Concept
Why Overbreadth Exists
Overbreadth
Why Overbreadth Exists
Overbreadth lets a challenger whose own speech may be punishable strike down a law that also reaches protected speech, and the Court tolerates so unusual a procedure only because ordinary litigation cannot repair the harm such a law does. A law can reach unprotected speech and still fall, because “a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”1 The law is not narrowly tailored to its legitimate concerns.2
Virginia v. Hicks supplies the measure. A showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” suffices to invalidate all enforcement of the law until a limiting construction or partial invalidation narrows it.3 That remedy departs from ordinary practice twice. The challenger may rely on the rights of speakers who are not before the court, and a victory suspends the law for everyone instead of excusing the challenger alone.4
Two harms justify both departures, and neither yields to litigation one prosecution at a time. An overbroad law deters protected speech by people who never appear in court, and it gives the officials who enforce it the power to choose whom to charge. Facial review answers both. It reduces official discretion in enforcing statutes that might curtail speech, widens the range of people who may bring constitutional challenges beyond those most directly affected (and perhaps reluctant to sue), and minimizes the chilling effect on people’s willingness to speak up and protest.5 The remedy has a price: a law that goes unenforced even against people the state could validly punish. The substantiality requirement in the next section answers that cost.
The Chilling Effect
Hicks states the central justification in one sentence: the threat of enforcing an overbroad law may deter, or “chill,” protected speech, “especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”6 A chill works through anticipation. The deterred speaker is never arrested, never charged, and never becomes a litigant, so the harm is easy to overlook and hard to remedy. Facing a statute that might cover a message, a speaker must weigh the message against the burden, and sometimes the risk, of vindicating a right through case-by-case litigation. Many will choose to abstain, which harms them and harms a society deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.7
The Court has traced the same hesitation in the true-threats setting. In Counterman v. Colorado it observed that a speaker may be unsure which side of a line the speech falls on, may worry that the legal system will err, or may fear the expense of becoming entangled in it, and may therefore censor speech the law could not reach. Each doubt grows with the breadth of the law. A statute that sweeps in much protected speech gives every speaker more reason to wonder where the line falls, and the sensible answer to that doubt is to stay far from the line. The silent speaker is therefore the person the remedy protects, which is why a challenger whose own conduct may be punishable can invoke it. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s very existence may cause others not before it to refrain from protected expression, and an overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent from their speech.8
Case-by-case litigation cannot repair this harm, for three reasons. An as-applied challenge needs a speaker who spoke, was charged, and then raised the defense, so the silent speaker never produces a case in which a court could declare the speech protected. The speaker who does reach court has already paid: in Dombrowski v. Pfister the Court recognized that the chilling effect may derive from the fact of prosecution, unaffected by the prospect of its success or failure, and it found sufficient irreparable injury for equitable relief in the loss or impairment of expression that would occur if the speakers had to await disposition of the criminal actions in the state courts.9 And a victory for that speaker leaves the statute on the books, so the next person who wonders whether the same speech is covered faces the same choice.
Thornhill v. Alabama located the danger in that continuing presence. “It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor, but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion,” and a penal statute that sweeps within its ambit activities that ordinarily constitute an exercise of freedom of speech carries “[a] like threat.” Such a statute produces “a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.”10 Facial invalidation is the one remedy that operates before the silence sets in, because it suspends enforcement and lifts the threat for every speaker at once.11
Criminal sanctions make the chill worse, because the price of a wrong guess rises with the severity of the penalty. Justice Brennan put the point in Gooding v. Wilson: invalidation for overbreadth is “necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”12 A prosecution brings arrest, a record, possible jail time, and the expense of a defense, even for a speaker who is ultimately vindicated. A speaker unsure of a law’s reach compares the value of the message with that price, and the more serious the sanction, the more likely a protected speaker is to say nothing.
The ban in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus shows the chill at its extreme. The Court held facially overbroad a rule that prohibited all First Amendment activities in an airport terminal, because it reached virtually every expressive activity, far beyond any legitimate regulatory objective. A traveler who wants to wear a campaign button or hand a leaflet to a companion falls within the ban’s words, cannot predict whether anyone will enforce it, and does best to do neither. The deterrence reaches ordinary expression that no one would think to prosecute.
The two people convicted may attack the ordinance on its face, and the court asks what the ordinance does to protected criticism by people like the retiree and the student, who are not before it. A ruling that merely excused those two from punishment would leave the retiree and the student silent, because the ordinance would still hang over every future critic of the police. Their silence is the harm, and overbreadth review is how a court reaches it.
