Concept
Notice of Breach
Acceptance and notice of breach
Notice of Breach
A buyer who accepts goods keeps the right to complain about them, and the Code charges a price for keeping it. The buyer must accept and pay for goods in accordance with the contract,1 and acceptance leaves the buyer owing the contract rate for the goods it kept.2 Acceptance does not, however, extinguish a claim for damages. In Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Systems, Inc. the court stressed that buyers who receive nonconforming goods with defects that are not easily detected have adequate remedies under the Code even though they accepted, and that they do not lose the right to damages by having accepted.3
Section 2-607(3)(a) sets the price. After accepting a tender, the buyer must notify the seller of any breach within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers it, or should have discovered it, or be barred from any remedy.4 The sentence holds a duty (notify), a clock (a reasonable time from actual or constructive discovery), and a sanction (a bar on every remedy). Forfeiture is harsher than a reduced recovery: it leaves a buyer with a sound claim and nothing to assert.
The rule is easy to state and unforgiving to apply, so the subsections below follow the questions a dispute raises. What does the duty require, and why? Which breaches does it reach? What must the notice say, how fast must the buyer give it, and whom must the buyer tell? How does it differ from the notices that accompany rejection and revocation? And what must a buyer do when a third party sues it? Each of these notices carries its own trigger and its own consequence, so a buyer who satisfies one can still fail another.
The Notice Requirement
Four elements make up the buyer's duty, and a buyer who misses any one of them loses the damages claim.
The first element is an accepted tender. A buyer accepts by signifying to the seller, after a reasonable opportunity to inspect, that the goods conform or will be taken despite their nonconformity; by failing to make an effective rejection; or by doing any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. A buyer who receives goods, processes them, and sells the finished product without trying to reject them has accepted.5 A buyer who instead rejects owes a different notification, because a rejection is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller,6 and a buyer who has accepted can no longer reject at all.7
The second element is a breach that the buyer discovered or should have discovered. The words should have discovered give the clock a constructive start, so a buyer cannot postpone the deadline by declining to look. The third element is the act of notifying the seller, which the later subsections on content, recipient, and form examine. The fourth is a reasonable time, which the official comment measures by commercial standards for a merchant and extends for a retail consumer.8
The sanction is forfeiture, and it reaches every remedy, damages included. Courts accordingly treat compliance as a condition precedent to recovery for breach of warranty.9 Notice is also part of the buyer's own cause of action and is not an affirmative defense, so the buyer must plead and prove it.10 Under Texas law the burden of alleging and proving proper notice rests on the buyer, and failure to give the notice that lets the seller try to cure bars recovery on the warranty.11 The allocation matches § 2-607(4), which puts on the buyer the burden of establishing any breach with respect to the goods accepted,12 and a buyer who turns to revocation of acceptance does not change who carries that burden.13
A complaint that never alleges notice invites dismissal. In J.M. McCormick Co. v. International Truck & Engine Corp. a buyer added implied-warranty claims to its counterclaim in July 2005 but did not tell the seller about the corrosion problem until December 2005. The district court held the claims barred, because the buyer gave no notice before filing them and did not allege notice in its counterclaim.14
Even a sympathetic claim falls to the rule. In Buford v. Toys R' Us, Inc. a boy was seriously injured when a defective weld caused the steer tube on his bicycle to separate from the front fork. His parents sued the retailer for strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the retailer on all three claims, which the court of appeals affirmed.15 The appellate court assumed a viable warranty claim and still ruled for the retailer: the accident occurred in April 1991, the seller received no notice until the complaint was served two years later, and notice that late was not reasonable as a matter of law.16
Buyers who sue after a repair failed fare no better. In Import Motors, Inc. v. Matthews the buyers never told the seller that an oil leak had reoccurred, so the seller had no opportunity to cure it, and breach of warranty gave them no recovery.17
The first bakery's email did the work the Code assigns to notice: it told the seller that a claim was coming while the seller could still act. Courts name three purposes for the rule. It gives the seller a chance to correct the defect, a chance to prepare for negotiation and litigation, and a safeguard against stale claims asserted after it is too late to investigate them.18 Early warning also lets the seller investigate while the facts are fresh, avoid the defect in the future, minimize its damages, and perhaps assert a timely claim of its own against third parties.19 The buyer holds the goods and knows when they fail, so the duty to speak falls on the buyer; and because the warning must reach the seller before the dispute hardens into a lawsuit, silence costs the buyer its remedies.
