Concept
Newsgathering and Confidential Sources
Freedom of the press
Newsgathering and Confidential Sources
The earlier sections of this chapter dealt with the press after it published: a defamation judgment, a sanction for printing a name, a penalty keyed to the content of a story. Newsgathering cases begin earlier and look different. Nothing the reporter has printed is at stake. The government summons the reporter, as it summons any citizen, and asks what the reporter saw or heard. The reporter answers that a source who fears exposure will stop talking, that the public will then learn less, and that the First Amendment should excuse the testimony. The recurring question is whether a duty every citizen bears becomes a constitutional problem when it falls on a reporter.
Branzburg v. Hayes, decided five to four, answered no. The Court held that a reporter has no First Amendment privilege, absolute or qualified, to refuse to appear and testify before a grand jury, including about the names of informants.1 The chapter's opening discussion of the Press Clause used the case to show that the press holds no privilege other citizens lack. This section examines it directly in three steps: the holding and its grounds, the separate opinions that qualify or contest it, and the general-law principle that carries the same logic beyond subpoenas.
The Branzburg Holding
The Court stated the question and its answer in two sentences:
The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.2
Three reporters brought the question from different directions. Branzburg's second case grew out of a January 1971 story on drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky; to survey the “drug scene,” he had spent two weeks interviewing several dozen drug users and had seen some of them smoking marihuana.3 Pappas had entered Black Panther headquarters on the condition that he disclose nothing he saw or heard inside, apart from an anticipated police raid. He stayed about three hours, no raid came, and he published nothing. Two months later he told a Bristol County grand jury what he had seen outside headquarters but refused to say what happened inside.4 Caldwell, a New York Times reporter assigned to the Black Panther Party and other black militant groups, was served with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to appear before a federal grand jury and to bring notes and tape recordings of interviews with the Party's officers and spokesmen.5 After he was held in contempt, the court of appeals reversed. It recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege on the theory that compelled testimony would deter informants and lead the reporter to censor his writing, and it held that even attendance at a secret grand jury session could be refused absent a special showing of necessity.6
All three reporters asked for less than absolute protection. They did not claim a privilege against official questioning in every circumstance; they argued that a reporter should not have to appear or testify until the government shows grounds to believe the reporter has information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for it is compelling enough to override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests.7 The Court rejected the claim in either form.8 Its reasons answer different parts of the reporters' argument.
The Court's first answer was that the subpoenas asked of reporters only what every citizen owes. The Court accepted that newsgathering is not without First Amendment protection, since without some protection for seeking out the news freedom of the press could be eviscerated.9 But the subpoenas restricted nothing the reporters could print. The sole issue was whether reporters must respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do, and citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from those subpoenas; neither the First Amendment nor any other provision protects the average citizen from telling a grand jury what he has received in confidence.10 The reporters therefore asked for a status no one else holds. The press enjoys no special immunity and no constitutional right of access to information unavailable to the public generally, and the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press.11
The Court then turned to the other side of the balance. Fair and effective law enforcement is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in it.12 The only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses rooted in the Federal Constitution, the Court observed, is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and it declined to create a second one for newsmen.13 Because the grand jury's task is to determine whether a crime has been committed and who committed it, it must call witnesses “in the manner best suited to perform its task.” That is why the reporters' proposed preliminary showings fail. Requiring the government to prove at the outset that a crime occurred and that the reporter holds relevant information unavailable elsewhere would demand the answers the investigation exists to produce, and only the grand jury can make that determination.14
Deterrence was the reporters' strongest argument, and the Court met it in two steps. First, it found the evidence thin, calling the estimates of the inhibiting effect widely divergent and, to a great extent, speculative.15 It gave reasons to expect the effect to be modest: a reporter may never be called, many informants depend heavily on the media to publicize their views, grand jury proceedings are secret, and officers experienced in dealing with informers have their own methods of protecting them.16 Only sources implicated in crime, or holding information relevant to the grand jury's task, need worry about subpoenas, and nothing suggested that they make up a large share of confidential sources.17 History pointed the same way. The common law recognized no such privilege, no one asserted the constitutional claim until 1958, and the press has flourished without it.18
Second, the Court assumed the worst. Even if an undetermined number of informants not implicated in crime would refuse to talk for fear of identification, the public interest in possible future news from undisclosed, unverified sources cannot take precedence over the public interest in prosecuting crimes already reported to the press and deterring such crimes in the future.19 The Court found no basis for holding that law enforcement and effective grand juries are insufficiently weighty to override the “consequential, but uncertain” burden on newsgathering.20 A privilege built on a prediction about what third parties might do cannot defeat a concrete, present interest in prosecuting crime, and the Court said so even granting the prediction.
