Concept
Benefits and Religious Schools
Free exercise
Benefits and Religious Schools
Until now this chapter has tested the command that Congress make no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion against government as regulator and employer, through criminal bans, licensing rules, and workplace discipline.1 A different problem arises when government acts as patron and hands out money that private parties spend as they choose. In Carson v. Makin, the Court held that a state that subsidizes private education may not exclude religious schools from generally available funding solely because they are religious. The Free Exercise Clause, through its neutrality principle, requires equal treatment of religious and nonreligious private schools. The Court also held that equal funding of this kind does not violate the Establishment Clause, a question for the study of that Clause.
The law of school aid was not always framed this way. For much of the past sixty years, the Court produced only a confused tangle of rulings about state aid to parochial schools: a state could supply buses from home to school but not buses for field trips, textbooks but not globes and atlases.2 The cases in this unit approach funding from the Free Exercise side and ask a simpler question, whether the state shut religious recipients out of a program open to everyone else.
Maine’s program shows what a generally available benefit looks like. The State is highly rural, and many school administrative units operate no public secondary school. For families in those units, Maine pays tuition, up to a statutory maximum, at the public school or approved private school the parent chooses.3 Approval requires accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or approval by the Department of Education, and approved schools must meet curricular rules such as English-language instruction.4 Parents could once direct the payments to religious schools as well, but in 1981 Maine amended the statute to require that every participating school be nonsectarian.5
Two families in units without a secondary school brought the challenge. The Carsons sent their daughter to Bangor Christian Schools, which began as a ministry of a Baptist church, and the Nelsons sent their son to Temple Academy, which is affiliated with a community church. Both schools were accredited and approved for attendance purposes, yet both were ineligible for tuition assistance because the Department deemed them sectarian.6 The families sued under the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses, and the District Court rejected their claims.7 The Court then decided Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, which struck down a state no-aid provision barring aid to schools controlled by a church, but the First Circuit still affirmed by distinguishing Espinoza on two grounds.8 Montana’s rule turned on a school’s religious status, the court said, while Maine’s turned on the religious use a school would make of the money; and Maine was providing the rough equivalent of a secular public education, which it could permissibly require.9 The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 6 to 3 and rejected both distinctions. The wording of the Montana and Maine provisions differs, but their effect is the same: each disqualifies some private schools from funding solely because they are religious.10
Carson rests on Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer and on Espinoza, which hold that a state may not exclude otherwise eligible recipients from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. Those decisions in turn rest on the principle from Sherbert v. Verner that conditions on receiving benefits may not penalize religious exercise.11 The benefit setting matters because a rule that conditions a benefit on giving up religious character penalizes free exercise even though no one is fined or jailed.12 A state need not subsidize private education, but once it does, the funding cannot turn on a school’s religious character. A rule that disqualifies a school because it is religious targets religion by its own terms, and the Court reviews it under the strictest scrutiny.13
The subsections that follow move from the settled rule to its limit. Status-based exclusions come first, because Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza supply the rule on which Carson builds. Use-based exclusions come second: they test whether a rule keyed to what a school teaches, rather than what it is, escapes that rule, which was the First Circuit’s central distinction. Locke v. Davey comes last, the decision allowing a state scholarship program to leave out devotional theology degrees, which the Court has since confined.14
Status-Based Exclusions
A rule that merely withholds a benefit fits awkwardly with a clause forbidding laws “prohibiting” religious exercise, because no one is fined, jailed, or ordered to abandon a ritual.15 Carson answers the objection by restating that the Free Exercise Clause protects against indirect coercion and penalties as well as outright prohibitions, and that a state violates it when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits.16 The Court drew on two recent decisions. In Trinity Lutheran, Missouri could not disqualify a church-operated daycare from playground resurfacing grants solely because it was church-operated. In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, Montana’s no-aid provision violated the Clause because it disqualified religious schools from scholarship funds solely because of their religious character.17 Together the cases mean that once a state subsidizes private education, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious, and a rule that does so receives strict scrutiny.18
Sherbert v. Verner explains why denying a benefit counts as a burden. A Seventh-day Adventist was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith, and when her scruples kept her from taking other Saturday work, she claimed unemployment benefits.19 It did not matter that such benefits are characterized as a privilege rather than a right, because the state cannot condition the receipt of government benefits on the surrender of constitutional rights. Benefits that depended on the claimant’s “willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith” effectively penalized the free exercise of her liberties.20 An eligibility rule drawn around religious identity works the same way. The applicant that wants the benefit must give up its religious character or stay out of the program, so the state accomplishes through a condition what it could not accomplish by command.