The seller's own awareness of the defect does not excuse the buyer. Notice is required even if the seller knows of the breach, because its job is to make the seller aware of potential litigation and of opportunities to cure, investigate, offer a settlement, and assert claims against suppliers.20 The Fifth Circuit drew the line in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.: it is not enough that the seller knows the facts constituting a nonconforming tender; the seller must also be informed that the buyer considers it in breach.21 Some courts relax the requirement where the seller's knowledge is strong, as when a federal court refused to dismiss implied warranty claims against car makers that buyers alleged had known of an anti-lock brake defect years before the buyers sued.22 That relaxation is a fallback argument, and a buyer who gives notice never has to make it.
Breaches Requiring Notice
The statute covers any breach of an accepted tender, and courts read those words as written. In Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. the Sixth Circuit gave the phrase its plain meaning under Ohio's version of the section and held that it applies to all breaches in which the goods are accepted.24
Late delivery strains that breadth the most, because the calendar shows the lateness to both parties. If the seller knows its shipment is late, the objection runs, a letter saying so tells it nothing new. The trial court in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. accepted that objection and held the notice requirement inapplicable to delivery delays, because a seller necessarily knows of that kind of violation.25 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not applying § 2-607 to the delays.26
The reversal turned on what notice is for. Even after the buyer has accepted a tender, notice tells the seller that the performance is nonetheless considered a breach of contract.27 After a late delivery, then, the seller already has the facts and lacks only the buyer's position. It is not enough that the seller knows the facts constituting a nonconforming tender; the buyer must also inform it that the buyer considers it in breach, and that rule governs delivery delays as it governs other breaches.28
Roth Steel carried the reasoning to price and time terms. The district court there had held that the seller's awareness of the facts underlying the buyers' claims discharged any duty of notice.29 The Sixth Circuit applied the statute's words instead. Nonconforming performance is often equivocal, and the policies that support notice when a latent defect surfaces also support notice when performance departs from the contract's time or price terms.30 A seller who watches a buyer accept a late or overpriced performance without protest may fairly read the silence as agreement.
The duty also reaches consumers, though their clock differs. The official comment judges a retail consumer's reasonable time by different standards so that it will be extended, because the rule is designed to defeat commercial bad faith and not to deprive a good faith consumer of a remedy.31 The duty itself remains. Buford applied it to a bicycle that had been accepted, holding that when goods have been accepted the buyer must give notice within a reasonable time after discovering, or when the buyer should have discovered, any breach.32
The duty follows a warranty claim into personal injury litigation. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co. rejected the argument that personal injury plaintiffs should escape the requirement: dispensing with notice would expose defendants to stale claims they can no longer meet with evidence, and a plaintiff who relies on the Code cannot fulfill only some of its requirements while neglecting others.33 The fit remains awkward, and two states have amended their versions of the Code to ban the notice requirement in personal injury cases.34 Absent such an amendment, apply the uniform text.
The rule stops where acceptance never occurred. Section 2-607(3) by its own terms applies only when tendered goods have been accepted, so a buyer owed no notice of breach about goods that were never delivered.35 Eastern put the point in a footnote: notice is not required when the seller has failed to deliver, because § 2-607 does not apply where there has been no tender or acceptance.36 The limit follows from the job notice performs. Notice answers the appearance of satisfaction that acceptance creates, and a buyer who received nothing has created none.
Run a fact pattern in a fixed order. First ask whether anything was tendered and accepted. If so, the buyer must have told the seller of its claim of breach, whether the grievance is a defect, a delay, or a price, and the seller's knowing the facts does not do that work. A consumer or a personal injury plaintiff owes the same notice, though the reasonable time is judged more gently.
