Concept
Sources of Citizenship
Citizenship
Involuntary Loss of Citizenship
Sources of Citizenship
Whether the government may take away a person's citizenship depends first on how that person became a citizen. The Fourteenth Amendment names two constitutional routes, birth in the United States and naturalization in the United States. The protection announced in Afroyim v. Rusk reaches every citizen who has not voluntarily relinquished that status: Congress may not strip a native-born or a naturalized citizen of nationality without the citizen's consent.1 Later parts of this chapter work through the holding and its reasoning. Here the point is structural. Because the protection tracks the constitutional sources of citizenship, the first step in any loss-of-citizenship problem is to classify the source.
Classification matters because a status that arrives by another route may stand on different footing. A person born abroad falls outside the Clause's birth language, so whatever citizenship that person holds must rest on something else, and how far the consent rule reaches it is a separate question, taken up in the later section on citizenship acquired abroad. A reader who skips the classification step risks applying the rule to someone it does not reach, or overlooking that it plainly protects someone it does.
The Citizenship Clause comes first below, because it supplies the constitutional definition and the vocabulary for everything after it. Birth and naturalization follow, since each carries its own rules and the later protections turn on which one applies.
The Citizenship Clause
The first sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the Constitution's own definition of a citizen: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”2 The sentence has three working parts. It names two ways into the class, birth and naturalization; it confines both to the United States and to persons subject to its jurisdiction; and it declares the result at two levels, national citizenship and citizenship of the state of residence. In Afroyim the Court read these words as a provision that “provides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to control the status of citizenship,” with no indication of “a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time.”3
The sentence exists because of Dred Scott v. Sandford. The Court there held that the descendants of enslaved Africans were not intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and so could claim none of the rights and privileges that instrument secures to citizens of the United States.4 The opinion also shut the other door. A state, it reasoned, cannot introduce a new member into the political community the Constitution created, and it cannot make a person a member of that community by making him a member of its own.5
Slavery stayed constitutional until the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, and until the Fourteenth in 1868 the Constitution offered no assurance of equal protection and so set no limit on race discrimination.6 The first sentence of Section 1 answered Dred Scott directly. By granting national and state citizenship to all persons born in the United States, it nullified the decision and made both the recently freed and the previously freed Black Americans “citizens” under the Constitution.7
A statute could not do that work securely. The civil rights bill had already spoken to the subject, but the debates describe the constitutional clause in different terms: “It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. . . . We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens . . . under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power . . . .”8 Afroyim drew the consequence. The framers were not particularly concerned with expatriation, yet from the language they used it seemed undeniable to the Court that they “wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy.”9
A second fear concerned the courts and the states. The Amendment's sponsors worried that unless citizenship were defined, freedmen might, under the reasoning of Dred Scott, be excluded by the courts from the scope of the Amendment, and they agreed it would be prudent to remove the “doubt thrown over” the subject. A basis for federal citizenship indisputably independent of state citizenship would also keep state legislatures from circumventing the Amendment by denying freedmen state citizenship.10 Writing the definition into the Constitution therefore closed the question to two audiences: courts reasoning as Dred Scott did, and legislative majorities that might otherwise revise a statute.
That account of the sponsors' concerns comes from the dissent in Afroyim, which read the clause far more narrowly than the majority and found nothing in the debates showing an intent to deny Congress authority to expatriate unwilling citizens. The chapter takes up the dissent in a later section. Even on that narrow reading, the clause does the work described here.
The two differ in how they entered the political community, and the sentence shows why long residence cannot close that gap. The word “reside” appears only in the second half, where it assigns state citizenship to those who are already citizens of the United States. A fact pattern that features a long-term lawful resident should therefore prompt one question: was the person born or naturalized in the United States?
The second half of the sentence makes a citizen of the United States a citizen of the state of residence, so state citizenship follows residence and does not wait on the state's approval. The Court's opinion in Saenz v. Roe draws on that half. It recalled Justice Miller's explanation in the Slaughter-House Cases that a citizen of the United States can, “of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”11 It then stated the corollary: citizens “have the right to choose to be citizens ‘of the State wherein they reside,’” and “[t]he States, however, do not have any right to select their citizens.”12
The choice belongs to the individual because the Clause gives the state no part in it. A state that could pick its citizens could withhold the label from a disfavored group, the very maneuver the Amendment's sponsors feared. This chapter uses Saenz only for that point.
