Concept
Instructing the Jury
Judicial notice
Instructing the Jury
Rule 201(f) tells the court what to say to the jury once it has noticed a fact, and the answer turns on the kind of case. In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.1
The instruction is where notice takes effect, because jurors take no part in the steps that lead to it. The court decides whether a fact qualifies, and the argument against notice goes to the judge alone.2 In a jury trial, the jurors learn that notice has been taken only from an instruction that says so and explains what it means. In a nonjury trial, the judge needs no instruction and takes notice merely by announcing or ruling, perhaps without using the words “judicial notice” at all.3 Rule 201 reaches the bench trial as well, since notice of an adjudicative fact may be taken where the court makes the factual determination.4
Rule 201(d) allows notice at any stage of the proceeding and draws no line between civil and criminal cases. The instruction is where the line appears.5
The two instructions rest on different reasons. A fact that is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction, or that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, leaves a civil jury nothing legitimate to weigh.6 A criminal jury stands differently, because Congress meant to preserve the jury’s traditional prerogative to ignore even uncontroverted facts.7 The label a court gives the fact also matters. Rule 201 deals solely with adjudicative facts,8 and the restrictions it imposes on notice of those facts are in many ways like the restrictions courts impose on notice of legislative facts. The major exception is the criminal jury instruction, which one casebook calls “wishy-washy.”9
Civil Cases: Conclusive Notice
In a civil case, Rule 201(f) provides that the court “must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”10 The word “must” leaves the judge no discretion over the instruction, and the word “conclusive” leaves the jury no freedom to weigh the fact against anything else in the case. Once the court notices a qualifying fact, the jurors treat it as established, whatever a witness has said about it.11
The reason lies in what a jury is for. Jurors resolve questions that reasonable people could answer either way, and Rule 201(b) allows notice only of facts beyond reasonable dispute: facts generally known in the territory or verifiable from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.12 A fact that clears that bar leaves the jury nothing to decide, and a binding instruction therefore makes good sense.13 The strict standard and the conclusive instruction work as a package, because the first earns the second.
The same logic keeps contrary evidence from the jury. Once a civil court has noticed an adjudicative fact, evidence against it does not go to the jurors.14 It would accomplish nothing, since they must accept the fact whatever the evidence shows. A civil jury told that a street lies in a residential neighborhood must hold that it does, even though a defense witness testified otherwise.15
An opponent who thinks the court is wrong is protected before the instruction, not after it. Because notice can foreclose the jury’s decision on an issue entirely or in part, the chance to argue against it matters, and the evidence bearing on the question goes to the judge, who decides it.16 On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes notice before notifying the party, the party is still entitled, on request, to be heard.17 A court persuaded by the objection should withdraw the instruction.18 The hearing before the judge is the opponent’s remedy; rebuttal evidence offered to the jurors is not.
In practice, a request for notice should rarely arise in civil litigation between evenly matched, competent counsel. A matter that is generally known or readily determined is usually the subject of a stipulation or a request to admit, and if counsel refuses to admit it, a motion in limine asking the court to take notice remains available.19
The usual test question supplies a civil jury, a noticed fact, and a witness who contradicts it. The jury is told to accept the fact as conclusive, and the contradiction does not enter the deliberations.
Criminal Cases: Nonbinding Notice
Rule 201(f) gives a criminal jury a different instruction: the court must tell the jurors that they “may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”22 The court still must give an instruction, because jurors who heard no evidence on the point have to learn that notice has been taken and what it means.23 Notice still excuses the prosecution from offering proof, but it cannot end the jury’s inquiry. The noticed fact reaches the jurors as one they may accept, and the decision remains theirs, which reverses the civil rule that makes the fact settled.
Congress made that choice deliberately. The Supreme Court’s version of the rule would have required acceptance of noticed facts in criminal cases as well, and Congress found that it violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional right to a jury trial by effectively permitting a partial directed verdict on facts in a criminal case.24 Reading that history in United States v. Jones, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Congress meant to preserve the jury’s traditional prerogative to ignore even uncontroverted facts.25 The same concern explains why a binding instruction is unavailable in criminal cases for constitutional reasons.26
The phrase “partial directed verdict” carries the argument. A directed verdict takes a question from the jury because only one outcome is rational. A conclusive instruction on a noticed element would do a piece of that work: the jury would still deliberate, but a finding needed for conviction would already have been made by the judge. The policy of requiring the jury to find each factual element of a crime, which may even be a constitutional requirement, explains Congress’s refusal.27 Nothing comparable stands in the way of a binding instruction in a civil case, which is why the civil rule differs.28
The defendant in State v. Lawrence was prosecuted for grand larceny after the alleged theft in 1950 of a 1947 Ford sedan, and the trial judge told the jury to take the car’s value as exceeding $50, the amount that separates grand from petty larceny.29 The jury convicted, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the instruction improperly took from the jury its power to “make findings which are not based on logic, nor even common sense.”30 Almost no one would doubt that a car of that vintage was worth more than $50, yet its value fixed the grade of the offense. Under Rule 201(f), a court could still notice the value, but it could tell the jury only that it may treat the value as proved and remains free to find otherwise, so a petty-larceny verdict stays possible.
