Concept
Due Process Roots
Vagueness
Void for Vagueness
Due Process Roots
A criminal law that ordinary people must guess at is void under the Due Process Clauses. The Fifth Amendment supplies the limit when a federal statute is involved, and the Fourteenth Amendment supplies it when a state statute is involved. A city ordinance, as an exercise of state power, falls on the Fourteenth Amendment side. Under either clause, a court must declare a criminal statute void when it is so vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."1
Due process was not the Court's first answer to unclear criminal laws. In some early cases the Court invoked the separation of powers: by enacting an ambiguous statute, Congress could not pass the law-making job on to the judiciary. The Court has also reversed convictions under uncertain criminal laws because the accused was denied the right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, to be informed "of the nature and cause of the accusation." Today, however, it is the void-for-vagueness doctrine under the due process clauses that prevails.2
The modern doctrine does three jobs. It ensures that criminal statutes give fair notice of what behavior is forbidden. It requires the legislature to define the elements of a crime clearly in advance, rather than leaving the judiciary to do so retroactively, and to give notice of the potential sanctions; that second job echoes the early separation-of-powers cases. And it prevents police from arbitrarily choosing whom to arrest.3 Without that clarity, someone other than the legislature ends up deciding after the fact what the crime is, whether that someone is a court or an officer on the street.4
The standard formulations track those jobs. Connally v. General Construction Co. supplies the classic test, quoted above, and it looks at the person who must obey the law. If persons of common intelligence must guess at a law's meaning and differ as to its application, the law fails, in part because the requirement ensures fair notice to the defendant.5 Lanzetta v. New Jersey is another early decision in the same line. The modern statement adds the enforcer: a penal statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.6 The sections that follow treat the notice half and the enforcement half of that sentence separately.
One decision shows the enforcement concern at work. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court struck down a broadly worded vagrancy ordinance because it gave the police "unfettered discretion" to decide whom to arrest. Justice Douglas observed that "The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together." The doctrine, in other words, also helps ensure a consistent and equal application of the criminal law.7 The Chicago ordinance in City of Chicago v. Morales, the subject of the next section, is a more recent case in this line.
The doctrine reaches uncertainty of three kinds: about who is covered, about what conduct is forbidden, and about what punishment may be imposed. Most cases involve statutes, but the same principle applies to common law crimes and to administrative regulations that carry penal sanctions.8 A defendant ordinarily raises the challenge in a criminal prosecution, though under limited circumstances an injunction may bar a prosecution under an unconstitutionally uncertain statute. And a court does not test the statute on its bare face. It tests the statute with its judicial gloss, meaning the authoritative construction the state courts have given it.9 The gloss counts because it fixes what the words mean in practice.
A vagueness ruling does not defeat the government's goal. The doctrine does not preclude a legislature from passing a criminal law to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement goal. It requires only clear and focused language.10 Courts admit, though, that it is not always clear when a law is too indefinite to be constitutional. They are more likely to strike a law down when it is very general in scope, too readily reaches innocent behavior (especially if the First Amendment is involved), and gives police very broad discretion to arrest whom they choose (especially if racial discrimination appears to be involved).11
The speech cases carry that last concern furthest. First Amendment treatments group vagueness with overbreadth and prior restraint,12 and Coates v. Cincinnati and Grayned v. City of Rockford are two ordinance cases that show the standard at work. The sections below return to that setting after working through the two independent grounds.