Concept
Fair Trial and Gag Orders
Freedom of the press
Fair Trial and Gag Orders
A defendant is entitled to a trial that satisfies due process, and the press is entitled to report on that trial. Ordinarily the two coexist. In a notorious case they collide, and the question becomes what a judge may do to the press, or to the people who supply it, to protect the jury. The First Amendment forbids abridging the freedom of the press, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment carries that liberty to the states.1 The accused's Sixth Amendment rights pull the other way, and the Court has declined to rank the two guarantees. The authors of the Bill of Rights assigned neither priority over the other, and it is not for the Court to rewrite the Constitution by doing what they would not.2
The first responsibility belongs to the trial judge. The jury's capacity to decide fairly is influenced by the tone and extent of the publicity, and that publicity is shaped in large part by what attorneys, police, and other officials do. What a judge says about a case, in or out of the courtroom, is likely to be reported. The measures a judge takes or fails to take against prejudicial publicity may determine whether the defendant receives a trial consistent with due process.3 The sections below follow the judge's options in descending order of how readily the Court accepts them. A restraint on the press almost never survives. Measures that never touch the press usually suffice. The states may limit what lawyers say on a lower showing than any restraint on the press could meet. Material the press obtained through the court's own discovery process may be protected for good cause.
The Nebraska Press Decision
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart is where the Court measured a gag order against a fair-trial claim. A unanimous Court overturned an order banning press reports of an alleged confession. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion insisted that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,” so that a “heavy burden” must be met. The threat the publicity posed to the trial was not shown to be sufficiently grave, and the unavailability of less drastic remedies was not proven.4
Two earlier cases supply the background. In Near v. Minnesota, a newspaper had accused public officials of protecting local gangsters and had demanded a special grand jury. Under a state statute, the government obtained an injunction forbidding the defendants to circulate “any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper.” Chief Justice Hughes's opinion lifted the injunction. Unless the publisher could “satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends,” his newspaper would be suppressed and further publication punished as contempt. The state had therefore instituted the equivalent of a licensing system, covering only the defendants.5 The Court reasoned that the chief purpose of the guaranty is to prevent previous restraints upon publication, and that the English struggle against the licenser had ended in renunciation of the censorship of the press.6
In the Pentagon Papers case, the government sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified study of Vietnam decision-making while the war continued, claiming that publication would jeopardize the war effort. The Court refused. Its short per curiam opinion noted the “heavy presumption” against the constitutional validity of prior restraints and held that the government had not met its “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.”7 A separate opinion stated what the government would have to show even for an interim order. It would need allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea. Mere conclusions never suffice, because an Executive that seeks judicial help in preventing publication must submit its basis to the court's scrutiny.8
Nebraska Press then applied that doctrine to trial publicity. The damage of a restraint is greatest when it falls on news and commentary about current events, and the protection against prior restraint has particular force for reports of criminal proceedings, whether the crime is a single act or a pattern of conduct. Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings already receive special protection against punishment after publication, and the same reasons support protection against restraint before it.9
The order in the case reached two kinds of information, and the Court treated them differently. It flatly rejected the ban on publishing testimony from the preliminary hearing: once a public hearing has been held, what transpired there cannot be subject to prior restraint.10 No balancing is involved, and the rule matches the one for open court generally, where there is an absolute right to report anything that transpires.11
The ban on other information, such as the alleged confession, drew a demanding but not categorical analysis. The Court did not declare a complete prohibition, but it made clear that the party seeking the restraint bears a heavy burden. It pointed to three considerations: the nature and extent of the pretrial news coverage, the availability of other measures to mitigate its effects, and the effectiveness of a restraining order in preventing the threatened danger.12 Each tests a premise of the order. The first asks how serious the problem is, the second whether a lesser tool would solve it, and the third whether silencing the press would even work.
The order in Nebraska Press failed that test. The threat was not shown to be sufficiently grave, and the unavailability of less drastic remedies was not proven.13 The entry of the order might be read as a judicial determination that other measures would not suffice, but the trial court made no express findings to that effect.14 The test leaves a door open in theory, yet the concurring opinions expressed such strong disapproval of publication bans that another order passing through it seems remote.15
A stem that describes a notorious crime and a judge worried about the jury invites you to uphold the restraint because a fair trial is at stake. Resist that pull. The fair-trial interest is real, but the order in Nebraska Press was set aside anyway because the danger and the inadequacy of alternatives had not been shown. The opposite error is to read the case as a flat ban on every gag order. The majority framed a demanding test and left room for the rare order that meets it, while the part of the order reaching an open hearing failed without any balancing.
