Concept
Indecency and Broadcasting
Regulation of unprotected expression
Indecency and Broadcasting
A radio station played a comedian's recorded monologue in the middle of an afternoon, and the Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission's sanction even though the Commission itself called the monologue patently offensive and not necessarily obscene.1 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation therefore concerns indecent speech: offensive expression that falls short of the Miller definition of obscenity.2 Justice Stevens wrote a narrow opinion that stressed the special context of broadcasting, with its pervasive presence and its inability to keep children out of the audience.3 A broadcast that might be permissible at midnight was inappropriate in the middle of the afternoon, when children were likely to be listening, so the decision is read to permit channeling indecent broadcasts to appropriate times, not to permit banning them.4
That result sits uneasily with the rest of this chapter. Cohen v. California gave profane and indecent language the strongest declaration of First Amendment protection, and the Court has held that such language is generally protected, with notable exceptions.5 Cohen's reason was that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric, and that government officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area, so the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style largely to the individual.6 Indecency is not yet an unprotected category like obscenity, and it has not been formally placed in a category of lesser protection, although the broadcast cases suggest that the Court may be willing to create a low-value category for it.7
The categorical method that opened this chapter begins by asking which category the speech occupies, and its weakness is that category boundaries blur and the assumptions behind them go unstated.8 Indecency exposes that weakness. A category earns its place because, within it, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests that no case-by-case adjudication is required.9 Fighting words qualify because such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that any benefit from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.10 Obscenity qualifies because Miller's definition and examples mark its boundary, and an obscenity law that reaches beyond that material is overbroad.11 Indecency has been placed in no such category, so the Court looks to context instead.
What replaces the categorical shortcut is a balance of interests that shifts from one medium to the next. Adults keep their interest in hearing the speech they choose. Against it stand society's right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years and the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by offensive speech in their homes.12 The weight of each interest depends on how the speech reaches its audience. A reader chooses a book, but a broadcast can reach a living room unannounced while children are present. The Court has therefore adopted an expressly medium-by-medium approach, examining indecent speech separately over the broadcast media, telephones, the Internet, and cable.13
A problem about indecent but nonobscene speech accordingly starts with the medium and the audience, because the speech begins as protected and any regulation needs a justification that the setting supplies. The first subsection takes up Pacifica itself: the monologue, the complaint, and the reasons the holding stays narrow. The second tests those reasons against the telephone, the Internet, and cable, where the Court has been less willing to carry them.
FCC v. Pacifica
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation holds that the First Amendment permits civil sanctions against a broadcaster for airing a full monologue of patently offensive sexual and excretory speech, even though the monologue is not obscene, at an hour when children are likely to be listening. Two features of the medium carry the holding: its ability to intrude into the privacy of the home and its accessibility to children. Because that reasoning depends on how broadcasting reaches its audience, Pacifica is a rule about a medium and an hour of the day. It stands as the closing contrast to Cohen and to the categories that came before it.
The speech was a twelve-minute monologue called “Filthy Words,” which the satirist George Carlin delivered to a live audience in a California theater. In it he listed the words he said could not be said on the public airwaves and repeated them over and over in a variety of colloquialisms.14 At about two o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon in October 1973, a New York radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation played the recording in a program on contemporary society's attitude toward language, after warning listeners that it contained language some might find offensive.15 A few weeks later a man who had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son wrote to the Commission. He said he could understand the recording being sold for private use but not its being broadcast over the air.16
The Commission granted the complaint in a declaratory order in February 1975. The order imposed no formal sanction, but the Commission announced that it would be associated with the station's license file, so that any later complaint would lead it to decide whether to use the sanctions Congress had given it.17 It described the monologue as patently offensive though not necessarily obscene, and it reasoned by analogy to the law of nuisance, which channels behavior more than it prohibits it.18 Asked later to clarify, the Commission said it had never intended an absolute prohibition and sought instead to channel such language to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it.19 The nuisance framing shapes everything the Court later said. A nuisance is a problem of where and when an activity occurs, and the remedy such a rationale supports is moving the activity to a better time or place.