The Court gave no weight to a source's wish for anonymity in order to escape prosecution. That preference is understandable but hardly deserving of constitutional protection, and it would be frivolous to assert that the First Amendment licenses either reporter or source to violate valid criminal laws.21 The Court also refused to forge a “virtually impenetrable constitutional shield” for a private system of informers operated by the press, one that would be unaccountable to the public, would threaten citizens' justifiable expectations of privacy, and would protect well-intentioned informants and those who betray their trust alike. Law enforcement officers use informers too and may, in proper circumstances, assert a privilege against disclosing their identity, but the Court was unwilling to hand the press a shield of its own that no legislature or court could control.22
Finally, the Court pointed to the difficulty of administering a privilege. Courts would have to decide who counts as “the press.”23 And a rule that compelled a reporter's testimony in investigations of some crimes but not others would have judges making a value judgment that the legislature, in defining the crimes, had declined to make. The task of judges, the Court said, is not to make the law but to uphold it.24 Protection belongs elsewhere. Congress may decide whether a statutory newsman's privilege is desirable and may fashion rules as narrow or broad as it chooses; state legislatures remain free to set their own standards; and the Court was powerless to bar state courts from recognizing a privilege, qualified or absolute, under their own constitutions.25 Many states have since enacted shield laws, though they differ markedly in scope, no federal shield law exists, and courts often construe the state statutes strictly because they depart from the common law.26
The holding has an edge. A reporter must cooperate as long as the grand jury inquiry is conducted in good faith, the questions are relevant, and there is no harassment.27 The Court observed that nothing in the records showed grand juries probing at will without relation to existing need, or forcing wholesale disclosure of names and affiliations for a purpose unrelated to whether a crime had been committed.28 Those missing features mark the line between a good-faith inquiry and an abuse. On the facts, if no privilege lets a reporter refuse relevant questions in a good-faith grand jury investigation, then a fortiori none lets the reporter refuse to appear until the government shows compelling need, so the judgment for Caldwell was reversed.29
Two errors recur in answering these problems. A fact pattern that stresses a promise of confidentiality tempts the reader to excuse the reporter, but the promise is a private arrangement and carries no more constitutional force than any other agreement to withhold evidence from a grand jury. The opposite error treats Branzburg as holding that newsgathering has no First Amendment protection at all, when the Court accepted that it has some and confined its holding to good-faith grand jury investigations.
Powell's Concurrence and the Dissents
Branzburg was decided five to four, and the margin gives the separate opinions unusual weight. Justice Powell supplied the fifth vote. He joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to emphasize the “limited nature of the Court's holding.”31 The holding itself stands as the last section stated it: no First Amendment privilege, absolute or qualified, excuses a reporter from answering a grand jury's good-faith questions. Powell's concurrence marks what that holding leaves open.
