Concept
Permits and Injunctions
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
Permits and Injunctions
Two kinds of content-neutral control put someone’s judgment between the speaker and the audience. A licensing scheme requires a speaker to win an official’s consent before using a street or park, and an injunction is a judge’s order telling particular speakers what they may not do. Both are prior restraints, because each operates before the speech occurs: one demands approval in advance, the other commands silence in advance. The ordinary content-neutral test measures a rule against its purpose. It asks whether the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively without it, and it forbids a regulation that burdens substantially more speech than necessary.1 The test says nothing about the person who applies the rule.
That person matters because discretion is where content finds its way in. “Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content.”2 A neutral purpose therefore does not end the inquiry. A permit system must carry standards that confine the official and review that checks the official, although the Court has relaxed the extra procedures it demands of film censors. An injunction faces a test somewhat more demanding than the one applied to statutes. The two subsections below take permits first and injunctions second, and they meet at one practical point: a speaker may ignore an invalid permit law but may not ignore an injunction.
Permit Systems
Thomas v. Chicago Park District states when a content-neutral permit system is valid. The ordinance must contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.3 Chicago’s ordinance met both demands. The Park District could deny a permit only for the reasons the ordinance set out, and those grounds were “reasonably specific and objective” and did not leave the decision “to the whim of the administrator.”4 A denial was also reviewable: first by appeal to the General Superintendent of the Park District, then by writ of common law certiorari in the Illinois courts.5
The scheme counted as content-neutral because its thirteen grounds for denial served purposes that had nothing to do with message. They let the Park District preserve and coordinate multiple uses of public space, prevent dangerous and unlawful uses, and ensure compensation for damage.6 Each requirement the Court imposed answers a different danger. Specific, objective standards keep the official to matters like a double-booked lawn or a safety hazard, and judicial review lets a refused applicant test the official’s stated reason against the ordinance’s text.
General statements of the public forum rules put the demand more firmly. A permit system for a public forum must serve an important purpose, give the licensing authority clear criteria that leave almost no discretion, and provide procedural safeguards such as prompt determination of requests and judicial review of denials.7 Thomas qualifies the procedural part. The specific requirements of Freedman v. Maryland, the film-licensing case, did not apply to Chicago’s content-neutral scheme, yet the Court still insisted on adequate standards and effective judicial review.8 Judicial review of denials therefore appears in both formulations.
Courts have long upheld permit requirements that confine the administrator to reasonable time, place, and manner constraints designed to accommodate public safety and convenience, and Cox v. New Hampshire is the standard example.9 A refusal on a neutral ground is valid as well. Because of congestion and the strain on police resources, a city could legitimately deny the Ku Klux Klan a permit to march on a particular day. It could not prohibit the Klan from marching on all days, or because it disliked the Klan’s message.10
The schemes that fail hand the official an open-ended power to consider nearly anything. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, a city ordinance let a commission grant or deny a parade permit according to its perception of the “public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.”11 The Court found those standards vague and subjective, vesting the commission with “virtually unbridled and absolute power,” and held that the potential for abuse passed the limits of constitutional tolerance.12 It invalidated the ordinance on its face, at the behest of a marcher who had never sought or obtained a permit.13 The words explain the result. “Decency” and “morals” invite the commission to ask whether a message is decent or moral, and “good order” and “convenience” make almost any refusal defensible. Nothing guides the decision, and a reviewing court has no standard against which to measure it, so the ordinance fails both requirements Thomas stated.
The same rule governs permission to use any public forum, not only a parade route. A licensing scheme that gives an administrator too much subjective discretion to grant or deny a permit, based on the speakers’ identity or the content of their message, will be struck down; Niemotko v. Maryland is the citation.14 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. carried the demand for neutral licensing criteria to a mayor’s power over newspaper boxes on city sidewalks.