Two statutory holdings set up the constitutional question. The Commission relied on 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which punishes anyone who utters “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.”20 The Court first read the statute's anticensorship provision to bar the Commission from editing broadcasts in advance while leaving it free to review the content of completed broadcasts.21 It then read “obscene,” “indecent,” and “profane,” which the statute lists in the disjunctive, to carry separate meanings. Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, while the ordinary sense of indecent refers merely to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.22 The second holding is the one that matters here, because it means the statute reaches speech outside the Miller definition of obscenity and the First Amendment question could not be avoided. The Court confined its review to the order as applied, because indecency is largely a function of context.23
Pacifica's strongest argument was simple: the monologue was speech, it was not obscene, and the Commission objected to it because of its content, so the order had to fall.24 The Court rejected the premise. Both the content and the context of speech are critical elements of First Amendment analysis, as Justice Holmes's example of a false cry of fire in a theater shows, and the Constitution mandates no absolute rule against regulation that depends on content.25 The opinion then turned to the words themselves. Offensiveness alone does not justify suppression, and offense that flows from the speaker's opinion is a reason for protecting speech, but the Court found no reason to believe the Commission's objection could be traced to the monologue's political content or to its satire of attitudes toward four-letter words.26 The Court assumed the monologue would be protected in other contexts and observed that the capacity of such language to offend, and its social value, both vary with the circumstances.27 Protection that varies with context calls for a look at the context, and two features of broadcasting supplied it.
The Court called broadcasting the form of communication that has received the most limited First Amendment protection and gave two reasons bearing on this case.28 The first is that broadcasting has a uniquely pervasive presence in American life. Patently offensive material on the airwaves confronts a person in the privacy of the home, where the right to be let alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder, and because the audience is constantly tuning in and out, advance warnings cannot fully protect a listener from unexpected content.29 To say that a listener may avoid further offense by turning off the radio, the Court added, “is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”30
The second reason is that broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. A written slogan like the one in Cohen might be unintelligible to a first grader, but a spoken broadcast reaches a child at once. Other media can be kept from the young without restricting expression at its source: bookstores and movie theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children.31
Justice Powell's concurrence supplies the mechanism that explains why these reasons support channeling and not a ban. A seller of books or recordings, or an exhibitor of films, can be required to shut the door to children without touching adult access. A broadcaster cannot, because during most broadcast hours both adults and unsupervised children are likely to be listening, and it cannot reach willing adults without also reaching children.32 As Powell read the Commission's order, it did not stop willing adults from buying Carlin's record, attending his performances, or reading the transcript, and it did not stop the station from broadcasting the monologue late in the evening, when fewer children are likely to be in the audience.33 The words stay the same in each of those settings. The sanction is justified only where the audience cannot be sorted.
The second scene is undecided because the Court said it had not decided that an occasional expletive would justify any sanction.34 Justice Powell likewise said the judgment did not speak to the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by the station.35 The question stayed open for decades. After Pacifica the Commission adopted a policy of not punishing a fleeting expletive, and when it later punished some on live awards broadcasts, the Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. held that the stations lacked fair notice. It resolved the case on due process grounds and left open whether punishing a fleeting expletive violates the First Amendment.36
The Court upheld the order by five votes to four, and the five did not agree on every reason. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, went further than the two reasons above. He placed patently offensive sexual and excretory language lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values, so that a broadcast of it may be regulated because of its content.37 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote separately. He rejected the view that the Court is free to decide, on the basis of content, which protected speech is most valuable. For him the result turned on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, society's right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such speech in their homes.38 The difference controls how far the case travels. A rationale built on the low value of indecent content would reach every medium, while one built on broadcasting's access to the home and to children reaches only as far as those features do. Only three Justices endorsed the first.39
The majority closed by stressing how narrow the holding is. The case did not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy, and the Court said it had not decided that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.40 The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale in which context is all-important, with the time of day emphasized and differences among radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions also relevant.41 Borrowing Justice Sutherland's remark in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, the Court said: “We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.”42 The sanction fit that logic. It was a civil, administrative step tied to an afternoon hour, and it left the monologue available at other times, in other media, and to willing adult audiences.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the constitutional question. His sharpest objection was that, at least in the radio context, the Court's approach made completely unavailable to adults material that may not constitutionally be kept even from children, a result he said violated the principle of Butler v. Michigan, which forbids reducing the adult population to hearing only what is fit for children.43 Justice Powell conceded that the argument is not without force and said the Commission should weigh it as it develops standards. His answer was that the decision would not prevent an adult who wished to receive Carlin's message from doing so, and that the argument is not strong enough to leave the Commission powerless to act in circumstances like these.44
A problem built on Pacifica starts from a different premise than the categorical analysis earlier in this chapter. Indecent speech that is not obscene is protected, so the question becomes what feature of the setting supplies a special justification for regulating it. Four questions organize the answer. Is the medium broadcasting? Was the material a deliberate, repeated, patently offensive treatment of sexual or excretory subjects? Are children likely to be in the audience at that hour? Does the sanction merely channel the material by time of day? The same words in a book, at a live performance for willing adults, or in a late-night slot lack the special justification, and a lone expletive falls in the territory the Court left open.45
Other Media Differ
Pacifica marks the limits of its own reach. The Court began from the premise that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems and that broadcasting has received the most limited protection of all.46 It then gave two reasons that belong to the medium itself: broadcasting's pervasive presence reaches into the home without warning, and broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.47 Both reasons concern how the medium delivers content, so they extend only as far as another medium shares those features. The opinion itself listed differences among radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions as variables that might matter later.48 Justice Powell's concurrence supplied the mechanism behind the second reason: a bookseller or film exhibitor can be required to shut the door to children without affecting adult access, but a broadcaster cannot reach willing adults during most hours without also reaching unsupervised children.49 Whether a telephone line, a website, or a cable channel presents the same problem depends on whether its audience can be sorted and whether listeners are taken by surprise. The Court has answered that question one medium at a time.