The older model is McDaniel v. Paty, which invalidated a statute that barred ministers from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention because it imposed a disability on the basis of religious status.21 Chief Justice Roberts explained the common thread. In McDaniel the benefit was available only to someone who gave up the status of being a minister, and in Trinity Lutheran only to an applicant that gave up the status of being a church. Neither the minister nor the church was directly required to abandon its status, but each was ineligible unless it did, and forcing that choice is constitutionally unacceptable. When government discriminates on the basis of religious status, it is irrelevant that the burden on free exercise is indirect.22
The facts of Trinity Lutheran show how plain such a rule can be. Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources offered grants to help public and private schools, nonprofit daycare centers, and other nonprofits buy rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires.23 Trinity Lutheran Church applied for a grant for its preschool and daycare center, and the application ranked fifth among 44 applicants. Despite that high score, the Department deemed the center categorically ineligible, explaining that Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution barred it from giving financial assistance directly to a church.24 The Court held that the policy expressly discriminated against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character, that such a policy penalizes the free exercise of religion, and that it triggers “the most exacting scrutiny.”25
Missouri had not ordered the church to change anything; it had made the church ineligible unless the church did. Under the McDaniel principle that is no defense. The church faced a choice between participating in an otherwise available benefit program and remaining a religious institution.26 What it asserted was a right to compete, not an entitlement to a subsidy. The express discrimination was not the denial of a grant but the refusal to let the church, solely because it is a church, compete with secular organizations for one, which is why the claim does not turn on any duty to fund.27 The Court separated the case from Locke v. Davey on the same ground. The student in Locke was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do with the money, while the church was denied a grant simply because of what it is.28 That contrast between religious status and religious use is the line the next subsection tests.
Once the exclusion drew strict scrutiny, Missouri had to show an interest of the highest order, and it offered only a policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns. The Court held that such a preference cannot be compelling in the face of a clear infringement on free exercise.29 The reason lies in how the two Religion Clauses fit together. The parties agreed that the Establishment Clause did not prevent Missouri from including the church, so the federal limit on government support of religion was already respected. The Court acknowledged “play in the joints” between what the Establishment Clause permits and what the Free Exercise Clause compels, but that room lets a state decline to fund some things; it gives the state no license to penalize a recipient for being religious.30 A state’s interest in achieving greater separation of church and state than the Establishment Clause already ensures is itself limited by the Free Exercise Clause, so the interest cannot justify the burden it creates.31 Nor does Smith rescue the state. Smith held that strict scrutiny does not apply to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law even when the law incidentally imposes a substantial burden on free exercise, but a policy that expressly disqualifies recipients for their religious character is not that kind of law.32
Espinoza applied the same logic to a school-choice program. Montana’s legislature gave tax credits to donors who funded private-school scholarships, and the Department of Revenue, to comply with the state constitution’s no-aid provision, barred use of the scholarships at religious schools.33 Three mothers whose children attended a religious school sued, and the Montana Supreme Court ruled against them under the no-aid provision.34 The Department argued that the money would be spent on religious education, but Chief Justice Roberts answered that the case concerned religious status and not religious use, because a school could escape the provision only by shedding any religious connection.35 Montana also said its provision protected separation of church and state more fiercely than the federal Constitution does. The Court replied that the Establishment Clause already secures the federal level of separation and that the Supremacy Clause binds state judges to the federal Constitution despite contrary state provisions.36 A state need not subsidize private education, the Court said, but once it decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.37
Many state no-aid provisions were enacted in the nineteenth century to keep state funds flowing only to public schools and not to Catholic ones. They were modeled on the failed federal Blaine Amendment and are sometimes called “little Blaines.”38 That history resembles the evidence of hostility examined in the neutrality cases, but the status rule does not wait on it. A policy that on its face disqualifies recipients because of their religious character draws strict scrutiny without proof of anti-Catholic motive.39
The reach of these decisions has been contested from the start. Chief Justice Roberts wrote in a footnote in Trinity Lutheran that the case involved express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing and that the Court did not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination; Justice Gorsuch did not join that footnote.40 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, stressed the kind of benefit at stake, a general program to improve the health and safety of children, and would have left other kinds of public benefits for another day.41 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. She read the case as asking whether Missouri had to pay to improve facilities a church uses to practice and spread its faith, funding she thought the Establishment Clause forbids when it flows directly to a house of worship.42 She also relied on play in the joints and on the history of state no-aid provisions to argue that Missouri was free to decline.43 The majority’s answer, given above, is that the Establishment Clause was not violated and the joints give no room to penalize religious status. Espinoza and Carson then carried the principle from a church’s playground to scholarship funds and tuition payments at religious schools.