Content of the Notice
The statute says only that the buyer must notify the seller of breach,38 so courts take the content standard from Official Comment 4. The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched, and it need only inform the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, which opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.39
The comment also says what a notice need not do. It need not include a clear statement of all the objections the buyer will rely on, as the section on stating defects upon rejection requires. It need not be a claim for damages, and it need not threaten litigation or any other resort to a remedy.40 The reason lies in the buyer's position after acceptance. The buyer is still learning how serious the problem is and what it will cost, and a rule that demanded a full list of objections, a damages figure, or a threat of suit would force a buyer in good faith to commit to a theory before it knew its loss. Tying content to the notice's purpose, which is to start the seller investigating, curing, or negotiating, protects those buyers at no cost to the seller.
A short letter met the standard in Bonebrake v. Cox. The Cox brothers wrote that the pinspotters were not installed within the meaning of the contract, that they needed repairs although the contract included a guarantee as to the quality and performance of the equipment, and that the brothers were keeping a record of their expenses so that they could substantiate a claim for any loss.41 The letter claimed no particular sum, but it told the seller that the buyers considered the contract unperformed and meant to pursue a loss. The court held it more than adequate to let the seller know the transaction was still troublesome.42
Notice can also be informal and repeated. In Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp. the buyers brought maintenance, parts, shortage, and supply problems to the attention of the seller's representatives, who came to the buyer's offices to resolve them and repeatedly assured the buyers they would. The complaints concerned the alleged express warranties on useful life and maintenance costs, and they were sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction was still troublesome and needed to be watched.43 The evidence permitted a jury to find the notice both sufficient and timely.44 In Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp. the court likewise found notice sufficient, because complaints at payment meetings, service calls, and the seller's own warranty extensions showed that the seller knew the buyer was dissatisfied.
The seller's knowledge of the facts does not stand in for a claim of breach. In Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co. the buyer argued it did not have to tell Magnavox that the controllers contained 4558 op amps, because Magnavox already knew. The court said the argument missed the point of the notice requirement: Eaton had to inform Magnavox not only that the controllers contained 4558s but also that it considered this a breach of warranty, and Magnavox received such notice only when a letter impliedly stated that the use of 4558s was a breach.45
Expressing dissatisfaction is also not enough. In Eastern, a letter from the airline asked the manufacturer to help mitigate the effect of impending delivery delays. A close reading showed the airline's primary concern was the lack of early warning, and a jury could reasonably infer that it was not claiming a breach of the particular contract, so the letter was not adequate notice as a matter of law.46 A pre-suit letter that blamed a buyer's cash-flow problems in part on a quality problem fell short in Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc. for a similar reason: it was equivocal and did not tie the complaint to the orders in suit.
The buyer's whole course of conduct counts, because the Code's draftsmen disposed of rigid technical requirements that would frustrate the notice rule's design of defeating commercial bad faith. Even though adequate notice may have been given at one point, later actions by the buyer may have dissipated its effect, and the buyer's conduct taken as a whole must constitute timely notification that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach.47 The point carries most force in continuing relationships, where an overly mechanical application of the requirement would defeat its design.
Timing of the Notice
The statute fixes no number of days, so every timing dispute breaks into two questions: when the clock started, and how long the buyer could take once it ran.49
The trigger has an actual branch and a constructive branch, and the constructive branch demands diligence and not foresight. A buyer who finds the defect on delivery day starts the clock that day, and a buyer who would have found it with ordinary care starts it at the same point. A buyer investigating a puzzling failure is not penalized for reasonable work, however. In Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc. the supplier had represented that its preservative prevented rot better than the old one, so it was reasonable that the buyer did not come quickly to suspect the preservative until it had explored and ruled out other causes. Once it saw excessive rot, its duty was to investigate further and determine whether the preservative was the problem, and it did.50 The same idea appears in the rule on inspection before acceptance, where a reasonable time to inspect must allow an opportunity to put the product to its intended use, or for testing to verify its capability to perform as intended.51
Eaton stood on the other side of the line. Eaton knew by July 14, 1977 that Magnavox had used RC 4558 DN op amps in the controllers, yet it did not notify Magnavox until March 6, 1978 that it considered their use improper.52 Eaton explained the eight months as time spent trying to bracket the affected controllers, evaluate repairs, and talk with customers. The court answered that Eaton knew by July exactly what was causing the failures, and that later activity, however reasonable, did not obviate its duty to notify. In the interval Eaton had also tried to obtain Magnavox's unwitting agreement to extend the warranty, conduct the court called inconsistent with the notice policy and evidence of bad faith.53 The two cases mark the line at identification of the breach. Marvin's investigation was part of finding the breach; Eaton's later work responded to a breach it already knew.