Alternatives to Restraint
Nebraska Press failed in large part because nothing showed that other measures would be inadequate, and the tools it had in mind come from Sheppard v. Maxwell. There the Court reversed Dr. Sam Sheppard's conviction for killing his wife. The community had been permeated with publicity about the case, including charges about his sexual conduct and doctored photographs, and the Court called the result a “carnival atmosphere.”17 Courts are expected to take steps to protect the fairness of the trial.18
Most of the alternatives to prior restraint were discussed with obvious approval in Sheppard. They include a change of trial venue, postponement of the trial to let public attention subside, searching questioning of prospective jurors, and emphatic and clear instructions on each juror's sworn duty to decide only on evidence presented in open court. Sequestration of jurors is always available.19 Some of these remedies raise no First Amendment question at all, such as moving the trial to a place with less publicity, questioning prospective jurors about their exposure, and cautioning jurors to decide on what they hear in the courtroom. Others do restrict speech, and the next section takes up the most important of those.20 Sheppard itself said the trial court might have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official that divulged prejudicial matters. Examples include the defendant's refusal to submit to interrogation or lie detector tests, his statements to officials, the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony, and any belief in guilt or innocence. The court might also have asked city and county officials to adopt a regulation on how their employees disseminate information about the case.21
These remedies usually suffice because the Constitution does not demand a jury that knows nothing about the case. In Irvin v. Dowd, the Court said that holding any preconceived notion of guilt or innocence enough to rebut the presumption of a juror's impartiality “would be to establish an impossible standard.” It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.22 Experience points the same way. However famous a case may be, it is always possible to find twelve people somewhere who have heard nothing about it, so gag orders should be avoidable even if the jury ends up exceptionally ill-informed.23
Closure raises the same problem from another angle. The media cannot publish information they do not possess, so a court may try to keep the information away by closing the proceeding, and closure is sometimes sought for other purposes too, such as protecting the privacy of jurors or crime victims.24 Criminal trials are presumptively open to the press and the public under a First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access. A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial but no corollary right to a closed one.25 The right to a public trial is not absolute, but to close a hearing over the defendant's objection the party seeking closure must advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced by keeping the proceedings open. The closure must be no broader than necessary, the court must consider reasonable alternatives, and it must make findings adequate to support the order.26 A statute requiring exclusion of the press and public during a victim's testimony in sexual-offense cases was unconstitutional because it did not require particularized, case-by-case findings.27 How far a claimed right of access reaches for a given proceeding is measured in specifics. A tradition of public entree gives the claim special force, and the question in each case is whether access matters to that very process.28
Whether the judge restrains the press or clears the courtroom, the demand is parallel. The judge must show that less drastic measures would not protect the trial before choosing one that cuts the public off from information. That demand explains why the fair-trial interest, though weighty, so rarely carries a restraint. Tools exist that guard the jury without touching the press, and necessity is what the heavy burden requires. A stem in which the judge goes straight to a gag order or a closure, with no findings about venue, voir dire, instructions, or sequestration, is signaling that the alternatives were never considered.
Lawyers' Out-of-Court Speech
One strategy for protecting the trial is to cut off information at its source, and the lawyers in the case are a key source. Professional responsibility rules in most states limit the right of lawyers to make press statements designed to influence the trial.30 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada shows how far a state may go. The defense lawyer in that case held a press conference at which he argued that his client was being framed to protect a police officer implicated in the crime. A badly divided Court reversed his punishment, finding the rule valid as written but unconstitutionally applied to him. The opinion of the Court was an extraordinary split, with one part written by Justice Kennedy and one by Chief Justice Rehnquist.31
In the Rehnquist part, the Court held that the standard in the state rule was sufficiently protective of speech. The rule prohibited statements with a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” a proceeding. An ordinary citizen could be restrained only to prevent a “clear and present” danger of interference with the proceeding, but the Court applied a lower level of protection to lawyers, who are officers of the court. “Lawyers representing clients in pending cases,” the Chief Justice said, “are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.”32
The Kennedy part nonetheless lifted the discipline. The rule's safe harbor allowed a lawyer to explain the general nature of the defense, and Justice Kennedy concluded that the lawyer was not properly put on notice that his remarks fell outside it, so the rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Justice O'Connor, the swing vote, considered the basic rule valid but the safe harbor unconstitutionally vague.33 The upshot is that this lawyer escaped punishment while the states have broad power to restrict lawyers' commentary about pending cases.34
The two standards differ because the two speakers stand in different places. The order in Nebraska Press addressed the press, which stands outside the proceeding, and it faced a heavy presumption of invalidity. The rule in Gentile addressed a participant, an officer of the court, and needed only a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. Both cases concern publicity about a criminal case, so the identity of the speaker is the variable that matters. The point also fits the lesson of the alternatives: limiting what lawyers say reaches the information at its source instead of the press.
Because the permitted showing is lower, clear notice becomes the lawyer's main protection. Defense lawyers' extrajudicial speech may be limited during trial if it has a substantial likelihood of creating material prejudice, but the bar regulations cannot be vague or misleading to the lawyer.35 The lawyer in Gentile prevailed on that ground and not because he had a right to say what he said. Experienced lawyers, it seems, remain adroit at skirting the limits of these rules.36
A stem in which a defense lawyer tells reporters about the evidence invites two opposite errors. One treats the discipline as a prior restraint that must satisfy Nebraska Press. The other assumes that lawyers have no protection and any bar rule is valid, which forgets that the lawyer in Gentile won on vagueness. The sound analysis applies the substantial-likelihood standard and then asks whether the rule gave clear notice of what was forbidden.
Discovery Protective Orders
The last setting involves a press that holds information only because the court's own process delivered it. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, a newspaper that was a defendant in a libel case obtained information during civil discovery. The Court held that the trial court could limit publication of that material for good cause shown.38 The contrast with Nebraska Press is instructive. When a newspaper reports what happens in open court, its right is absolute, because the state has opened the proceeding to the public.39 A newspaper that learned something through discovery has no comparable claim, because it received the material through the litigation and not by attending a public proceeding. Good cause is the safeguard: the court must find a reason for confidentiality before limiting publication.
The four settings in this unit can be sorted by the speaker and the source of the information.
- Information from open court. An order restraining a report of it is invalid, and the right to report it is absolute.
- Other information about a pending trial. Any restraint on its publication carries a heavy presumption of invalidity, and the proponent must show a grave danger, inadequate alternatives, and an effective order.
- A lawyer's out-of-court speech. The state may restrict it on a showing of substantial likelihood of material prejudice, if the rule gives clear notice.
- Material a newspaper obtained through civil discovery. The court may limit its publication for good cause shown.
A stem that says only that a judge has limited what a newspaper may publish invites the reflexive answer that the order is an invalid prior restraint. Identify the speaker and the source first, and the standard follows.