Powell wrote that the Court does not hold that reporters subpoenaed before a grand jury lack constitutional rights in gathering news or safeguarding their sources, and he rejected the suggestion that state and federal authorities are free to “annex” the news media as “an investigative arm of government.”32 A reporter keeps a remedy in two situations. If the reporter is asked for information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or has other reason to believe that the testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, the reporter may move to quash, and the court may enter an appropriate protective order.33 His method is balancing: “The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.” In his words, “the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.”34
The two triggers track the majority's own rationale. The public's claim to every person's evidence is strongest when the testimony helps the investigation and weakest when it has almost no connection to it. The second trigger also reaches further than the limit Justice White announced. White had said the First Amendment would protect against harassment of reporters, but Powell seemed to say that a First Amendment privilege could be invoked even where there was no harassment.35
The zoning reporter and the warehouse photographer in the last section both promised confidentiality, so the promise explains nothing. What differs is the link between the testimony and the crime under investigation. Where the questions are relevant to a good-faith inquiry, the reporter must testify. Where they wander from the investigation and the prosecutor shows no need for the source, Powell's concurrence gives the reporter a route to relief.
Because Powell's vote was needed to make a majority, his concurrence became a guide to how far the majority would go, and lower courts have used it that way. Some treat his balancing test as the controlling law, and about half the states have passed shield laws embodying similar balancing tests.36 Some commentators go further and argue that a majority of the Court actually endorsed a qualified privilege.37 The Supreme Court itself has not followed. In its formal opinions it has ignored the lower courts' sympathetic developments and has stayed unwilling to create new First Amendment-based privileges: it refused to create an editorial privilege shielding the editorial process from discovery in Herbert v. Lando, and it refused an academic freedom privilege for peer review materials in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.38 An answer that says Branzburg recognized a qualified privilege therefore misreads the majority opinion, even though a privilege survives in some lower court decisions and in state law.
Justice Stewart, joined by two other Justices, dissented. He called the majority's view of the First Amendment “crabbed,” described Powell's concurrence as “enigmatic” while taking some hope from it of “a more flexible view in the future,” and warned that the decision “invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government.”39 A view Stewart set out in a 1974 speech helps explain the dissent: the primary purpose of the free press guarantee, he said, was to create “a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three rival branches.”40 On deterrence, he refused the majority's demand for certainty. The Court could not “await an unequivocal—and therefore unattainable—imprimatur from empirical studies”; it must accept the evidence in the record and elsewhere that “overwhelmingly supports the premise that deterrence will occur with regularity in important types of news-gathering relationships.”41
Stewart's test reverses the burden. Before a reporter can be forced to disclose, the government must prove:42
- probable cause to believe that the reporter possesses clearly relevant evidence relating to a law violation;
- the absence of any means of acquiring the evidence less destructive of First Amendment rights; and
- a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
Justice Douglas rejected balancing altogether. He saw no compelling need that could qualify a reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury unless the reporter is implicated in a crime. The First Amendment shields a reporter who is not involved in crime; if the reporter is involved, the Fifth Amendment stands as a barrier; and because no area of inquiry is unprotected, the reporter need not appear even to invoke a privilege question by question.43 His reason was that the framers had already done all the balancing when they cast the First Amendment in absolute terms.44 The four positions line up this way.