Discretion can also hide in a price. An ordinance that let the official vary the cost of a permit by estimating what it would cost to maintain public order at the event effectively allowed an unconstitutional content-based restriction on unpopular messages.15 The Court invoked Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement for the risk that unduly broad licensing discretion lets an official favor or disfavor speech based on its content.16 The cost of keeping order depends on how hostile the audience is expected to be, so the official’s estimate of that cost becomes an estimate of the message’s unpopularity, and the least popular speakers pay the most. A cap on the fee would limit how high the price could climb but would leave the official free to vary it by the community’s hostility.
A permit rule can also fail for breadth alone. In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the village’s provisions reached “a significant number of noncommercial ‘canvassers’ promoting a wide variety of ‘causes,’” religious and political alike.17 Had the ordinance covered only commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, the Court said, it would arguably have been tailored to the village’s interests in protecting residents’ privacy and preventing fraud.18 The interests were real. The ordinance’s reach to speakers who did not threaten them was the defect.
A valid permit law can still be applied unconstitutionally, and the Court has recognized that content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions might be applied in a discriminatory manner.19 The remedy depends on the kind of defect. When the ordinance is invalid on its face, a speaker may ignore it and hold the protest without applying, or hold it after being turned down, and a person charged under the law may contest its validity in her defense.20 When the law is valid and only the denial is claimed to be unconstitutional, the speaker may not go ahead and hold the meeting if she wants to preserve her constitutional defenses.21 In Poulos v. New Hampshire, a conviction for holding a meeting in a park without a required permit was sustained without considering the claim that the denial was arbitrary, because the speakers had not gone to court to challenge it.22
A refusal based on the message is a content-based restriction on a traditional public forum, and it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.23 That is strict scrutiny: the refusal is presumed invalid, and the government must show that it employed narrowly tailored or necessary means to achieve a compelling interest.24 The union’s claim attacks the refusal, and it does not let the union attack a valid neutral rule on the ground that exempting it would do no harm. The time, place, and manner test is facial. The question is whether the restriction, taken on its face, significantly advances the goal, and not whether applying it to one speaker does.25 The Court reached that conclusion when a state supreme court struck down a state fair’s location rule because an exemption for the Krishnas would not noticeably worsen congestion; the rule applied evenhandedly to all distributors and was therefore content-neutral.26
Content-Neutral Injunctions
An injunction that limits protest can be content-neutral and still draw a harder look than a content-neutral statute. The ordinary test condemns a rule only when it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve its interest.28 In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., the Court asked more of an injunction: each of its provisions must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. That formulation tightens the ordinary standard without reaching strict scrutiny. The rest of this subsection shows where the tightening comes from and how it sorts the terms of a single order.
The ordinary test is easiest to see on a rule. Demonstrators who had set up a symbolic city to dramatize the plight of the homeless challenged a ban on camping and sleeping in a park, and it was undisputed that the ban was content-neutral and was not applied because of disagreement with the message.29 The regulation narrowly focused on the government’s substantial interest in keeping the parks in the heart of the capital attractive, intact, and available to millions of people.30 It left the demonstration intact, with its signs and its day-and-night vigil, and nothing barred the demonstrators from delivering their message to the media or the public by other means.31 That case is Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. Alternatives must be real, though. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the city argued that residents could still use handbills, letters, telephone calls, and bumper stickers, but the Court was “not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist” for a sign at the home, because a sign there “often carries a message quite distinct” from the same text placed elsewhere.32 Madsen’s tailoring inquiry puts the same questions to each term of an injunction: what interest does this term serve, and how much speech does it cost?
The injunction in Madsen began as an order forbidding abortion protesters to interfere with access to a clinic. When the protesters kept interfering, the Florida state court broadened the order to cover named organizations and all persons acting in concert with them, and it restricted their activities on the streets and sidewalks around the clinic. The petitioners could not attack the order as vague and overbroad merely because it reached those acting in concert with them, since those people were not parties to the dispute.33
The threshold question was classification, and the Court held the injunction content-neutral. An injunction applies to particular people in a specific dispute, so it regulates their activities, and perhaps their speech, because of what they did there. These protesters had violated the first order, and that violation, not their opposition to abortion, justified the broader one. That the order bound only abortion opponents did not change the result, because no one on the other side had demonstrated, and the group whose conduct warranted relief simply shared a viewpoint. A fact pattern that stresses that an order binds only one side describes who is covered; classification turns on why they are covered.
