Concept
Remedies for Unconscionability
Unconscionability
Remedies for Unconscionability
Both provisions that anchor the doctrine end by telling the court what it may do once it has found unconscionability. UCC § 2-302(1) lets a court that finds the contract or any clause unconscionable at the time it was made refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder without the unconscionable clause, or limit the application of the clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 gives the same three responses in the same order and says “term” where the sales statute says “clause.”2 Earlier sections of this chapter dealt with the finding. This section deals with what the court does next.
Each response is introduced by “may,” so the choice belongs to the court, and it should fit the defect the court found. Unconscionability generally combines an absence of meaningful choice with terms unreasonably favorable to the other party,3 and the two are causally linked: by engaging in unconscionable conduct during formation, one party has been able to impose an unconscionable contract or term on the other.4 The remedy must undo that product, and the product varies. Sometimes one overreaching clause sits inside an otherwise sound deal, and the cure is narrow. Sometimes the unfairness runs through the whole agreement, and no trimming would leave anything the parties could be said to have bargained for. A court limited to a single response would either destroy fair bargains to reach one bad term or leave a thoroughly tainted agreement standing. Unlike illegality or fraud, unconscionability does not necessarily invalidate the entire contract, and the judge who applies it acts in a supervisory role, preserving the integrity of agreements while protecting against unscrupulous practices.5
| Response | What the court does | Typical fit |
|---|---|---|
| Refuse enforcement | Ends the bargain and restores the parties | Unconscionability permeates the agreement or taints its central purpose |
| Sever the term | Deletes the term; the parties keep the rest | The term is collateral and can be cut out cleanly |
| Limit the term | Keeps the term in corrected form | Deleting the term would leave a gap or discard something both sides wanted |
The subsections below take the responses in order of severity: refusal first, then the two narrower cures that keep the bargain alive, severance and limitation. They end with a question the statutory text leaves open, whether unconscionability serves only as a defense against enforcement or can also support an affirmative claim. Other doctrines supply their own grounds for refusing enforcement; even a fairly bargained clause that impairs access to court, such as a forum selection clause, can be attacked as violating public policy.6
Refusing Enforcement Altogether
Refusal is the first of the three responses and the most drastic. Severing a term and limiting its application keep the bargain alive in reduced form, but refusal ends it.7 A court that chooses refusal is saying that the defect lies in the agreement as a whole and that no trimmed version deserves enforcement. Because both texts let the court refuse enforcement of the contract and not only of a clause, the response remains available when the unfairness runs through the whole agreement and cannot be isolated in a single line. The practical question is when a court should use so heavy a power, and the decisions answer by asking whether unconscionability permeates the agreement.
Courts do not refuse enforcement whenever they find an unconscionable term. Under the standard applied in Prasad v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC, which draws on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Armendariz, a court may refuse to enforce an entire agreement only when unconscionability has permeated it. The inquiry looks to the contract’s purposes. If the central purpose is tainted, the contract as a whole cannot be enforced; if the offending provision is collateral to the main purpose and can be cut out by severance or restriction, the court severs or restricts it.8 A general statement of the remedy reaches the same place: avoidance is most appropriate when unconscionability permeates the contract or profoundly affects the basis of the bargain.9
Two lines of reasoning lead to refusal. The first follows from what severance assumes, a remainder that the parties actually bargained for. When the tainted element is what the contract is for, cutting it out leaves an agreement that neither side made, and a court that enforced it would be writing a new bargain. The second rests on numbers. In Armendariz the California Supreme Court said that multiple defects may indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration on an employee as an “inferior forum that works to the employer’s advantage.”10 The numbers argument also supplies an incentive. If the only consequence of overreaching were deletion of whichever term happened to be challenged, a drafter could load a standard form with one-sided terms at no cost, but the risk of losing the whole contract discourages that strategy. Because refusal interferes most with what the parties wrote, courts treat it as a remedy of last resort, appropriate when neither severance nor alteration can cure the unconscionability or when the change would fundamentally alter the nature of the agreement.11
Employment arbitration agreements show how one inquiry yields opposite results. In Prasad the court found several provisions unconscionable but enforced the rest, because each was collateral to the agreement’s central purpose of providing an alternate forum for disputes between the employer and its employees. Claims of both sides were subject to arbitration, and the court was not persuaded that cutting out the offending provisions would reduce the agreement to a nullity. It severed them, barred the class, collective, and representative claims, and compelled arbitration of the individual claims.12
The employees in Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC faced an agreement of a different kind: a long English-language form, presented to Spanish-speaking employees with little or no facility in reading English, that shortened the limitations period, allowed only the employer to recover attorney’s fees, and sent the employees’ claims to arbitration while excluding claims the employer might bring to protect its own interests. The court found procedural and substantive unconscionability and declined to sanitize the clause by severing or amending its unconscionable aspects. The multiple defects, it concluded, showed a systematic effort to impose arbitration as an inferior forum favoring the employer, so it avoided the provision entirely. In Zullo v. Superior Court a handbook agreement imposed no restriction on the employer’s right to sue while requiring the employee to arbitrate, and the employee lost even that recourse unless the employer received notice of the claim almost immediately. The court refused to enforce the clause in its entirety because it was permeated with unconscionability and had been drafted to maximize the employer’s advantage and not to resolve disputes neutrally. Deletion would not have cured it. A time limit can be struck, but a one-way obligation to arbitrate cannot be cured by adjusting the provision, because the defect lies in who is bound and not in a phrase that can be removed.