An answer that stops at the point that the county never had to fund anyone has missed the claim. The church-run preschool in the first county asserts a right to compete, and the denial of a chance to compete on religion-blind terms is the penalty.44
Use-Based Exclusions
The status cases leave an obvious opening: a state might avoid them by drawing its eligibility line around what a school does instead of what a school is. Carson v. Makin closed that opening. Maine’s Department of Education excluded a school only when the school was associated with a faith and, beyond teaching academic subjects, promoted that faith or presented its material through that faith’s lens. Church affiliation was only an indicator, and the Department said it looked chiefly to curriculum and related activities.47 The First Circuit read that rule as a restriction on religious use and distinguished the status-based provisions the Supreme Court had struck down.48 The Supreme Court reversed. It held that when a state subsidizes private education it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious, and that Maine’s exclusion could not survive strict scrutiny.49
Each of the First Circuit’s two reasons for treating Maine’s rule differently failed, and the failures show why relabeling an exclusion leaves its constitutional character unchanged. The first reason concerned the benefit. The panel described the program as funding the “rough equivalent of the public school education that Maine may permissibly require to be secular,” and Maine repeated the point in the Supreme Court.50 The argument has surface appeal: a state that must provide a free public education, and may make it secular, might seem free to attach the same condition to money that stands in for it. But the statute directs payment of tuition at a public school or an approved private school chosen by the parent, and it says nothing about requiring a private school to provide a public education.51 The program’s operation confirms the point. Participating private schools need not accept all students, often charge tuition far above the state maximum, need not employ state-certified teachers, may be single-sex, and are exempt from many state curricular rules.52 The one resemblance to public schools the program demands is secularism, and a benefit defined as private secular education is only another way of saying that the state pays no tuition at religious schools.53 A definition that already contains the exclusion cannot justify it, because the open question is whether the state may draw that line at all.
Defining the benefit that way was also unnecessary, because Maine had options that required no discrimination. The Court observed that Maine chose to let some parents direct state tuition payments to private schools and was not forced to do so; it could instead expand its public school system, increase transportation, combine tutoring, remote learning, and partial attendance, or even operate boarding schools of its own.54 The rule from Espinoza therefore stays intact: a state need not subsidize private education, but once it decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.55 That answers the dissenting charge that the decision forces Maine to fund religious education, since the choice to fund private schools at all remained the State’s own.
The second reason was that Maine’s rule turned on religious use and not religious status. The Court rejected that distinction too. Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza addressed status discrimination, but nothing in them suggested that use-based discrimination is less offensive to the Free Exercise Clause.56 Espinoza had already pointed this way: the Court there declined to suggest that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid, and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence argued that status and use make no constitutional difference.57 The reason lies in what a religious school is for. Educating young people in their faith and inculcating its teachings is central to a private religious school’s mission, so a rule that excludes a school for what it teaches burdens the school’s exercise of religion as directly as a rule that excludes it for its affiliation.58 The mechanism matches Sherbert, where a state could not condition a benefit on the surrender of a protected liberty. A school can qualify in Maine only by ceasing to promote its faith or by teaching its subjects without the lens of that faith, and parents who want such a school for their children lose the benefit unless they choose another.59
The distinction also fails because it would make the status rule easy to evade. Religious instruction is what a religious school exists to provide, so a rule written in terms of use reaches the same schools a status rule reaches.60 After Espinoza, a legislature that wanted to bar church-run schools would need only to rewrite its statute to bar schools that would use funds for religious teaching. The line also invites an inquiry the Religion Clauses discourage. To give it effect, officials must examine whether and how a school pursues its religious educational mission, which raises serious concerns about entanglement with religion and denominational favoritism. Maine conceded that the Department barely engages in such scrutiny, which suggests the line has little meaning in practice.61
Once the status-use line is gone, Maine’s rule draws strict scrutiny, and the only justification the State offered was an antiestablishment interest. A neutral benefit program in which public funds reach religious organizations through the independent choices of private recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause, so Maine’s exclusion promoted a stricter separation of church and state than the Federal Constitution requires.62 Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza had already held that an interest in separating church and state more fiercely than the Constitution does cannot qualify as compelling when it infringes free exercise.63 Maine and the dissents also relied on Locke v. Davey, where Washington’s scholarship program left out one use, a degree designed to train a minister. The Court read Locke narrowly, because it turned on a historic and substantial state interest against funding clergy, and no comparable tradition exists against aiding private religious schools.64 Locke cannot be stretched beyond its focus on vocational religious degrees to let a state exclude religious persons from public benefits on the basis of anticipated religious use.65 The next subsection takes up that exception on its own terms.