A content-based injunction draws strict scrutiny, which presumes the order invalid and requires the government to show narrowly tailored means to a compelling interest.34
Content neutrality did not end the analysis, because an injunction differs from a statute in how it is made and whom it reaches. A statute reflects a legislative choice for a broad population. An injunction is imposed by one judge on identified people without legislative debate, which carries a greater risk of censorship and discriminatory application, and the Court therefore required a somewhat more stringent application of ordinary First Amendment principles. Two features keep the test below strict scrutiny. An injunction binds people who usually have already violated the law and who present a continuing threat of illegal activity, and it can be tailored to the specific problem the court faces.
Applying the test term by term, the Court upheld some provisions and struck others. The significant interests in play included access to lawful medical services, public safety and order, the free flow of traffic, and property rights.
- The Court upheld a 36-foot buffer on the public streets and sidewalks in front of the clinic entrances and driveway, because the first order had failed to protect access, the narrow area left few options, and demonstrators standing in the middle of the street would block traffic. It also upheld limits on high noise levels during surgery and recovery hours.
- It struck the same buffer as applied to private property at the side and back of the clinic, because nothing showed that speech there interfered with access.
- It struck the ban on images observable from inside the clinic, because it is much easier for a clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up both ears.
- It struck the 300-foot zone barring uninvited approaches to people seeking clinic services, because a ban on every uninvited approach, however peaceful, is hard to justify on this record.
- It struck the 300-foot ban on picketing and demonstrating near the residences of clinic staff. Although the home is the “last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,” the 300-foot ban was much larger than necessary.35
The Court measured each term against the unlawful conduct that justified the order. The front buffer answered a documented problem of blocked access at the place where it sat. The side-and-back buffer reached ground where the record showed no obstruction, and the image ban and the residential zone each had a narrower substitute available. One order can therefore come out mixed, and a finding sufficient for one term cannot carry the rest.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York applied the same test to a federal injunction issued after large-scale protests and blockades, and it split a single order in the same way. The injunction barred demonstrating within fifteen feet of clinic doorways, parking lot entrances, and driveways, which created fixed buffer zones, and within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving the clinic, which created floating ones. The Court upheld the fixed zones because the record showed that protesters had blocked or hindered access at those places, and it deferred to the district court’s estimate of how many feet the problem required. It struck down the floating zones because a protester who wanted to stay at a normal conversational distance from a patient had to move as the patient moved, which kept speakers from conversing or handing out leaflets on public sidewalks. Both kinds of zone served the same purpose, and they differed in what they did to the speaker. The fixed zone moved speakers back from a place where the record showed obstruction, and the floating zone followed every patient and carried the speaker’s route to the audience away with it.
Madsen’s standard drew objections from both directions, and that is the best evidence of where it sits. Justice Stevens would have reviewed an injunction more deferentially than a statute, because an injunction binds only people who have already engaged in illegal conduct. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, would have applied strict scrutiny to any speech restriction imposed by injunction.
Getting the tailoring right at the outset matters more for an injunction than for a statute or a permit ordinance, because disobedience carries a different price. One can ignore an unconstitutional ordinance and protest, but one cannot ignore a judicial injunction based on the same unconstitutional ordinance and then invoke the First Amendment as a defense to a contempt charge.36 The two Birmingham cases mark the contrast: Shuttlesworth, who had never applied for a permit, could challenge the ordinance, while the demonstrators in Walker v. Birmingham, who defied an injunction, could not raise the First Amendment in answer to contempt. The route from permit to injunction is short. A city that lawfully denies a permit for a neutral reason could seek an injunction against a march held without one.37 A defective injunction silences speech until it is set aside, which is one reason precision in drafting matters.