Concept
Injunctions Against Speech
Prior restraint
Injunctions Against Speech
Licensing was the first classic prior restraint, and the court injunction is the second. Near v. Minnesota involved a statute that let a court abate as a public nuisance any “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspaper article about political and public figures. The Supreme Court invalidated it, conceding that freedom of the press is not absolute and that a state may punish abuses.1
An injunction carries a danger of its own. In Walker v. Birmingham, the Court held 5-4 that marchers could not defend against contempt charges by asserting that the ordinance or the injunction was unconstitutional, because a court order must be obeyed until “reversed for error by orderly review.”2 A bound speaker must therefore obey while seeking review or risk contempt, and for speech that depends on timing, obedience can be as final as suppression.
Three questions organize the section. Does an order aimed at conduct, such as blocking a clinic entrance, draw the heavy presumption against prior restraints at all? What procedure must a court follow before it restrains speech? And does the old rule against enjoining defamation survive once a court has found the statements false?
Content-Neutral Injunctions
The presumption against prior restraints does not reach every court order that touches speech. Not all injunctions that burden speech are subject to the heightened scrutiny that the prior restraint doctrine requires.3 In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., a state court order imposed noise and distance limits on anti-abortion protesters, and the Court deemed it content-neutral because it focused on proscribing certain conduct. The protesters may have shared a common viewpoint, but the burden on their speech was only incidental to the conduct the order prohibited.4
The contrast with Near turns on what put the court's power in motion. In Near, the content of the articles did, because the statute reached publications that were “malicious, scandalous and defamatory.” In Madsen, the protesters' conduct did. A message-based trigger brings the full presumption; a conduct-based trigger with an incidental effect on speech does not.5
Escaping the presumption does not mean escaping review. The Court recognized that injunctions carry a greater risk of censorship and discriminatory application than ordinances, and also that an injunction can be tailored to afford more precise relief than a statute.6 Both points shape the test. A court asks whether each restriction burdens more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.7
Madsen applied that test term by term, with mixed results. The Court upheld certain restrictions and struck others, among them certain buffer zones and blanket prohibitions on observable images.8 It also invalidated the ban on picketing and demonstrating within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff. Although the residence is the “last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,” a 300-foot ban is much larger than necessary, and it was not limited to focused picketing in front of a particular residence. It banned general marching.9
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York draws the line between tailored and untailored zones more cleanly. The Court upheld an injunction's “fixed buffer zone,” which barred protesters from interfering with patients and counselors within 15 feet of an abortion clinic, but it found that the injunction's “floating buffer zones” burdened more speech than necessary.10 The difference is easy to see. A fixed zone marks a known stretch of ground, so speakers can plan around it and speak from its edge. A floating zone moves with each person, so a speaker cannot tell in advance where speech is allowed.
The tailoring demand applies to statutes as well. In McCullen v. Coakley, sidewalk counselors challenged a Massachusetts statute that established fixed buffer zones only at clinics that performed abortions. The Court accepted that the government had a legitimate interest in public safety but stressed that public streets and sidewalks have historically served as important venues for the robust exchange of ideas. It deemed the statute content-neutral, yet held that it violated the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests.11 Neutrality is only the first step: a zone that takes more of a public sidewalk than the interest requires fails, whoever drew it.
The neutrality label itself deserves a second look. In the sign-ban context, the warning is that an asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for content-based suppression, because a city could mask its real aim, eliminating the messages signs typically carry, by declaring that signs are visual clutter. When a total ban rests solely on such an interest, deliberate or unintended government manipulation can also impede the inquiry into whether the means fit the end.12 An answer that finds neutrality should therefore ask two questions: what triggered the order, and whether the stated reason is the real one. After that, the answer examines each term against the interest it serves.