Once the clock runs, its length depends on the buyer and the defect. The official comment applies commercial standards to a merchant buyer and judges a retail consumer by different standards, so that the consumer's time is extended.54 The defect matters too. Eggl v. Letvin Equipment Co. quotes a commentator's observation that, if any pattern is emerging, it is that the more severe the defect, the greater the time within which the buyer has the right to invoke the remedy.55 The standard therefore resists any rule of thumb measured in days.
Reasonableness is generally a question of fact. Courts treat revocation notices that way: a buyer can delay so excessively that its actions are untimely as a matter of law, but otherwise the answer depends on the facts and circumstances, and one court upheld a jury finding that revoking acceptance of a new car after 22 months and 22,000 miles was reasonable.56 Notices of breach go to juries too: in Royal Typewriter the evidence permitted a jury to find the notice both sufficient and timely.57
Roth Steel shows both outcomes on one set of facts. The buyers protested the 1973 price increase as soon as the seller announced it, telling the seller that the fixed-price agreement was enforceable and that they would sue to recover losses if the increase was imposed, and a later statement that the seller had not met its legal or moral obligations added to the record. The court called these statements timely and unequivocal.58 A separate notice dated October 3, 1974 never received a ruling on timeliness from the district court, and without findings the Sixth Circuit could not say whether the buyers had discharged their obligation.59
A court decides the question itself when the delay is long and nothing excuses it. In Buford, notice first reached the retailer through the complaint, served two years after the accident, and the court held that notice was not reasonable as a matter of law.60 The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion about a consumer in Hebron v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.: two years of unexplained silence, with actual prejudice to the seller, was unreasonable as a matter of law.
The enacted text asks nothing about prejudice. Eaton found the notice untimely even though no prejudice to the seller was shown, because prejudice is not required for that finding.61 The cure opportunity that notice protects can still be concrete. In EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc. the seller was still trying to adjust and cure two months after the goods reached Mexico and offered to reorder conforming heads at its own cost. The buyer, whose notice came well beyond a 45-day period, rejected those efforts, paid $20,000 more than the seller's price for conforming heads elsewhere, and sold the nonconforming heads at a $10,000 profit.62 A buyer should not count on the seller's showing no harm, because the text does not guarantee that argument.
A warranty period works as a deadline of its own. In Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton the court quoted the view that limiting the period of an express warranty is in effect limiting the time within which a claim must be asserted under it. Where the warranty promises repair or replacement of parts found to be defective within the period, a discovery within the period presumably earns a further reasonable time for giving notice, but there the defect had not been discovered within the period.63
Recipient and Form
The statute says only that the buyer must notify the seller,65 and it names no recipient beyond that word and prescribes no form. Courts supply both from the purposes the notice serves.
When goods pass from a manufacturer through distributors and a retailer to a consumer, the word seller could mean any of them. In Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co. the Colorado Supreme Court construed seller to mean only the immediate seller that tendered the goods to the buyer, so a buyer who has told that seller of the defect owes no further notice to distributors beyond it. The Code envisions that a seller who receives the buyer's notice will pass it upstream to preserve its own right of action, and so on until the manufacturer is reached, so notice to the immediate seller ordinarily inures to the manufacturer's benefit. That sequential notice gives the remote manufacturer notice and an opportunity to correct the defect, where possible, and to investigate claims that may become lawsuits.66
A notice to a manufacturer, where one is owed or given, must concern the buyer's own transaction. In McKay v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. a physician had told the manufacturer of problems his patients were experiencing with its drugs, but nothing showed that he alerted it that the plaintiff in particular had been injured. A manufacturer must be made aware of a problem with a particular product purchased by a particular buyer, so the general notifications did not suffice.67 A general report that a product line is troublesome gives the manufacturer no basis to examine this buyer's unit or to settle this buyer's claim.
