Concept
Defining Prior Restraint
Prior restraint
Prior Restraints on Speech
Defining Prior Restraint
A prior restraint stops communication before it happens, either through an administrative system that demands permission first or through a judicial order that bars the speech in advance. Since Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court has met such measures with special suspicion. The government bears a heavy burden to justify blocking publication ahead of time, and only narrow exceptions exist, such as preventing disclosure of troop movements in wartime. Later sections take up Near in full; for now, what matters is the kind of rule it announced. The doctrine governs how and when the government acts against expression, and it does not ask whether the expression is protected.
That focus on method lets the doctrine defeat an order even when the speaker had no right to say what was said. A prior restraint is premature even if publication might be punished afterward, so the defect lies in the procedure the government chose, and a speaker whose words could be sanctioned under a differently drawn law may still defeat an advance ban.1 Prior restraint thus joins overbreadth and vagueness among the form-based limits on speech regulation. An overbroad law sweeps in too much speech and a vague law leaves unclear what it sweeps in; a prior restraint acts too early. A First Amendment lawyer reaches these questions only after asking whether the government has regulated “speech” through an “abridgment” at all, and a regulation aimed at speech the government may control can still fail if it takes the form of a prior restraint.2
Two forms of prior restraint dominate the cases: licensing systems that make speech depend on an official's approval, and injunctions that a court issues against future expression.3 Later sections develop each in turn. The three subsections below trace the boundary of the concept. The first fixes the definition around the timing of the government's action. The second tests it against orders that burden speech without being prior restraints, and the third against informal pressure that the Court treats as a restraint although no formal order exists.
Timing, Not Effect
The label matters because it decides who carries the burden. A measure that earns it must clear the heavy presumption against prior restraints, while a measure that does not faces the ordinary rules for regulating speech. A definition drawn too loosely would hand that burden to every speech regulation, and one drawn too tightly would let real censorship escape it.
Effect cannot supply the line. Every law that outlaws speech aims to prevent it, so a definition built on prevention would turn all of them into prior restraints, and an after-the-fact penalty, if large enough, can prevent speech just as much as any prior restraint.4 The traditional contrast between censorship before speech and punishment after it does not settle the question either. All punishment for speech, whether it comes through a prior restraint or any other law, follows the expression, and all government regulation of speech, restraint or not, exists before the speech occurs.5 A rule's mere existence in advance therefore cannot set a prior restraint apart.
The clearest definition looks to the form of the government's action: a prior restraint is an administrative system or a judicial order that prevents speech from occurring. Alexander v. United States describes the term as covering “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications” issued in advance of the time the communications are to occur.6 As Professor Rodney Smolla has observed, most prior restraints in practice involve either a license or permit that a speaker must obtain before expressing anything or a judicial order directing a speaker not to speak.7 Those two are the classic examples, not the only ones; seizing every copy of a particular newspaper would also be a prior restraint.8
The working test for any new measure compares the timing of the government's intervention with the act of communication. Intervention before the expression makes the measure a prior restraint, and intervention only afterward makes it subsequent punishment.9 A court order enjoining a newspaper from publishing classified information places the force of law between the would-be publisher and the act of publication, which makes it a classic prior restraint. A statute making it a felony to publish the same information leaves publication possible and imposes sanctions only afterward, so it is subsequent punishment even though it was designed to prevent publication.10
The line falls at timing because of what advance control does. Thomas Emerson's classic argument holds that a system of prior restraint reaches a far wider range of expression, shuts off communication before it takes place, applies more readily because suppression comes by stroke of the pen rather than through a criminal process, ignores the safeguards of that process, and leaves less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism.11 The line also changes the speaker's position in a concrete way. A speaker confident that a criminal speech statute is invalid may violate it and raise the First Amendment as a complete defense in the prosecution. A speaker who violates an injunction ordinarily cannot defend on the ground that the order was unconstitutional, and the only usual way to challenge it is to comply while contesting its validity in court.12 The standard justification for advance control, that the speaker learns before speaking whether the speech is lawful, adds little. A speaker who wants that assurance can seek a declaratory judgment, and if the real need is greater deterrence, the legislature can raise the criminal penalty directly.13
Two neighboring cities that target the same unprotected speech show the contrast.