Procedural Limits on Injunctions
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne shows what happens when a court restrains speech without hearing the speakers. Local officials obtained an order barring the petitioners and their “white supremacist” National States Rights Party from holding meetings “which will tend to disturb and endanger the citizens of the County.” The petitioners received no notice before the order issued. They cancelled their rally and challenged the injunction in court, rather than ignoring it as the marchers had in Walker.14
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, found no adequate justification for the order's ex parte nature. An ex parte order is one entered on one party's application while the party to be bound is absent. The Court drew its line with care: there is “a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate.”15 Notice is therefore the rule, and whoever skips it must show that notice was impossible.
Two dangers explain the rule. The first is a one-sided record. Without an adversary hearing, the Court found “insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication.” A judge asked to restrain a rally must predict what words not yet spoken will do, and speakers who are present can contest the officials' account and point to narrower measures. The second danger is delay. The Court stressed that the case involved “a rally and ‘political’ speech in which the element of timeliness may be important,” so procedural care mattered even more than it had in the obscenity context of Freedman.16 A restraining order that issues shortly before a scheduled rally can finish its work before any hearing occurs, because the occasion passes while the case waits. That is why the exception survives only in narrow form: a short order without notice may issue when notice is truly impossible, and the party who seeks it must make that showing.
These safeguards connect directly to the collateral bar rule. Walker held that marchers who ignored an injunction could not defend the contempt charge by attacking its validity. Justice Stewart wrote that the Court “cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets.” The Alabama courts had justifiably relied on the general rule that court orders must be obeyed until “reversed for error by orderly review.” Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas, dissented, arguing that the Court had elevated a “rule of judicial administration above the right of free expression.”17 Carroll shows the other side: the petitioners tested the order in court rather than in the streets, and the Court demanded a justification for how the order was obtained. The rule that speakers must use the courts thus depends on a state that supplies a process worth using. If the state fails to provide strict procedural safeguards, including “immediate appellate review,” the injunction does not bind. A similar principle governs a facially valid law applied unconstitutionally, where the protestor must seek judicial review of the administrative action before taking to the streets.18
The demand for immediate appellate review comes from National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie. The Court emphasized that appellate review of the trial court's injunction could take a year or more to complete, and it said that a stay was required unless there was immediate appellate review.19 The logic concerns timing. A speaker bound by an injunction cannot speak while the appeal runs, and the collateral bar rule forbids testing the order by disobedience, so a year of delay turns a temporary order into a de facto ban. On remand, the Illinois Appellate Court narrowed the injunction to prohibit only display of the swastika, and the Illinois Supreme Court then vacated the entire injunction as violating the First Amendment.20
Two misreadings recur on exams. The first treats Carroll as a ban on every ex parte order against speech, although the Court allowed short orders on a showing that notice was impossible. The second treats Skokie as abolishing the collateral bar rule, although its point is that obedience can be demanded only where review is prompt. The speakers' message plays no part in either point. The speakers in these cases were a white supremacist party and the National Socialist Party, and the procedural rules protected them regardless of their views.