The two dissents mark the limits of the majority’s reasoning. Justice Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Kagan and in large part by Justice Sotomayor, argued that the majority gave almost exclusive attention to the Free Exercise Clause and neglected the play in the joints between the two Religion Clauses, the room that sometimes lets a state advance antiestablishment interests by withholding aid from religious institutions without violating free exercise.66 On his view Maine’s rule was use-based in a way that mattered, because it excluded a school only when the school both affiliated with a faith and promoted it through its curriculum. The case therefore concerned religious activity and not religious labels, and nothing in the free exercise cases compelled Maine to give tuition aid to schools that would use it to provide a religious education.67 Justice Sotomayor’s separate dissent charged that the Court had moved from a rule allowing a state to refuse to fund religious entities to one that in many circumstances requires states to subsidize religious indoctrination, and she pointed out that the schools at issue denied enrollment on grounds that included gender identity, sexual orientation, and religion.68 She also treated the benefit as the public education that Maine’s constitution guarantees and that the Establishment Clause requires to be secular, and she saw the case as no different from Locke.69
The two sides disagree about what the benefit is. The majority treats it as tuition at a school the parent selects, so excluding a religious school removes an available benefit because of religious exercise. The dissents treat it as a public education delivered through private hands, so a secular limit only preserves what the Establishment Clause already demands of public schooling. The majority answers with the statute’s text and operation, which require only that participating schools be secular, and with the observation that the Montana and Maine provisions, though worded differently, have the same effect: each disqualifies some private schools solely because they are religious.70
An exam stem that describes a funding rule keyed to what a school teaches invites the answer that the decision covered only exclusions based on identity, so a use-based rule survives. That answer misreads Carson, which treated the two kinds of exclusion alike once the program was a generally available tuition benefit. What survives is narrower: conditions that make no reference to religion, and the Locke exception for training clergy.
The third step does most of the work, because a state’s defense usually arrives as a description of the benefit and rarely as a stated interest.
The Locke v. Davey Limit
One decision marks a narrow exception to the benefit cases. In Locke v. Davey the Court held that Washington could refuse to let a state scholarship pay for a degree in devotional theology without violating the Free Exercise Clause.73 Joshua Davey won a Promise Scholarship and enrolled at Northwest College, a Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God, where he planned a double major in pastoral ministries and business management in preparation for a life as a church pastor.74 The pastoral ministries degree was devotional and therefore excluded, and Davey was denied the funds when he refused to certify that he would not use them toward a devotional degree.75 The Ninth Circuit held that Washington had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment and so had to justify the exclusion as narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. The Supreme Court reversed.76
The Court placed the case in what it called the play in the joints between the Religion Clauses. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are frequently in tension, yet the Court has long said that “there is room for play in the joints” between them, so that some state actions are permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.77 The Establishment Clause sets the outer limit on what a state may do for religion, and the Free Exercise Clause sets the minimum a state must do, which leaves a zone of discretion between the two. Washington sat inside that zone. Because the independent and private choice of the recipient breaks the link between government funds and religious training, the State could have allowed Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology, and it did not contend otherwise.78 The question was whether Washington, acting under a state constitutional provision read to forbid even indirect funding of instruction that prepares students for the ministry, could decline to pay without violating the Free Exercise Clause.79
Davey argued that the program was not facially neutral toward religion and so was presumptively unconstitutional under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah. The Court refused, because accepting his argument would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond its facts and its reasoning.80 Hialeah had made ritual animal sacrifice a crime in order to suppress Santeria worship. Washington’s disfavor of religion, if it can be called that, was in the Court’s words “of a far milder kind.” The program imposed neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any religious service or rite, did not deny ministers the right to take part in political affairs as the law did in McDaniel v. Paty, and did not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and a government benefit as the unemployment cases did.81 The State had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”82 The program’s operation bears that description out. Recipients were free to use the money at accredited religious and nonreligious schools alike, and the only thing barred was spending it toward a devotional degree.83 The Court therefore treated the burden on Promise Scholars as relatively minor and found nothing in the text, history, or operation of the program that suggested animus toward religion.84