| Opinion | What the government must show first | Reporter's position against a relevant, good-faith grand jury question |
|---|---|---|
| Court (Justice White) | Nothing, because no privilege exists | Must answer; relief only for bad faith or harassment |
| Powell, concurring | No preconditions; the judge balances each claim on its facts | Must answer unless the testimony is remote and tenuous or implicates sources without a legitimate law enforcement need |
| Stewart, dissenting | Probable cause, no less intrusive alternative, and a compelling and overriding interest | May refuse unless all three showings are made |
| Douglas, dissenting | Nothing can suffice unless the reporter is implicated in a crime | Need not even appear |
The labels matter less than the outcomes. In the grand jury context, journalists are generally required to disclose sources and produce materials or suffer sanctions, and they frequently lose when a criminal defendant invokes Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to obtain evidence of innocence. The claim of privilege sometimes prevails in civil cases, though not always.45 Courts that recognize a qualified privilege typically ask the government to show that the information is “substantially related” to a “compelling government interest.” Branzburg, however, is viewed as having established that the government's interest in investigating crime is per se compelling, so a showing that the information is substantially related to the grand jury's investigation satisfies the test, absent factors strongly suggesting that the investigation began in bad faith.46
General Laws and Newsgathering
The reasoning that defeated the reporters in Branzburg rests on a premise that reaches well beyond grand jury subpoenas: the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that results from enforcing civil or criminal statutes of general applicability. Otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the burden, because the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.48 The Court has repeatedly rejected press attempts to win constitutional exemptions from antitrust statutes, labor laws, and state contract liability; the labor-law example is Associated Press v. NLRB.49 The question in this area is therefore whether a law reaches the press along with everyone else or singles it out.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. applies the premise to a broken promise of confidentiality. Cohen sued the newspapers for breach of contract and fraud after they identified him, and a jury awarded him $200,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. The Minnesota Supreme Court found the fraud and contract theories untenable but held that the compensatory award could rest on promissory estoppel, a doctrine that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them, except that enforcing it would violate the newspapers' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding no First Amendment bar to a promissory estoppel action.50
The newspapers relied on the line of cases holding that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, officials may not punish its publication absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. Justice White answered for the Court that the case was controlled instead by the equally well-established line holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because enforcing them against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.51 Promissory estoppel does not target or single out the press; it applies to the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota. Any incentive it gives news organizations not to disclose a source even when the identity is newsworthy is, in the Court's words, “no more than the incidental and constitutionally insignificant consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them.”52 The result also helps the press, since enforcing confidentiality promises makes the press's promises more credible and so increases its ability to obtain information.53
The dissent saw a different burden. It compared the case to Hustler, where, in its words, the operation of the state law could not be called a merely incidental burden on speech because “the publication of important political speech is the claimed violation,” so the law could not be enforced to punish truthful information or opinion.54 The two opinions disagree about classification. The majority treated the effect as incidental to newsgathering and reporting, and the dissent treated the claim as a penalty for publication.
The principle has a boundary. The press is not without special constitutional protection: the Constitution protects it against prior restraints and against post hoc burdens on publication such as defamation liability, and laws that treat the press differently face stricter scrutiny.55 In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, a special use tax imposed solely on the use of paper and ink in publishing was invalid absent a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that the state could not achieve without differential taxation, even though the press otherwise enjoyed favored tax treatment.56 The contrast with Cohen is the reach of the law. Promissory estoppel binds every promisor in the state, while the tax fell only on publishers. That is why a nondiscriminatory tax appears among the general laws the press must obey, and why enforcement of such general laws against the press draws no stricter scrutiny than enforcement against anyone else.57
The same logic governs searches. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily upheld an ex parte warrant, meaning one issued without notice to the newspaper, authorizing a search of a student newspaper's offices for photographs of a riot.58 The Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness, not the First Amendment, controls searches and seizures at newspapers and newsrooms.59 Congress responded with the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, which prohibits searches of newsrooms except in exceptional circumstances.60 The pattern matches Branzburg: the Court declines to find a constitutional privilege, and the legislature supplies protection by statute.
The Fourth Amendment also restrains police who help the press. In Wilson v. Layne, the Court held that police may not bring reporters into a private home on a ride-along when their presence does not aid in executing the warrant. The limit binds the police and protects the homeowner; it gives newsgathering no claim of its own.
Because the Constitution supplies so little beyond the general-law rule, broader protection for newsgathering comes from legislatures. Any greater protection for newsgathering is found in state statutes, not in the Constitution.61 About half the states have shield laws, many embodying balancing tests like the one Justice Powell described.62 A legislature can decide who is covered and what a prosecutor or litigant must show, and can refashion the rules as experience dictates, as the Branzburg Court noted.63