What separates these outcomes is the relationship between the bad terms and the agreement’s purpose, and the number of bad terms matters only as evidence of that relationship. Prasad itself involved several unconscionable provisions, so a student who counts defects will misjudge the remedy. In Prasad the forum still worked for both sides once the offending provisions were gone. In Samaniego and Zullo the defects reached who was bound, which claims were covered, and whose advantage the forum served, and enforcing what remained would have meant enforcing something the drafter never offered.
Refusal has consequences for performance that has already occurred. When a court avoids the contract as a whole, each party must restore any performance received under principles of unjust enrichment.13 The Restatement’s comment on remedies describes the simplest application as denial of specific performance where the contract as a whole was unconscionable when made, and it adds that denial of money damages may also be appropriate if the contract is entirely executory. But the policy is not penal: unless the parties can be restored to their pre-contract positions, the offending party will ordinarily be awarded at least the reasonable value of the performance rendered.14 The limit follows from the doctrine’s purpose, which is to deny the drafter the benefit of an oppressive bargain. A rule that handed the other side free goods or free labor would reverse the imbalance and leave it just as lopsided.
The sales cases show the same pattern. In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc. the great number of individually unconscionable clauses in a lease led the court to void the entire contract, and in State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger an entire agreement was struck without any attempt to sanitize it by enforcing it on a partial basis.15 Where courts have excused buyers from the full contract price, the buyers did not receive the benefit of the contract at no cost: the defendants in Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano had already made payments, and the sellers in Kabro Construction Corp. v. Carire and Hult Chevrolet, Inc. v. Meier sought liquidated damages from consumers who breached before any goods or services had been provided.16 The equitable roots of the response appear in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz. The farmer defended successfully because the court found the contract so one-sided as to be unenforceable in equity, and the court held the entire contract unenforceable even though only the unconscionable part had been invoked.17
Severing the Unconscionable Term
Severance is the second response: the court enforces the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause or term.19 It cuts the offending provision out and holds the parties to everything else. The question that decides between severance and refusal is the one the previous subsection asked, whether the defect is collateral to the bargain or central to it. When it is collateral, refusing the entire contract would destroy terms both parties legitimately wanted, so the text lets the court remove the bad term and leave the rest. The facts that point toward refusal, a tainted central purpose or defects too numerous to cut out, are therefore the facts that point away from severance.
The Restatement’s comment states the ordinary consequence. Where a term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily to deny effect to the term, and for an exculpatory term the effect may be to enlarge the liability of the offending party.20 Deletion changes the parties’ positions because a drafter writes a clause to move them away from the law’s default rule, and when the clause disappears the default governs again. The Code reaches a similar result for remedy clauses that fail in their purpose: when an apparently fair clause, because of the circumstances of its application, deprives either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it gives way to the general remedy provisions of Article 2.21
Courts usually aim to interfere as little as possible with a contract’s terms and to correct it without fundamentally altering its purpose.22 That aim fits what the victim often wants. A buyer who has received the goods, or a worker who has taken the job, typically wants the transaction to stand and the overreaching term gone, and a ruling that voids everything would give that party a result nobody requested while wiping out the other side’s legitimate bargain. Suppose a consumer buys goods from a large retailer on a standard form that requires arbitration of every dispute. The contract is otherwise unobjectionable, but the arbitration term unduly favors the retailer. The court could sever the term entirely and leave the parties to litigate, or it could remove the unfair aspects and still hold the parties to arbitrate under less one-sided rules.23 The first option is severance proper, and the second is the alteration response taken up in the next subsection. In choosing among these responses, courts weigh four considerations:
- whether the provision taints the contract’s central purpose or is collateral to it;24
- whether it can be cut out cleanly, by severance or restriction, without significant harm to the basis of the bargain;25
- how far the term was imposed without meaningful choice; and26
- what relief the victim requests.27
The first two factors ask about the contract, and the last two ask about the claimant. The third connects the remedy to the sliding scale taught earlier, since the procedural showing can be strong or modest. In Shubin, for example, the court found that an office manager hurried the plaintiff into signing documents without time to read them and left her no realistic opportunity to suggest modifications, and that finding established procedural unconscionability.28 The fourth factor informs the court without binding it, as the cases below show.