Citizenship by Birth
Birth in the United States is the first route the Clause names, and Afroyim's account of United States v. Wong Kim Ark shows how firmly the Constitution protects it. The Court there first held that, within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States. It observed that he might renounce that citizenship and become a citizen of another country but had never done so. It then held that Congress could do nothing to abridge or affect the citizenship the Amendment conferred.14
The Court built on Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Osborn that Congress, under the power of naturalization, has “a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away.” The Fourteenth Amendment, it said, “while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.”15 The contrast in origin carries the argument. A naturalized citizen's status begins in an act of Congress, and Marshall still denied Congress any power to take it back. A native-born citizen's status begins in the Constitution, and the Amendment gives Congress no authority over the effect of birth.
Afroyim then stated the general conclusion. The Fourteenth Amendment protects “every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race,” and it gives each citizen “a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”16 In practice, almost all persons born in the United States acquire citizenship automatically and cannot lose it involuntarily, even if they leave the United States immediately after birth and never return.17 The Clause itself confines the class to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, a qualification this chapter does not develop.
Legal systems do not agree on what fixes citizenship at birth. Under jus soli, citizenship follows the place of birth; the principle was a tenet of English common law, has roots in feudalism, and still serves as a basic rule of citizenship in many parts of the world. Under jus sanguinis, the rule of civil-law countries in Europe, a person's citizenship at birth follows the citizenship of the parents, a concept that took hold in Europe during the French Revolution.18 The Clause speaks the language of place: “born . . . in the United States.” A claim that rests on a parent's citizenship rather than on birth here is therefore not a claim under the Clause's birth language.
The connections a person must have with the nation vary with how the citizenship was acquired.19 The later section on citizenship acquired abroad, which includes Rogers v. Bellei, takes up how far the consent rule reaches a status that does not rest on birth in the United States. A fact pattern that stresses a parent's citizenship invites the mistake of treating the child as a birthright citizen, and one that stresses the parents' foreign nationality invites the opposite mistake. The Clause asks only where the birth occurred.
Citizenship by Naturalization
Naturalization, the second route, differs from birth in where the status begins. The Constitution gives Congress the right to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the power is exclusively Congress's: even the Dred Scott Court said that no state since the adoption of the Constitution can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges of a citizen under the federal government.21 The power also fits a larger pattern. Not every federal power rests on an affirmative grant in the Constitution. Some areas of governance are “inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality” and therefore fall to the federal government as a necessary concomitant of its existence, and Congress holds many of these in light of its primacy as the law-giving agency of the nation.22 Deciding who joins the nation sits comfortably within that description. The Fourteenth Amendment confirms that persons naturalized in the United States are citizens but leaves the power to regulate naturalization where it stood before, in Congress.23 A native-born citizen's status comes from the Constitution itself, and a naturalized citizen's arrives through an act of Congress. That difference explains why Congress has wide discretion at the start of the process and why, as the rest of this section shows, the discretion ends when the process is complete.
Because the power is Congress's, the terms of admission are Congress's too. An applicant generally must reside in the United States for three or five years after becoming a permanent resident, show good moral character and attachment to the United States, demonstrate English literacy, and understand American history and principles of government.24 The residence requirement shows how finely those terms can be drawn. An absence of under six months leaves continuity intact, an absence of more than six months but under a year breaks it unless the applicant rebuts the presumption, and an absence of a year or more breaks continuity as a matter of law, so the applicant must complete a new period of residence.25 Congress can be this demanding because an applicant does not yet hold the status being sought.
Conditions of that kind decide who gets in. They say nothing about what Congress may do after admission, and on that question the leading statement comes from Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States. A naturalized citizen, he wrote, “becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native.” The Constitution “does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights,” and the national legislature's power “is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.”26 The Afroyim Court described the passage as a mature and well-considered dictum, meaning a statement made while deciding something else.
The reasoning runs in short steps. A power to prescribe a rule for admission is a power to apply that rule to a person, and once the rule has been applied the power has done its work. The citizen then holds the same status as a native, so any later burden on the status would be an attempt to enlarge or abridge rights Congress was never authorized to touch. The Afroyim Court said the same of citizens generally: “The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”27
The tempting error is to reason that Congress made the naturalized citizen and so may attach conditions to the status later, just as it attached conditions to the application. Afroyim v. Rusk answers that error. Because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from forcibly destroying citizenship, the Court agreed that the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under § 401(e).28 Set beside the applicant in the box above, the contrast is the whole lesson. The same Congress, acting under the same power, may fix the price of admission for an applicant but may not reduce the status of a citizen who has paid it. A citizen can lose the right to live in the United States only through voluntary expatriation or revocation of naturalization.29 Later sections take up the second of these as a limit on the consent rule, together with the equal treatment of naturalized citizens.