Whether notice to an authorized dealer reaches the manufacturer can turn on their contract. In Bieda v. CNH Indus. Am. LLC a federal court declined to hold as a matter of law that the buyer had failed to give the manufacturer reasonable notice. The dealer agreement disclaimed an agency relationship, but it also obligated the dealer to provide warranty service on the manufacturer's products and to follow the manufacturer's policies in doing so.68 The label in the agreement therefore does not settle the question by itself.
The Code's demands about form are minimal. Its general definition of notify is to take such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually comes to know of it.69 The Code prescribes no writing, and courts credit informal, oral, and repeated notice, as the cases in the preceding subsection show. A buyer who relies on informal notice must still plead and prove it: at a minimum, a plaintiff must allege that it notified the defendants in some manner, and a federal court dismissed an express warranty claim whose complaint alleged no notification even in general terms.70
The hardest form question arises when the first communication to the seller is the lawsuit. The general approach is that a complaint is not notice. In McKay the court held that commencement of litigation does not satisfy the requirement.71 The Illinois court in Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. recorded the same rule for consumers who do not sue for personal injuries, and it noted a federal decision under Pennsylvania law holding that filing a civil complaint satisfies the notice requirement.72 The reason is timing. A complaint arrives after the buyer has chosen to litigate, so the seller gets none of the window the rule was built to open, in which it can resolve the dispute before suit.73 Some courts nevertheless accept a served complaint. The Alaska Supreme Court held in Shooshanian v. Wagner that a retail consumer's complaint, filed within a reasonable time and served on the defendant, can satisfy the statute. Results have gone both ways even on similar facts, and one authority calls it at best imprudent to give no notice until the complaint is served, though occasionally that will suffice.74
Courts also divide on whether the seller's own knowledge can replace the buyer's communication. The stricter view appears in Mills v. Ethicon, Inc., where the court rejected a constructive notice argument. The Code distinguishes having notice of a fact, which includes actual knowledge, from notifying another person, which requires steps taken to inform that person.75 A defendant aware of a defect may be unaware that a particular buyer intends to sue, and so lose the chance to negotiate before litigation.76 The permissive view appears in Connick, where the complaint alleged that the manufacturer's executives knew the vehicles were unsafe, that the attorneys general of seven states had launched investigations, that the manufacturer had announced it was considering remedial steps, and that it was already involved in other rollover litigation.77 The complaint was filed June 12, 1990,78 and these allegations established that the manufacturer knew the transactions were troublesome and must be watched.79 What separates the lines is how closely the seller's knowledge was tied to the buyers' own claims. The Connick defendant was publicly confronting the defect and faced a class complaint from owners, while the Mills plaintiff offered no allegation of notification at all.
Notice, Rejection, and Revocation
A buyer unhappy with goods may owe the seller any of three communications, and each has its own clock and content. Notice of breach is due within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach.81 Rejection must come within a reasonable time after delivery or tender and is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.82 Revocation of acceptance, the third route, requires a notice of its own. A letter that satisfies one of these is easily mistaken for a letter that satisfies all three.
The notices say different things because they ask different things of the seller. A notice of breach need only tell the seller that the transaction is still troublesome and is claimed to involve a breach.83 The buyer then still holds the goods, so the seller needs only a reason to investigate, offer a cure, or negotiate. A notice of revocation asks more. Mere notification of breach under § 2-607(3) is not enough, and the buyer must inform the seller that it does not wish to keep the goods. Such a notice must be unequivocal, though it need not be formal.84
Accepting the goods and suing for damages is a different route from unwinding the sale. The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that a buyer who neither rejects nor revokes acceptance, but accepts the goods and seeks damages, has no remedy at all unless it notifies the seller of breach within a reasonable time. If it does, damages and not cancellation is the proper remedy.85 A letter that reports a breach and says nothing about returning the goods therefore puts the buyer on the damages track, and the buyer cannot later point to it as the notice that undoes the sale. Lanners v. Whitney shows both notices in one transaction: a buyer's early complaint about an airplane preserved a damages claim, and a later notice of rescission operated as revocation because it told the seller the buyer meant to end the contract.