Indecent expression that is not obscene is protected speech, so outside broadcasting the ordinary rule for content-based laws applies. Government may regulate the content of protected speech to promote a compelling interest only by the least restrictive means, and the Court has recognized a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.50 That interest stays constant from one medium to the next, and two variables change. The first is how much the medium exposes unwilling listeners, since the assault-like surprise of an unexpected broadcast in the living room carries less force where the listener must first take a deliberate step. The second is whether government has a gentler tool than a ban, because a prohibition that burdens adults more than necessary fails when screening or blocking would protect children as well.
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC applied that baseline to the telephone. Congress had amended the Communications Act of 1934 to make it a crime to run commercial “dial-a-porn” services, meaning pre-recorded sexually oriented messages that a caller obtains by placing a call and paying for it, whenever the messages were obscene or merely indecent.51 The Court upheld the ban as applied to obscene messages and held it unconstitutional as applied to indecent ones.52 The government relied on Pacifica, and the Court's answer identified two differences. Pacifica had not involved a total ban on broadcasting indecent material, and the dial-it medium, unlike a broadcast, requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the message.53 In the Court's words, “[p]lacing a telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message.”54 A caller who seeks out and pays for the service is generally not an unwilling listener, so the captive-audience problem that supported regulation in Pacifica is missing.55
The second difference concerned tailoring. The FCC had concluded, after lengthy proceedings, that credit card, access code, and scrambling rules adequately kept dial-a-porn messages away from minors, and nothing in the record showed that those rules would fail.56 A total ban therefore denied adults access to protected messages far beyond what was needed to protect children, and it limited adult telephone conversations to what is suitable for children to hear.57 Tested under the baseline above, the ban fell because it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest and did not use the least restrictive means.58 Beside Pacifica, the contrast is concrete. An afternoon broadcast that reached homes and children by surprise supported a civil sanction that channeled the material to other hours, while a service that adults had to dial and pay for, and that screening technology could keep from children, could not be banned outright. Both cases involved indecent but nonobscene speech and the same interest in protecting children, so the audience's control over its own exposure and the availability of narrower means carried the difference.
Mail shows the same unwilling-listener reasoning at work. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. did not concern indecent speech as such, but the Court there invalidated a federal ban on mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. It reasoned that government may prohibit speech as intrusive only when a captive audience cannot avoid it, and that the short trip from mailbox to trash can is an acceptable burden.59 Pacifica was distinguished because receiving mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable than receiving a broadcast.60 An unrequested message can therefore fall outside Pacifica when the recipient can dispose of it with minimal effort.