The remaining question was why a state could draw a line at this point at all, and the Court’s answer was history. Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor, and the Court said that training for religious professions and training for secular professions are not fungible, because the federal and state constitutions embody distinct views on religion, favoring free exercise but opposing establishment, that have no counterpart for other callings.85 A state that treats ministerial training differently is acting on those views, and the difference is no evidence of hostility. The tradition supplied the weight. Since the founding there had been popular uprisings against using taxpayer funds to support church leaders, one of the hallmarks of an established religion, and most states that sought to avoid an establishment around that time wrote formal prohibitions on tax support for the ministry into their constitutions.86 Given that historic and substantial state interest, the Court concluded that denying funding for vocational religious instruction alone is not inherently suspect, and with no presumption of unconstitutionality Davey’s claim failed.87
Three features answer different objections, and the exclusion needed all of them. The absence of hostility removes the concern from Lukumi that government is targeting a faith for suppression, and the modest burden removes the concern from Sherbert that a believer is being pressed to give up a religious precept to obtain a benefit. Neither feature would justify an exclusion that singles out religion unless the state also had an affirmative reason, and the tradition against funding clergy supplies it: a long, specific, and widely shared judgment that paying for ministers is a mark of establishment. The Court did not run the strict scrutiny of Lukumi. It weighed a substantial state interest against a relatively minor burden and let the State prevail, an approach that sits uneasily beside the forced-choice reasoning of Sherbert.88
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, and his objections show how much weight the tradition carries in the majority’s opinion. He argued that when a state makes a benefit generally available, the benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured, so withholding it solely because of religion violates the Free Exercise Clause.89 The founding-era history, in his account, involved measures that singled out the clergy for public support, and it says nothing about whether the clergy had to be excluded from benefits open to everyone. No one would seriously contend, he observed, that the Framers would have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church.90 He added that the modest dollar loss did not dispel the indignity of being singled out for a religious calling. The majority answered by pointing to the early state constitutions that excluded only the ministry from state dollars, which in its view showed that religious instruction for the ministry is of a different ilk.91 The disagreement thus turns on whether the old tradition against funding clergy justifies leaving ministers out of a general program, and the majority said yes for ministerial training.
Later decisions took Locke at its word and confined it to its facts. In Trinity Lutheran the Court separated Locke from a church’s exclusion from a playground-resurfacing grant: Davey was denied funds because of what he proposed to do with them, which was to prepare for the ministry, while the church was denied a grant simply because of what it is.92 Espinoza added two further distinctions. Washington had excluded only training for the ministry while allowing scholarships at pervasively religious schools, and Locke relied on a historic and substantial state interest in not funding the training of clergy, with no comparable tradition supporting Montana’s decision to bar religious schools.93 The history supports that second point. Early state constitutions, statutes, and practices permitted and promoted funding of private religious schools, and a contrary tradition arose only with the nineteenth-century state no-aid amendments, which came too late to count as an early American tradition and were tainted by anti-Catholic bias.94
Carson then rejected Maine’s reliance on Locke. The Court read Locke as upholding a narrow exclusion of funds to prepare for the ministry on the strength of a historic and substantial state interest against funding clergy, and it found no comparable tradition against aiding private religious schools.95 Locke, it said, cannot be read beyond its “narrow focus on vocational religious degrees” to let a state exclude religious persons from public benefits because of the religious use they anticipate making of them.96 That sentence blocks a tempting inference, that Locke approves use-based exclusions generally. Davey was refused funds because of what he proposed to do with them, but what saved the exclusion was the tradition attached to that particular use, and a use-based line with no tradition behind it receives the strict scrutiny the benefit cases demand. Even the dissent in Carson accepted the narrowness of the tradition. Justice Breyer wrote that Locke allows a state to refuse to fund particular religious uses because of a historic and substantial tradition against funding clergy that does not extend to helping private religious schools generally. He would have upheld Maine’s rule through the play in the joints for other reasons: it avoids social conflict, spares the state from evaluating religious curricula, and keeps public education religiously neutral.97 The later cases point toward reading the Free Exercise Clause to require nondiscriminatory aid to religious beneficiaries whenever the Establishment Clause permits it, and Locke survives as good law for the small category it addressed.98
An exam stem in which a state withholds scholarship money from religious applicants turns on one question: what category of conduct or institution does the exclusion reach?