The instruction approved in Bello shows what compliance looks like. The trial judge told the jurors that, although no evidence had been introduced in their presence, the court believed the detention center lay within land reserved for the use of the United States, that the point was of such common knowledge and so readily determined that it could not reasonably be disputed, and that the jurors might therefore reasonably treat it as proven. The judge added that the final decision belonged to the jury and that the jurors were not required to agree with the court, and the First Circuit held that the instruction complied with the rule.31
The nonbinding instruction also changes what the opponent may offer. In a civil case, contrary evidence does not reach the jury once the fact is noticed, but Rule 201(f) apparently contemplates that contrary evidence is admissible in a criminal case, and evidence supporting the noticed fact may come in as well.32 A jury may then hear the court call a fact beyond reasonable dispute and hear testimony disputing it in the same trial. A prosecutor who expects the defense to contest the fact is better off proving it in the ordinary way.
Critics find the arrangement illogical. The instruction operates only on facts that allow no reasonable dispute, yet it expressly invites the jury to dispute them.33 One commentator objected that the court must tell a jury it need not accept that travel from Newark to New York crosses a state line, so that “in the morning when the judge tries a civil case the world is round. That afternoon when he tries a criminal case the world is flat.”34 Defenders answer with the policy of requiring the jury to find each factual element of a crime.35 A careful exam answer gives the rule from its text and history, names Congress’s concern for the jury-trial right as the reason, and says only that the underlying policy may even be constitutionally required.
Notice After Verdict or on Appeal
The nonbinding instruction has a consequence for timing that the rule never states outright. A criminal jury can use the freedom the instruction gives it only while it is still deliberating, so notice taken after the verdict, or for the first time on appeal, reaches no one who can accept or reject the fact. That consequence collides with Rule 201(d), which permits notice at any stage of the proceeding and draws no line between civil and criminal cases.38 In a criminal jury trial, the instruction prevails.39
United States v. Jones supplies the leading example. The defendant was charged with illegally intercepting his estranged wife’s telephone conversations, and a jury convicted him on three of five counts. The statute required proof that the telephone company was a common carrier providing facilities for interstate or foreign communications, and the government offered no proof about South Central Bell, so the district judge granted a judgment of acquittal.40 On appeal the government asked the Sixth Circuit to notice the company’s status, though it had never asked the trial court to do so, and it relied on the rule allowing notice at any stage. The court acknowledged that the language of that rule does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases, and it still affirmed the acquittal.41
The court’s reasoning ran from the instruction to the timing. Rule 201(f) “plainly contemplates that the jury in a criminal case shall pass upon facts which are judicially noticed.” A jury cannot do that when the fact is first noticed after it has been discharged and the case is on appeal, so the general authorization of appellate notice “must yield in the face of the express congressional intent” for criminal jury trials.42 Reports of Jones letter these provisions differently, some calling the instruction provision Rule 201(g) and the timing provision Rule 201(f); this chapter uses the current letters, (f) for the instruction and (d) for timing.43
The burden falls on the prosecutor. A fact the government neither proved nor asked the trial court to notice leaves the record without evidence on that element, and an appellate court in a jury case cannot fill the gap afterward. Because retrial is often barred by double jeopardy when the first trial’s evidence was insufficient to establish guilt, the omission can produce a permanent acquittal on a point nobody seriously disputes.44 Jones is not isolated. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dior refused to notice after trial that $13,690 in Canadian currency was worth $5,000 or more in United States currency, and decisions of the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Bliss and the Third Circuit in United States v. Thomas are consistent with Jones.45
The limit belongs to criminal jury trials, and a civil appeal shows why. An appellate court in a civil case can take notice to the same extent as a trial court, including on its own initiative of facts not noticed below.46 Nothing is lost when it does, because a civil jury would have been told to accept the noticed fact as conclusive.47 The treatises put the criminal limit more cautiously, calling it doubtful that notice can be taken on appeal in a criminal case tried to a jury.48
Courts that find the Jones result harsh have looked for a way around it, and the route runs through classification. Rule 201 governs only adjudicative facts, so a court that labels the missing fact legislative takes it outside the instruction requirement. It also escapes the strict standard, since the standard for legislative facts is apparently only one of probability.49 In United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, the Second Circuit held that a district court may decide that a federal penitentiary lies within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States without submitting the issue to the jury, treating geographic and jurisdictional matters as legislative facts.50 The device has not always worked, and critics regard it as sleight-of-hand to avoid the anomalous acquittals the rule would otherwise produce.51
The cure for the prosecutor lies at trial. A prosecutor who asks the court to notice the fact while the jury can still receive the instruction gets the permissive instruction, the jury may accept the fact, and the gap in the proof closes. The usual exam error is to reason that Rule 201(d) allows notice at any stage and that the court of appeals can therefore repair the omission. That answer is right for a civil appeal and wrong for a criminal jury verdict.52