The Internet raised the question on a larger scale in Reno v. ACLU. Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 were challenged. One made it a crime to knowingly transmit obscene or indecent messages to a recipient under eighteen. The other made it a crime to send or display, in a manner available to anyone under eighteen, material that depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in patently offensive terms.61 The Court held both provisions unconstitutional to the extent that they prohibited nonobscene communications.62 Its first step was to ask whether the justifications that supported broadcast regulation exist online. Those justifications were a history of extensive government regulation, the scarcity of available frequencies, and the invasive character of the medium, and none of them was present in cyberspace.63 Internet content does not appear on a user's screen unbidden, users seldom encounter it by accident, sexually explicit images are generally preceded by warnings, and the medium offers relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of every kind. The Court therefore found no basis for qualifying the level of scrutiny applied to it.64
With no broadcast-style justification available, the ordinary rule governed, and restrictions on nonobscene indecent speech had to serve a compelling interest by the least restrictive means.65 Protecting minors was a legitimate and important goal, but the statute pursued it by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to send to one another, and that burden is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective.66 Adults keep the right to receive the speech when narrower means exist, the government had not shown that they did not, and software might well limit children's access to indecent material online.67 The undefined terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” made matters worse, because a speaker could not confidently assume that a serious discussion of birth control or prison rape would escape the prohibition, and that uncertainty silences some speakers whose messages are protected.68 The scale of the medium compounds the problem. A person posting to a public web page cannot know who will read it, and a ban keyed to minors' access pushes every speaker toward content fit for children, the same effect that doomed the telephone ban. Congress answered Reno with the Child Online Protection Act of 1998, which also criminalized certain Internet speech, and the Court ruled against that statute as well in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union.69
Cable television sits between these poles, and the Court has declined to place it on either side. In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC the Court reviewed three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. The Justices split over the right standard, upholding some provisions and striking others.70 Section 10(a), which allowed a cable operator to refuse to transmit indecent programming on leased access channels, was upheld by a vote of 7 to 2.71 Justice Breyer's plurality opinion declined to choose any single standard for cable, whether by analogy to broadcast, common carrier, or bookstore. It held instead that government may directly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve them without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.72 The dynamic nature of technological change in telecommunications made it premature to select one analogy or one specific set of words.73
The plurality found Section 10(a) justified by the extremely important interest in protecting children, by the similarity between the problem Congress faced and the one in Pacifica, since cable is as accessible to children and as uniquely pervasive as over-the-air broadcasting, and by the fact that the provision authorized operators to ban indecent programming without requiring them to.74 Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment on a different ground: cable operators have a First Amendment right to decide what programming to carry, so allowing them to refuse sexually explicit material violates no one's rights.75 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, objected to applying a less rigorous Pacifica-type standard of review.76 The Court struck the other two provisions. Section 10(b) required indecent programming to be segregated on a blocked channel that a subscriber had to ask to have unblocked, and it failed by a vote of 6 to 3 under both the strictest and the less strict standards. The burden of compliance would lead operators to ban programming they might otherwise carry, and the V-chip, which the 1996 Telecommunications Act required new televisions to include, is a less restrictive way to let parents block programming.77 Section 10(c), which allowed operators to bar indecent programming from public access channels, fell by a vote of 5 to 4, because the plurality found no showing that patently offensive programming aimed at children was a problem on those channels, so a harm needing redress could not be assumed.78
A later decision pulled in the other direction. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. a majority held that the “signal bleed” provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required cable operators to scramble sexually explicit channels or confine them to late-night hours, was a content-based regulation that failed the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.79 The Act already allowed viewers to block such programming individually, so that voluntary alternative was the less restrictive means, and the late-night option had produced in practice a daytime ban on sexually explicit cable programming.80 Cable thus shares features of broadcasting, because it enters the home and children can reach it, and features of the Internet, because subscribers choose it and can block it. The plurality's comparison to Pacifica rested on pervasiveness and access by children, and the later strict scrutiny ruling rested on the availability of blocking, so the decisions do not settle which resemblance controls.
Read together, these decisions have not made indecency a category of lesser protection, though the broadcast cases lend support to that view.81 What emerges is a valid interest in protecting minors whose strength varies by medium, stronger in broadcasting than in the telephone or print settings.82 The broadcast cases can be read to suggest that indecency is low-value speech, while Sable applied strict scrutiny, so the cases contain real tension and ambiguity, and the character of the speech in the particular medium may be critical to the outcome.83
The area stays unsettled because the technology keeps changing, and the cases say so. The Denver Area plurality declined to pick one analogy for cable for exactly that reason.84 Reno placed speakers and service providers together against the government, so a dispute among providers, or between a provider and the public, could present a conflict like the one in Denver Area, and it may be premature to conclude that strict scrutiny will govern all future Internet regulation.85 Even within broadcasting, the isolated expletive remains an open question.86 A well-organized answer commits to strict scrutiny for telephone and Internet restrictions that burden adult access, to Pacifica-style channeling for over-the-air broadcasts, and to a tailoring analysis for cable that admits the Court has not fixed the standard.