Selective Enforcement Risk
A law that reaches protected speech also gives officials a choice among speakers, and Jews for Jesus shows how. The airport defended its resolution by reading it to cover only expressive activity unrelated to airport purposes, and the Court found that reading itself overbroad and vague.14 Much nondisruptive speech, such as wearing a button or shirt carrying a political message, is not “airport related” and is still protected, and the line between airport-related speech and other speech is murky. The airport’s own examples showed how murky: a traveler who reads a newspaper or chats with a neighbor was engaged in permitted activity because such pastimes let the traveling public pass the time, yet the airport could not comfortably say the same of a member of a religious or political group who passes the time by handing leaflets to other travelers. Under that reading, airport officials alone would decide in the first instance which activities were airport related. A law that “confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation” is unconstitutional because “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident.”15
Official discretion alone is not the danger, because every criminal statute leaves police and prosecutors room to decide whom to charge. The danger appears when that room attaches to a statute that reaches protected speech. No one expects an airport to arrest every traveler who reads a newspaper, so the resolution would never be enforced across its full literal sweep, and a reader could not tell which activities it covered and which it ignored. With no standard in the text, enforcement depends on how one employee reacts to one speaker. A mainstream charity might be welcomed while a fringe group is turned away, and the statute covers both. A trespass or assault law leaves a similar choice about whom to charge, but it gives officials no protected speech to punish.
Houston v. Hill applied the same reasoning to an ordinance that made it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of official duties. The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because it criminalized a substantial amount of protected speech and gave the police unconstitutional discretion over whom to arrest. Coates v. Cincinnati presents the discretion problem in its starkest form. Its ordinance directed any three or more people who met on a sidewalk or street corner to conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or other person who happened to pass by.16 The Court held the ordinance vague, because it subjected the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and broad, because it authorized the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.17 Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, so the ordinance specified no standard of conduct at all, and “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”18
The vagueness cases name the resulting danger. The ban on vagueness protects not only liberty but also equality and the separation of executive from legislative power, through the prevention of selective enforcement, and the more important aspect of the doctrine is the requirement that legislatures set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.19 Overbroad statutes call for containment for the same reason, because of their potential for selective enforcement at the discretion of law enforcement officials.20
Case-by-case review cannot detect this harm, which is why the concern supports a facial attack. A court reviewing one prosecution sees one defendant and one charge. The speakers who were never charged, and the reasons officials chose the ones who were, never appear in the record. Thornhill named this danger in the same passage that named the chill: a statute that sweeps in protected speech “readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.”21 The speakers officials resent are often those making the most contested arguments. In Bond v. Floyd (1966), for example, the Court held that the Georgia General Assembly could not refuse to seat Representative Julian Bond for supporting a statement strongly critical of the Vietnam War and the draft, because his statements were advocacy of ideas protected by the First Amendment.22 Bond was not an overbreadth case, but it shows the kind of speech that official displeasure can reach.
The Court has carried the concern into licensing, where officials decide in advance who may speak. In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. an ordinance allowed newspaper racks on public property only with an annual permit from the mayor, who could deny it on terms the mayor deemed necessary and reasonable. The Court allowed a facial challenge and identified two risks of unbridled licensing: self-censorship by speakers who want to avoid being denied a license, and the difficulty of detecting and correcting content-based censorship case by case when no standards measure the licensor’s action. It concluded that “a facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.”23
Standardless licensing schemes create the risk of selective and content-discriminatory enforcement, so laws granting excessive discretion fall on their face, apart from any showing that the discretion was in fact abused and without any showing by the challenger that specific protected speech was curtailed.24 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement applied the same reasoning to a permit-fee ordinance that left an administrator free to set the fee. The reason is that a standardless power leaves no yardstick against which misuse could be proved, and speakers will trim their messages to please the licensor long before anyone documents misuse. The city in Lakewood asked the Court to presume that the mayor would act in good faith, and the Court refused: any limits the city claimed were implicit in its law had to be made explicit through text, binding construction, or well-established practice.
The discretion theory has nothing to attach to here, because the clerk has no power to choose among speakers. The only live dispute is whether the stated criteria were met, and the group’s own case can resolve it. The Lakewood concern is a standardless power over speech, and the mere fact that officials issue permits does not supply it. The hypothetical also corrects a common exam error, which is to treat every grant of official discretion as fatal. The risk is serious when a law reaches protected speech and leaves officials free to decide whom to charge or license; a rule that confines officials to objective, content-neutral criteria leaves the concern with nothing to work on.