Defamation Injunctions
Near arose from a nuisance statute aimed at “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspapers, and its answer to the officials who invoked that statute set the pattern for defamation law. The Court observed that for about 150 years there had been “almost an entire absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers,” which showed a “deep-seated conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional right.” It suggested that public officials, whose conduct remains open to debate in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in libel laws “providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals.”23
Courts have been reluctant to enjoin defamatory statements ever since. Coupled with Near's strong anti-injunction stance, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan seemed to give defamation defendants strong protection and to indicate clearly that prior restraints against defamatory speech are prohibited.24 The refusal has rested on two grounds over time. Historically, equity declined to enjoin slander or libel because an injunction would deprive the defendant of a jury trial when an adequate remedy at law was available. More recently, the rule rests on the First Amendment: injunctive relief would necessarily infringe on free speech by denying the speaker the option of getting the message to the public at large.25
The prohibition is firmest before adjudication. The central dispute in a defamation case is whether the statement is false and defamatory, and a trial answers that question after both sides have been heard. An order entered earlier would silence the speaker on the strength of an allegation and a forecast of what the speaker will say next, and the collateral bar rule would then demand obedience to an erroneous order until a court set it aside.26 An injunction against defamation entered before the statements have been adjudicated false and defamatory is therefore prohibited, and the plaintiff's remedy lies in a libel action after publication.27
A finding of falsity changes the analysis, and courts disagree about how far. One view holds that an injunction may become a suitable supplement to other relief when a court has formally determined that a statement is both defamatory and false and the defendant persists in publishing it; an injunction carefully worded so as not to be too broad might then be both appropriate and constitutional.28 Cases have held that the Constitution does not forbid an injunction against repeating statements adjudicated to be defamation. Whether such an order is appropriate remains a question of state law, especially where damages may be an adequate remedy or where discretion counsels caution.29 Courts weigh heavily the public interest in free speech when they exercise that discretion.30 Some courts have approved narrowly tailored injunctions against repeating statements found at trial to be defamatory and false, including Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (Cal. 2007) and Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp. (Ky. 2010).31
Texas rejects orders against repetition but permits orders of removal. In Kinney v. Barnes, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that an injunction against repeating defamation is an unconstitutional prior restraint even when granted after trial, because any effective injunction would “chill” protected speech. It nevertheless permitted injunctions requiring removal from web sites of content that had been “adjudicated defamatory.”32 The two kinds of order differ in structure. An order against repetition must define in advance what counts as repeating, so a bound speaker must guess whether a paraphrase, a related accusation, or a true statement on the same subject falls inside it, and a wrong guess brings contempt. A removal order acts on identified words that a court has already found false and leaves everything else the speaker might say untouched.
Even where relief is permitted, the order must be drawn narrowly. The scope and detail of an injunction against speech are of special concern. An order forbidding all repetition of speech adjudicated defamatory would be too broad, for example, because it must not exclude the defendant's right to repeat her claims to public officials in seeking redress of grievances.33 A defendant who loses a defamation case still may petition the government, and an order broad enough to cover that petition would punish speech that no court found false.
The Court's own encounter with the question illustrates overbreadth. In Tory v. Cochran, the Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutionality of a permanent injunction against continuing libels directed at the lawyer Johnnie Cochran. Cochran died before the appeal was heard, and the injunction's primary purpose, preventing the coercion of Mr. Cochran, lapsed. In that light, the Court found the injunction an overly broad prior restraint on speech.34 An injunction draws its justification from the harm it is meant to prevent, so an order that keeps forbidding speech after that harm has ended has nothing left to support it.
The argument for relief seems strongest online, where postings persist and spread, yet the decisions resist it. In Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, an appellate court overturned a trial court's injunction against the defendants' Internet postings as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.35 A removal order aimed at a platform can meet a separate obstacle. A plurality of the California Supreme Court held in Hassell v. Bird that section 230 immunity protected Yelp from an order requiring it to remove defamatory comments. Justice Cuéllar dissented vehemently: “The Internet has the potential not only to enlighten but to spread lies, amplifying defamatory communications to an extent unmatched in our history.”36
Commercial disparagement receives less protection. Constitutional doctrine gives less protection to speech that is commercial or that does not involve a matter of public concern. An injunction may therefore be available in a slander of title case or in an action for disparagement of a commercial competitor, but not against citizens who criticize a business's practices or products, or against those who publish the criticism. That criticism is noncommercial speech, and it may concern a matter of public concern. The plaintiff must also show special damage caused by the falsehood, because that requirement applies to injunctions as well as to actions for damages.37
The first step decides most problems, because a request for an order before any adjudication fails. Students then tend to err in one of two directions. Saying that defamation can never be enjoined overstates the law, since courts have approved narrow post-adjudication orders. Saying that post-adjudication injunctions are generally allowed ignores Texas and the overbreadth limits. A good answer presents the second step as a genuine split and commits to a conclusion under the stated approach.