Beltran v. AuPairCare, Inc. shows severance at its cleanest. AuPairCare, an official sponsor in a U.S. Department of State program that placed foreign au pairs with host families for a year, responded to the au pairs’ class action by seeking to compel arbitration under the au pair contract.29 The au pairs argued that the clause was procedurally unconscionable because it was adhesive and they were young, inexperienced with contracts, and not fully proficient in English. They argued that it was substantively unconscionable because of a fee-shifting provision, a requirement that all disputes be resolved in San Francisco, and the sponsor’s right to select the arbitrator unilaterally. The district court found the provision unconscionable and denied the motion to compel. The court of appeals held that complete avoidance of the clause was too extreme. It treated adhesion alone as creating a modest degree of procedural unconscionability, enough for a remedy on the sliding scale if significant substantive unconscionability is also present, and it found that the only substantively unconscionable aspect was the unilateral selection of the arbitrator. The court severed that aspect and enforced the clause without it.30
Beltran also shows how the availability of severance shapes the finding itself. Had avoidance been the only remedy, the court might not have found the clause unconscionable at all, given the modest procedural showing and the single objectionable feature. Severance let it find unconscionability and craft a remedy less drastic than voiding the entire contract.31 The mechanism is proportionality. A judge who must choose between enforcing a clause with a biased arbitrator and destroying an agreement that is otherwise fair may hesitate to find unconscionability on a thin record, and the biased term then survives for want of a remedy small enough to fit. A menu of responses lets the court match the cure to the size of the showing, so a modest showing can still produce relief.
Other decisions follow the pattern. In Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. the arbitration procedure was fair and applied to claims by both sides, but a requirement that each party bear its own attorney’s fees waived the employee’s statutory right to recover fees if he prevailed. The court severed the waiver and otherwise left the arbitration agreement in force.32 In Prasad the court concluded that each of several unconscionable provisions was collateral to the agreement’s central purpose, and it rejected the employee’s contention that cutting them out would leave a nullity.33 The employee wanted the agreement gone altogether and did not get that result, so the victim’s preferred relief weighs in the analysis without controlling it. In Bolter v. Superior Court of Orange County the court found unconscionable a provision requiring mom-and-pop carpet-cleaning franchisees in California to arbitrate all disputes in Utah, and it held that it was “not necessary to throw the baby out with the bath water,” because the unconscionable provisions could be severed and the rest of the arbitration agreement enforced.
Severance has limits, and they appear where deletion cannot cure the defect. An intermediate remedy works only where the clause can stand without the offending aspects and removing them cures the unconscionability. Zullo shows the limit. The employer’s notice deadline could be struck, but the lack of bilaterality in the obligation to arbitrate cannot be cured by adjusting the provision, and the court refused to enforce the clause in its entirety.
The reason is that severance subtracts. It can take away words that are on the page, such as a deadline, a fee provision, or a clause naming the drafter’s own arbitrator, but it cannot supply a promise the drafter never made. When the defect is the absence of the employer’s obligation to arbitrate, no sentence can be deleted to create it, and a court that wrote in a reciprocal obligation would be making a different bargain from the one the parties struck. Beltran and Zullo therefore differ in the kind of flaw. The sponsor’s unilateral power to choose the arbitrator was a discrete feature the rest of the clause could live without, while the one-way duty to arbitrate was the structure of the clause. Severance also costs a drafter little, since the rest of its clause survives, which is why the multiple-defects inquiry works as the counterweight: a form with many one-sided terms signals a systematic effort to tilt the forum and may hold too many terms to cut out.34 Where a term cannot be severed without significant harm to the basis of the bargain, altering it may be less intrusive, and the next subsection takes up that response.35 A frequent exam error is to answer that any unconscionable term voids the contract. The text says only that the court may refuse enforcement, and the ordinary remedy for an unconscionable term is to deny it effect.36
Limiting a Term’s Application
The third response lets the court “so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”38 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 gives the same power over any unconscionable term.39 The wording shows what limiting does: the clause stays in the contract, and the court controls how far it reaches, with the unconscionable result setting the stopping point. Limiting therefore sits between the two responses already taught. Refusal ends the bargain, severance deletes a term and holds the parties to the rest, and limiting narrows or rewrites a term so that the bargain continues with that term cut to a fair size.