The two cities share a target, and the Ruralex felony may deter as well as the Metrolex board, yet only Metrolex intervenes before the communication.14 A student who reasons that a heavy criminal penalty chills speech as much as an injunction freezes it, and so calls the statute a prior restraint, has measured effect when the test measures timing. The threat of criminal sanctions can deter strongly, and sometimes as effectively as a prior restraint, but the deterrent effect is not itself a prior restraint, and prior restraints remain the most disfavored type of restriction on expression.15
Orders Outside the Doctrine
Alexander v. United States shows where the definition stops. The government prosecuted the owner of a chain of adult-entertainment stores under federal obscenity and racketeering (RICO) laws, and after a jury convicted him the trial court ordered, besides a prison term and a fine, forfeiture of his wholesale and retail businesses and the proceeds of the racketeering.17 He argued that the forfeiture, which in effect closed his business, worked like the injunction in Near because it barred future protected expression in retaliation for past unprotected speech. The Court rejected the argument. Treating a forfeiture imposed after a full criminal trial as a prior restraint, it reasoned, would virtually obliterate the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments.18
The Court looked at what the order did, not at how hard it fell on the business. Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions, meaning court orders that actually forbid speech activities, are the classic prior restraints.19 The forfeiture order forbade no future expression and required no prior approval for any. It took only the assets tied to past racketeering, so the owner could open new stores and stock them with untainted money the next day without risking contempt.20 The usual objections to a restraint were therefore missing: nothing froze his speech, no official had to approve it, and no contempt sanction hung over a future sale. The statute also paid no attention to whether the forfeited assets were expressive. Books, sports cars, narcotics, and cash are all forfeitable under RICO, and a rule exempting expressive businesses would let racketeers shelter their proceeds by investing them in such businesses.21
The contrast with Near turns on one variable: whether the order forbids future communication or takes assets as punishment for past unlawful conduct. An order barring a magazine from publishing its next issue speaks to the future, and a publisher who ignores it answers in contempt, so it is a classic prior restraint that must meet the government's heavy burden. The line stays visible even when one trial court issues both kinds of order.
The boundary is contested. Justice Kennedy's dissent would have treated the destruction of a book and film business and its entire inventory, which included presumptively protected works, as suppression of a disfavored class of speech that threatens every distributor of such materials.22 The majority answered that the order operated on the assets' role in the racketeering enterprise and followed the safeguards of a full trial. On an exam, the majority's account of the label controls, and the dissent explains why a close fact pattern deserves a sentence of analysis.
Other measures that burden speech also fall outside the classic category. The Court has treated discovery protective orders, as in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, and an agency cease-and-desist order against sex-designated help-wanted advertisements, as in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, as something other than a classic prior restraint. A zoning-type ordinance such as the one upheld in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. regulates where adult theaters may operate and is judged as a content-neutral time, place, and manner rule. Because the presumption against prior restraints attaches only to measures that earn the label, the first question on a new fact pattern is whether the government has forbidden communication in advance or imposed a consequence for conduct already completed.
Informal Government Pressure
A license denial or an injunction is not the only way to stop speech before it happens. If it were, officials could escape the heavy burden of Near by writing letters instead of seeking orders. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan closes that route. The Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth identified books it considered “objectionable” for children and wrote to sellers urging them to stop making those books available.24 Each letter informed the seller that the commission intended to recommend obscenity prosecutions, the commission passed its list to local police, and an officer often visited the seller afterward to see what had been done.25 No order banned a book and no prosecution followed, yet the Court held that the pressure was an unconstitutional prior restraint.26 It looked past the label of “friendly advice” and saw in the system a prior restraint in reality.27
The reasoning turns on the position of the person who opens the letter. A bookseller holding a list from an official who decides whether to recommend prosecution, and who knows the police have the same list and may stop by, must weigh the cost of keeping a listed title against the risk of a criminal charge. Pulling the book is cheaper, so it leaves the shelf with no judge deciding whether it is obscene and no hearing for the distributor. If the doctrine reached only formal orders, an official with enforcement power could avoid both the heavy burden and the procedural safeguards covered later in this chapter simply by writing letters, because the seller's compliance would produce the same result.
Pressure does not always count as a restraint, and Meese v. Keene marks the other side of the line. Acting under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the federal government identified several Canadian films as political propaganda, among them the Academy Award-winning documentary If You Love This Planet, which showed an anti-nuclear speech, and Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery?.28 Exhibitors had to place the words “political propaganda” at the start of each film, and the producer had to give the government a list of its major distributors and of the groups that had asked to show the films.29 The label forbade nothing, and the Court found no violation. It reasoned that the statute “neither prohibits nor censors the dissemination of advocacy materials by agents of foreign principals” and that Congress had simply required “additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.”30
The two decisions differ in what the government held over the speaker. In Bantam Books the commission acted as an enforcer, pairing its list with prosecution referrals and police follow-up. The label in Meese left every exhibitor free to show the film and gave viewers information about its source. Together the cases leave courts the task of evaluating the degree of pressure. Pressure that is more than minimal calls for First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books, and Meese may be distinguished on the ground that the Court saw little adverse effect on speech from a government label.31 A later holding that government speech cannot be challenged under the Free Speech Clause adds a complication, since it would seemingly preclude a challenge to the official statements that supply the pressure.32
The more of the first three features a fact pattern shows, the closer it sits to Bantam Books; a pattern showing only the fourth sits with Meese. A strong essay places the facts between the two poles and explains how much pressure the government applied.