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, beachfront owners argued that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to accretions and the right to have littoral property touch the water took rights they held. Justice Scalia accepted that a judicial decision can effect a taking but found none, because the owners failed to show that the Florida court's interpretation was inconsistent with prior state law.56
Timing creates a separate trap for the state. A state may argue that a regulation, once enacted, becomes a background principle binding every later purchaser. Palazzolo rejected that move. A regulation that would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of state law by the mere passage of title.57 A background principle is a common, shared understanding of permissible limitations drawn from the state's legal tradition, so it cannot bind some owners but not others. Whether an existing general law can limit all economic use turns on objective factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed, and a law does not become a background principle for subsequent owners by enactment itself.58
The defense has its critics, and their objections show how much room it leaves. An affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found.59 The Restatement, however, defines nuisance by an ad hoc balancing test, which prompts the question whether the exception swallows the rule.60 Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued from the other side that the exception freezes the state's common law and denies legislatures much of their traditional power to revise property law as society learns the importance of wetlands, endangered species, and fragile coasts. On an exam, the majority's formulation controls: the state must show that the use was already barred, and a legislative declaration of harm does not show it.