Each notice runs on its own clock, so a timely notice of one kind does not rescue a late notice of another. The rejection clock starts at delivery or tender and the breach clock at discovery. Revocation timing depends on the facts and circumstances and is normally a question for the trier of fact, though excessive delay is untimely as a matter of law.86 A buyer who loses the right to reject by delay keeps its damages claim, but only if its notice of breach came in time.
What the buyer does after notifying matters too. If limited financial resources or the unavailability of substitutes compels the buyer to keep using the goods after giving notice of revocation, a court may hold, even as a matter of law, that continued use does not bar revocation. Revocation may be barred, however, if the buyer keeps using the goods after revoking without seeking replacements with which to cover with adequate dispatch.87 A buyer who reaccepts the goods after a valid notice of revocation supersedes that notice, and reacceptance can be implied from conduct such as continued use.88
Acceptance also fixes the burden. Because acceptance precludes rejection, a buyer who accepted bears the burden of proving the breach, and the burden does not move when the buyer invokes revocation of acceptance.89
Third-Party Litigation Notice
Section 2-607(3)(b) imposes a second notice duty, one that arises when a third party claims that the goods infringe its rights. If the claim is for infringement or the like and the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach, the buyer must notify the seller within a reasonable time after it receives notice of the litigation, or be barred from any remedy over for liability established by the litigation.91 A remedy over is the buyer's right to pass a loss up the chain: after paying a judgment to the third party, the buyer claims reimbursement from the seller whose goods caused it. The duty operates alongside the buyer's own notice of breach and does not replace it.
The two duties differ in trigger and sanction. Under § 2-607(3)(a) the clock runs from the date the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach, and silence bars any remedy.92 Under subsection (3)(b) the clock runs from the date the buyer receives notice of the lawsuit, and the bar is confined to the remedy over for the liability the litigation establishes. A buyer sued on an infringement claim can therefore hold two distinct claims against the seller, one for its own loss from the breach and one for reimbursement of the judgment, and each carries its own deadline and its own forfeiture.
The second duty exists because the seller answerable over is the party who may ultimately pay. It is not a party to the suit and cannot see the evidence, shape the defense, or weigh a settlement offer. If the buyer could stay silent until the judgment was final, the seller would first learn of the dispute when handed a bill for liability fixed on a record it never saw, with facts it might have contested and a settlement it never had a chance to evaluate. Early notice lets the seller investigate, supply evidence the buyer may lack, and decide whether to defend or settle, which are the opportunities notice of breach protects generally.93 The bar on the remedy over gives the buyer its incentive to speak, since the buyer loses exactly the reimbursement the seller never had a chance to influence.
Subsections (5) and (6) of § 2-607 let the buyer turn notice into something more than a preserved claim. Under subsection (5)(a), the buyer sued on a claim for which the seller is answerable over may give the seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend and that, if the seller does not, it will be bound in any action against it by the buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then the seller is so bound unless it comes in and defends after seasonably receiving the notice.94 The seller keeps its freedom to stay out, but it cannot stay out and then contest in the second suit what the first suit decided. The notice must carry both statements, because binding the seller depends on warning it of that consequence in the notice itself.
Infringement claims add a second mechanism, which runs in the seller's favor. Under § 2-607(5)(b) the original seller may demand in writing that the buyer turn over control of the litigation, including settlement, or else be barred from any remedy over. The demand is effective only if the seller also agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, and a buyer who does not turn over control after seasonably receiving such a demand is barred.95 Each half of the arrangement matches the other. The seller who will pay the judgment gets the power to direct the defense and decide on settlement, and the buyer who hands over control is protected against the cost. Subsection (6) extends subsections (3), (4), and (5) to any obligation of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against infringement or the like.96 The positions of the parties reverse there, with the sued seller giving the notice and the buyer who owes the indemnity receiving the invitation to defend.