The text needs a response beyond deletion because some terms cannot be cured by subtraction. Severance removes words on the page and cannot supply what the drafter never wrote. A price term, once deleted, leaves a sale with no price. An interest-rate term, once deleted, leaves a loan that costs the borrower nothing, a windfall as unconnected to the bargain as the original rate was. A right to withhold consent to an assignment, once deleted, removes the drafter’s legitimate interest along with the abuse. In each case the court must either keep the term in corrected form or discard something that both sides wanted, and the third response lets it keep the term. The consumer arbitration example above shows the same choice: the court may sever the term entirely, or it may remove the unfair aspects and still hold the parties to arbitrate under less one-sided rules.40
The decisions show the same move with several kinds of terms. One court reduced the interest rate on a secured loan from 200 percent to 24 percent, so the loan stood and the lender kept a right to interest at a defensible rate. Another, citing § 2-302 in a contract outside the sale of goods, imposed a condition that any withholding of consent to an assignment be reasonable, which avoided an otherwise unconscionable restraint against alienation, meaning a restriction on transferring an interest in property.41 The holder of the consent right kept it but could no longer refuse arbitrarily. Each correction preserves the function of the term and removes only its excess.
How far to cut is a judgment call, and two sales cases answer it differently. In Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso the trial court held the price of a refrigerator-freezer unconscionable and limited the buyer’s obligation to the seller’s cost, but the appellate court ruled that the seller was entitled to its net cost plus a reasonable profit, necessary expenses, and reasonable finance charges.42 The trial court’s figure left the seller no return beyond cost, so the correction worked as a penalty as well as a cure. The appellate court’s figure leaves the seller what a fair sale would have produced and fits the statutory stopping point more closely, because avoiding an unconscionable result calls for removing the excess and not for stripping the drafter of a fair return. In Jones v. Star Credit Corp. the buyers had already paid over $600 toward a freezer with a retail value of $300, and the court “reformed and amended” the contract by changing the payments called for to equal the amount actually paid.43 That result resembles the one courts reach when they refuse enforcement of a contract on which payments have already been made, because the buyers owed nothing further.
The choice between severing and altering depends on what the court can leave in place. Courts weigh the degree to which the term was imposed without meaningful choice, the relief the victim requests, and the effect of the change on the basis of the bargain, and they aim to interfere as little as possible without fundamentally altering the contract’s purpose. Where a term cannot be severed without significant harm to the basis of the bargain, altering it may be the less intrusive course.44 In Beltran the only substantively unconscionable feature was the sponsor’s unilateral choice of the arbitrator, and the court severed it because the clause could still operate for both sides without it. Where the objectionable feature is what a term consists of, deletion would leave nothing workable, and narrowing the term is the cure that keeps the bargain.
The power has two limits. The first is its reach. A court may alter a term only as far as needed to cure the unconscionability, and if neither severance nor alteration can cure it, or the change would fundamentally change the nature of the agreement, avoidance of the contract is probably the only proper remedy.45 Wholesale rewriting would replace the parties’ agreement with the court’s own judgment about what a good bargain would have been, and the statute authorizes a limit, not a new contract. The second limit is deterrence. A drafter who knows that the worst result of overreaching is a fair term has little to lose by overreaching, and an occasional reformation does little to discourage a seller bent on a pattern of unconscionable behavior. Whether the victim can recover anything beyond a corrected term is the question of the final subsection.
Three errors recur on exams. One treats limiting as identical to severing, when severing deletes and limiting leaves a corrected term in place. Another describes the court as free to rewrite the contract on whatever terms seem fairest, when the text permits only a limit that avoids the unconscionable result. The third assumes that every unconscionable term can be adjusted, when a change that would fundamentally alter the agreement points to avoidance.
Shield, Sword, and Damages
Every item in the lists of UCC § 2-302(1) and Restatement § 208 is an act performed on the contract itself: refusing to enforce it, enforcing the remainder without the offending clause or term, or limiting how far that clause or term reaches.47 Neither text says that a party who suffered under an unconscionable term may sue for money because of it. That silence has split the authorities over whether the doctrine works only as a shield, a defense raised when the other side seeks enforcement, or can also work as a sword, a basis for relief that the injured party starts. Many courts read the sales provision as defensive only, and a few allow damages or restitution. Neither camp has settled the question for every jurisdiction, so the positions are best learned as a split.
The defensive reading rests on the wording of the remedies and on the nature of the finding. A determination of unconscionability is purely defensive in character: it is not a breach of contract and gives rise to no cause of action for damages, and the judge who makes it acts in a supervisory role to preserve the integrity of agreements while protecting against unscrupulous practices.48 That description fits the doctrine’s equitable ancestry, because unconscionability belongs with the “conscience defenses,” which developed to bar relief to a claimant whose own claim the court regards as morally tainted.49 On this view the drafter of a harsh clause risks losing the court’s enforcement, and a damages claim would add a sanction the text never mentions. In Arthur v. Microsoft Corp. purchasers sought damages on the theory that the gap between price and cost was unconscionable, and the Nebraska court, treating the doctrine as defensive, refused to award them. In Cowin Equipment Co. v. General Motors Corp. a dealer that had to sell cars below cost because of a clause barring return of unsold cars sued the manufacturer, alleging that the clause was unconscionable. The court held that, whatever the clause’s merits, the statute did not permit the remedy sought, and damages were unavailable even if they flowed directly from the claim.50
The contrary decisions begin with the gap the shield leaves open. The overdraft litigation, re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, began with customers who alleged that banks posted debit charges from the largest to the smallest so as to maximize overdraft fees, and then kept the fees. The complaints did not rest on fraud, and the court found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for unconscionability. It rejected the banks’ argument that the doctrine can be used only defensively, reasoning that if unconscionability could not support a claim to recover the improper fees, the customers would have no remedy for the banks’ unconscionable conduct. The Eighth Circuit, in Langemeier v. National Oats, Inc., read the same section’s power to enforce a contract without the unconscionable term as one that may lead to affirmative relief. Both the Arthur purchasers and the overdraft customers were consumers who wanted money from a seller or bank after complaining of its terms, so the courts parted on whether the text’s silence about damages forecloses them.
Statutory text can also change the picture. The borrower in McFarland argued that, under the text of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, unconscionable inducement is grounds for relief by itself, without regard to the loan agreement’s substantive terms. His example was a loan allegedly induced by misrepresentations, focused on a vastly inflated appraisal of his home.51 Whether such an argument succeeds depends on the statute’s words, so the governing statute should be read before the Code’s list of responses is assumed to be complete.
The shield-only reading leaves a practical gap whenever the party who benefits from a clause collects without going to court.
Restitution, meaning the return of a benefit the other party has no right to keep, is the affirmative remedy easiest to defend, because it needs no freestanding cause of action for unconscionability. Once the court denies effect to a clause, the contract it enforces gives the other party no right to money collected under that clause, so keeping the money enriches that party unjustly. Authority on the Code’s remedies treats restitution as the appropriate recovery when money or property was transferred under a clause later held unconscionable, and it observes that § 2-302 does not say otherwise, although an occasional court has remarked that a finding of unconscionability affords no basis for restitution. The same authority adds that enforcing the contract without the offending clause may itself lead to compensatory damages in a particular case, as when removing an exculpatory term enlarges the offending party’s liability.52 Those recoveries come from the obligations that remain once the clause is gone, which separates them from a claim like the dealer’s in Cowin, which sought compensation for having been held to the clause. Restitution also protects the party who wrote the clause. The policy is not penal, and an offending party who cannot be restored to its pre-contract position will ordinarily receive at least the reasonable value of its performance.53
Punitive damages face two barriers. The first is the general rule that punitive damages are not available for breach of contract. The reply is that unconscionability is not a breach but conduct analogous to fraud, for which punitive damages are recognized when the fraud is malicious, wanton, or reckless, as in District Motor Co. v. Rodill, where a salesperson set back a used car’s odometer and sold the car as new. The second barrier is UCC § 1-305(a), which allows consequential, special, or penal damages only where the Code specifically provides for them or another rule of law does. Section 2-302 provides no damage remedy, so various courts have denied punitive damages under it, and a court inclined to award them would have to find another rule of law, probably by extrapolating from the fraud cases. The case for them is deterrence, since a seller who budgets for an occasional refund or reformation loses little by overreaching, but the commentary itself is divided on whether a commercial code is the place to allow them.
A problem asking whether a customer can recover money because a clause was unconscionable should therefore identify the governing jurisdiction’s position and flag the split. The default answer treats the doctrine as a shield, so unconscionability defeats enforcement but supplies no damages claim. The better-supported affirmative relief is restitution of money paid under a clause held unconscionable, and punitive damages are the least likely recovery.